The presentation of emotions in Euripidean tragedy.

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THE PRESENTATION OF EMOTIONS IN EURIPIDEAN TRAGEDY

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Abstract

The introductory part of the thesis deals with differences and similarities in attitudes and beliefs about emotion between our world and that of ancient Greece. A brief overview of emotional portrayal in earlier literature, as well as comedy, highlights the methods of presentation employed in tragedy and the extent to which they may be conventionally determined. Topics such as the terminology of emotions, the stylized activity which accompanies them, and categorization of the emotional range of tragedy conclude this section.

The central chapters analyse emotions of madness and love as portrayed in the tragedies of Euripides. The section on Madness consists of a brief introduction to conceptions of madness in popular and medical opinion and earlier literature, and discussion of its representation in tragedy. A symptomatology of madness is established and its use by Euripides in *Herakles*, *Orestes*, and *Bacchai* is examined. The presentation of the protagonists' emotional experiences contributing to, causing, or following their madness is closely analysed. The section ends with discussion of the means used to differentiate kinds of madness, with particular reference to the perspectives offered by recent research into the psychology of emotions.

The section on Love is introduced with a summary of the notions of love in the modern and ancient world and how these are influenced by social conventions. *Alkestis*, *Medea*, and *Hippolytos* are used for the analysis

of the portrayal of emotions related with love between the sexes, and negative feelings often derived from it, while the last play also illustrates the negative portrayal of love as madness. The social, as well as tragic conventions, and their influence on modern interpretations are discussed, before turning to scenes describing family bonds, relations and obligations.

Concluding discussions raise questions about the relation between naturalness, realism and conventions in Euripidean tragedy and suggest that the ambiguity of Euripides' material acts as a means of supporting the real-life quality of the presentation.

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GORRIGENDA

1. On page 82, l. 8 : for "springs" read "causes to spring".

2. On page 294 : for "Covacs" read "Kovacs".

INTRODUCTION

i. Prolegomena

There has recently been a marked new interest in the emotions in the criticism of Greek tragedy. Although theories about emotion, and investigations into its nature have been one of the main preoccupations of our century, it is not until recently that the issue found its way into discussions of Greek tragedy. This century is now drawing to a close, and it is only in retrospect that we can speculate as to why such an important question was denied its deserved attention from scholars.

On a general level, one possible reason that could be suggested is that, until not long ago, the subject of human emotions was, and in many ways probably still is, something of a taboo. Describing, judging, or assessing emotions is an exercise that requires, among other things, the ability to appraise them. This ability is itself gained, to a large degree, from experiences of the "personal dimension".[1] And deep inhibitions have always existed, especially in northern parts of the world, imposing an instinctive avoidance of anything emotional. That is why discussions which could reveal, even if indirectly, how one felt, were never as popular as expositions of what one thought or believed.

Coming back, more particularly, to the realm of tragedy, a different reason could be put forward for the decline in interest regarding an issue which had been important to ancient critics. Judging from the privileged treatment that Aristotle's undeniably important theory of katharsis has enjoyed, it would not be unreasonable to assume that it contributed to a confusion regarding the general issue of emotions. Concentrating on the "tragic emotions" of pity and fear as essential for achieving katharsis seems to have brought about a diversion of the

issue into fields of discussions regarding the 'proper' nature of tragedy. The list of, and concern about, "tragic emotions" were kept limited; either restrictively to the audience's response of pity and fear, or, at best, to those emotions that function in bringing these particular two about.[2]

Yet another assumption would suggest that the earlier relevant psychological theories (i.e. Freud and psychoanalysis), proved favourable with very few scholars, because of their abstract/unscientific nature. On the other hand, despite their general popularity and appeal, they were hardly applicable in the case of Greek tragedy, where we deal with 'characters', not real persons we could 'put on the couch'. Moreover, background information on either the characters or their environment is too limited to allow extensive psychologising.

In contrast with psychoanalysis, clinical psychology, on which this research has relied for guidance, is based entirely on scientific research. This provides a form of guarantee against unsafe assumptions and suppositions. Clinical psychology has managed to make progress in the understanding of human emotions because as a process it relies on observable and provable facts. Emotions are stripped of any subjectivity and turned into an observable object.

Emotions, then, "are not only lived and experienced, they are also observed."[3] As the readers/audience of Greek tragedy we are in fact meant to observe emotions. Such observation is detached, in the sense that it is not directly involved. This lack of direct involvement is based on two important factors. First, we are observing emotions outside ourselves, i.e. experienced by somebody else. Secondly, not only are these 'other people', who are experiencing the emotions, complete strangers to us, but,

moreover and most significantly, they are not 'real'. The only relation they bear to real life is the fact that their creator was a real person, who used human beings as his models. This 'un-real' quality that tragic characters possess is often manifest in their distinct unlikeness to observable human beings, while their limited relation to real life is further qualified by the fact that the tragedian's models are human beings in an abstract, general sense, rather than particular individuals.

Nevertheless, it should here be stressed that, while this observation is in a sense detached, its detachment is, clearly, not of the same nature as the one practised by an investigating psychologist. As the audience of Greek tragedy we are also meant to experience emotions. It is in fact the observation of the emotions presented in the plays that provokes in us certain responses, which are, if not in their majority, at least for a substantial part, emotional. These responses constitute an involvement which inevitably interferes with a complete detachment.

One of the purposes of this research is to attempt an assessment of the effect and significance of emotions presented **within** the tragedies.[4] This would not be possible without a close and careful examination of the presentation of such emotions. Therefore, it is essential to approach these emotions from the standpoint of the observer. In real life there are three major levels for observing and measuring emotional states[5] : i. The physiological level. ii. The self-report level, and iii. The overt-behavioural level.

J. D. Weinrich[6] points out that any definition of emotion can only be reached as the conclusion of an investigation, a summary, rather than a prediction of results. His suggested method for achieving this is as follows :

(a) "Find the set of physiological indicators of the emotion."
(b) "Do a validity study showing that the subject's introspections correlate with these indicators."
(c) "Argue that these indicators reliably reveal the feeling of the emotion and then enshrine these physiological indicators as the definition of the expression of emotion."

Any evidence, however, regarding a person's emotion that we would obtain in real life from observing their behaviour, comes for us in tragedy only from one source, the author. I must explicitly draw attention here to an important implication of this fact. What it essentially means is that the evidence we are presented with in a play is the result of a process of selection which the dramatist has chosen and already applied to the mass of whatever his own information consisted of. Two important questions arise out of this. First, from where did the dramatist draw his evidence? And, secondly, what was his chosen process of selection? In other words, which method did he adopt for portraying an emotion? Since this question is clearly central to the investigation of the presentation of emotions, it is essential that any indications or suggestions as to what the answer might be are here carefully scrutinized.

Because of the nature of his medium, the dramatist has limited and specific means at his disposal to convey the expression of a character's emotion to us. These are :
(1) The character's own literal reports of their feelings.
(2) The activity that accompanies or stands for such expression.
(3) The reporting of the character's emotion literally by other characters in the play; and finally,
(4) The description of the character's emotional activity, again by other characters.

It is of course immediately obvious that (1) here is identical with the "subject's introspections" mentioned above in Weinrich's model, and clearly belongs to the self-report level. However, since direct interaction with the subject of the emotion is not of course possible, we have to rely on (3), which I shall call "the indirect report level", as a kind of substitute not needed in real life. Moreover, as the observation of behaviour in tragedy is in a sense indirect (i.e. via the author's presentation), the overt-behavioural level of the character reaches the audience as determined by the author, either with the use of (2) or (4), or indeed a combination of the two. Here there is a further problem. Since we unfortunately cannot be "the audience", but merely the readers of Greek tragedy, (2) is for us substantially lost. Inevitably, we are limited to (4) and whatever indications there might be in it for (2). Finally, because of this limitation, the overt-behavioural level of observation has to be either deduced from, or totally replaced by, the character's physiological response, i.e. the symptoms of the emotion as reported to us (4), rather than as would have been observed by "the audience" (2).

Since the levels used by psychologists to observe emotion do seem to correspond with the levels operating in the dramatist's means for presenting emotions, a suggestion here that the dramatist might have indeed followed a method similar to Weinrich's to form his presentation would not, I hope, seem altogether implausible.[7] Therefore, making the assumption that this suggestion might well represent the actual case, I will be examining the presentation of emotions in the plays under the guidance of Weinrich's model, bearing of course in mind the modifications discussed above. To sum up, then, assuming that the dramatist's source of information was his observation of emotions in real life, I will be examining what, if any, physiological indicators

of an emotion he presents in a text, as well as any evidence correlating to the emotion from both the direct (i.e. "self") and indirect report level. If indeed physiological indicators are used to reveal the feeling of an emotion, this will, I believe, confirm both of the assumptions involved in my argument. That is, first, that the dramatist's portrayal of a character's emotion is indeed formed by using physiological indicators of its feeling and further supported by correlating information;[8] second, that the portrayal's source of information was close observation of real life.

Independently of Weinrich's model, two further reasons support the decision to give, in the order of investigation, priority to information from the physiological level : (a) The factor of reliability, and (b) its primary importance.

(a) There are several reasons for which information from the report level cannot be considered by itself as adequate evidence for assessing an emotion. When people interpret their emotions, their reports are subject to distortions such as levelling, sharpening, repression, etc. In such cases, what we are led to assume might be mistaken; in other words, the reports are not reliable.[9] When characters in tragedy report or interpret their emotions, however, such provisoes of emotional deception are neither frequent, nor, when they do occur, are they subtle. When the characters' exposition of an emotion is not an honest or straightforward report or interpretation of the feelings they are actually experiencing, this is always made explicit by the dramatist,[10] for the conditions of Greek tragedy are such that do not allow the audience to judge emotional deception for themselves. Facial expression, which might indicate the discrepancy in real life, is covered by a mask; intimate knowledge of the character, which might suggest otherwise, the audience does not possess.

(b) I shall turn now to discuss the second reason for giving priority to physiological information regarding an emotion in the text. Its paramount importance is attested by the attention modern psychology pays to it. In Warren's *Dictionary of Psychology* [11] the definition of emotion runs as follows : "Non-discriminating or mass activity aroused by social situations, either perceived or represented by ideas, i.e. total response of an organism in which ***a large proportion is made up of visceral and somatic elements*** ."
P. T. Young[12] defines emotion as an acute affective disturbance of the individual, psychological in origin, involving behaviour, conscious experience and ***visceral functioning*** .

The two definitions may differ in many respects, but I have marked in italics their most essential shared element, the emphasis on physiological indicators. As C. E. Izard[13] argues, for a complete definition of emotion we must take into account :
(a) the expression of conscious feelings of emotion.
(b) the processes that occur in the brain and the nervous system.
(c) the observable expressive patterns of emotion.

Every day life experiences unfailingly reveal how much of a problem emotion is as a psychological concept. Naming and describing extreme emotions presents no difficulty. Based on subjective experiences, emotions like anger or fear can be recognised almost unreflectively. This same process, however, does not prove as simple and straightforward if the attempt is to define emotions with less marked or prominent distinctions. It is not on rare occasions that people find themselves short of words to express emotions that they quite distinctly feel.[14] This distinct gap between what may be felt and how limited the ability is to express it, indicates that emotional capability is larger than

perceptive knowledge. In other words, "we feel more than we know", and the reason for this is that all the necessary words have not, as yet, been developed to name feelings.[15] It is almost self-evident that there exist many more emotions than just the ones we have given names to so far. A good illustration for this is the fact that each individual culture has its own particular words for certain emotions that may well not even have been identified in another. We frequently come across words, related to cultural/emotional experiences, that remain impossible to translate from one language to another.[16] It is unlikely that any language, however 'advanced', has a full range of names for all possible emotions. Therefore, as part of my assessment of the method of emotional presentation, I shall try to see whether it reflects any awareness of this human inability to express emotion.

Despite such significant problems, however, most people still believe, - and in most cases correctly -, that they can communicate their emotions. This belief is not entirely without substance. It is founded on the assumption that other people must have experienced, at some stage, under similar circumstances, a similar emotion. It is precisely on this basic assumption that emotion as a psychological process relies. It attempts to group together behaviours with noticeable common characteristics, the most important of which is, as has already been seen, the physiology of the feeling. More often than not, the communication of emotion is successful because it is accompanied, or indeed solely expressed, by expressions of emotion other than verbal. Significantly enough, such expressions (e.g. facial expression, changes in the sound of one's voice, gestures etc) are recognisable across all studied cultures. Emotions, then, are best identified by the pattern of symptoms which accompany them. Despite the fact that the pattern may be of varied intensity, the core of the

emotion is always similar for each one of us. This core of the emotions is in fact the sole means we possess for **recognising** emotions in a human being.

It is safe and reasonable to assume that this means of basic emotional recognition has always been valid in all human cultures, and therefore for the Greeks too. Nevertheless, understanding an emotion means being able to assess its subject's state not only in terms of our own experiences and ways of expression, but also in theirs. Therefore, in order to effect a better understanding of the emotions in Greek tragedy, there is a need to be aware not only of how we view and express emotions but also of how the ancient Greeks did.

ii. Views on Emotion

What does the word 'emotion' convey today? The question could be answered with numerous different definitions, all based on personal experience and expressed in subjective terms. The best way to avoid confusion, and be as precise and factual as possible, is to turn to psychology for help in defining and describing emotion. This problem, encountered in our contemporary world, becomes even worse when trying to provide an account of the way emotions were viewed in ancient Greece. Evidence is indirect, scattered over the literature we have surviving, and indeed very scarce. The most helpful and informative account we can turn to seems to be that of Aristotle,[17] who is the first to offer a thorough and comprehensive treatment of the emotions. One may of course be tempted to ask whether and how such 'specialized' information might be relevant to the beliefs of average people of that age. It seems to me to be relevant and useful, in the same way and for the same reason that psychological evidence is in illustrating modern day beliefs and attitudes. Ordinary people's

beliefs and attitudes serve as the trigger and basis for developing elaborate theories, which rely for their credibility or verisimilitude on the way they reflect or try to make sense of such beliefs.

Aristotle, whose views about emotions present, as will be seen, interesting similarities with modern psychology, relies, for the "casual" definition of an emotion, on ordinary people's notions of it [cf. *Nic. Ethics,* 1115^{a}9]. The "casual" definition, however, is only one part of the "final" one. Equally important to him in a definition are the "material" causes, in other words the physiology of an emotion. For example, in the case of anger, the surging of blood and the heat around the heart [*On the Soul* 403a25-b2]. Here Aristotle speaks of the intimate connection between emotions and the body; they are of the soul but cannot exist apart from the body. It has already been seen that the physiology of emotion enjoys equal importance in modern psychology, which regards the bodily disturbances of an emotional response as one of the main characteristics of an emotion.

Ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη, δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία. δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία· λέγω δ' οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς, πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἕν ἢ τὰ δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἄν εἴη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. [*Rhet.* II. 1378^{a} 8].

Aristotle's above definition yields three points of great importance. For him : **(a)** Emotions are caused by certain stimuli, real or imagined (see also his definition of fear [*Rhet.* II. 1382^{a}1]). For their complete definition

we need to know their stimulus, as well as their subject's disposition and situation or environment.
(b) Emotions have objects and aims and are accompanied by pain or pleasure, and
(c) Emotions affect our judgement.

(a) It is often the case that a person responding to an emotion may well not be aware of it, or, indeed, its conventional name. In the same way, it is by no means necessary that an emotional response is accompanied by direct awareness of its situational stimulus. Nevertheless, however obscure, unconscious or imaginary, the stimulus always exists, for emotions do not occur at random. Aristotle specifies that for a complete definition of an emotion it is essential to know its stimulus as well as the situation/environment of the person experiencing it. The same postulation is still valid for psychologists today, who believe emotions to be "aroused by social situations" [cf. Warren's Dictionary definition above]. Experienced by individuals, emotions are, of course, "psychological in origin" [cf. Young above], but remain responses to social stimuli. For a complete assessment psychology does not only examine the individuals in question, but also refers to their social environment as instigator of their emotions. This latter is termed the "situational" factor, while the name "dispositional" is given to the psychological structure of the individuals (i.e. their beliefs, personality, etc.).

Aristotle observes that certain categories of people are more prone to anger and more easily excited. Season, time, place, age, and state of mind, are some of the factors which can influence people and render them more susceptible to emotions [*Rhet.* II. 1379^{a} 10-12]. Psychologists' agreement with Aristotle extends to this; the sex, age, or state of mind of the subject, are some of the factors seen as determining the intensity of an emotion, or the degree to, and ease with which it is

revealed. Some individuals abandon themselves to emotion, others strive to restrain it.[18]

(b) In modern psychological terms an emotion could be defined as a non-practical relationship with an object, since it is a perception about the object that acts as the stimulus of the emotion. Whether, however, this perception will actually become an emotion or remain a cold perception depends on how it will be appraised. Appraisal is the way our cognitive system interprets the stimulus; as pleasurable or painful, profitable, gainful, damaging etc.. In other words, it assesses the effect the perception has on our relationship with the object, and if it is affecting us, then it turns into an emotion. Aristotle was perhaps the first to point out the role of cognition in the perception > appraisal > emotion process. For him, the appraisal served as the "efficient cause" of emotional response rather than just one of its features. For example, in his definition of anger [*Rhet.* II. 1378^{a} 9], outrage is treated as the efficient cause. The thought of outrage is not simply one of the features of anger, it is seen as what originates anger in us.

Emotions for Aristotle have aims as well as objects. For example, anger is defined in *Rhetoric* [II 1378^{a} 9] as a desire (ὄρεξις) for revenge, accompanied by pain as well as a certain pleasure which arises from the hope of revenge to come. His mention of the "final" causes (e.g. the desire for revenge), the aim/goal of an emotion, can be taken to correspond to our general notion of "motives" - (although motive, in its psychological use does not only mean the conscious action that is aimed/desired as a result of the emotion, but also the involuntary urge to act that we experience with an emotion. For the specific example of anger, it would be the urge to hit, strike). Aristotle seems to be talking in terms of "goal-directed behaviour". Understanding goal-directed behaviour is clearly a helpful step towards distinguishing between

those emotions which are tied to actions and those which are not. Although it is not very clear whether Aristotle was aware that not all emotions call for conscious action, his thorough definitions of shame [1383^{b}1-1385^{a}1], or indignation [1386^{b}1-1387^{b}16] include no mention of aim/goal.

(c) I shall turn now to the last point from Aristotle's definition, the fact that *emotions affect our judgement*. Although normally the motives of our actions are derived from an appraisal that can be the result of intuition as well as reflection, there occur instances when the intuitive side dominates. In such cases we find it difficult to account for our actions, we are at a loss as to what explanation there might be for our behaviour. Expressions like "I do not know what made me do this", or "I was not myself", "I was out of my mind" are very common in every language and imply that the action was in fact an unconscious reaction to something we have felt. Such expressions provide ample evidence that emotional states are in fact altered states of consciousness.

This term of "an altered state of consciousness" provides a clue for the explanation of what lies behind ancient beliefs about external interference in explaining emotional behaviour. Emotions were primarily thought by the Greeks to be caused by a supernatural agency [cf. *Od.* ix 381], like all other forms of disturbance (ξυμφορά θεήλατος [*Or.* 2]; shot as arrows by gods : disease [*Il.* i 9f.], pain [Pind. *Pyth.* iii 9f.]).

The Homeric belief that the source of thoughts and feelings was not in man himself, as well as the description of their experience in various different parts of a man [*Od.* i 320-4;*Il.* xvii 569-74], seems to have attributed to the forming of the rather popular theory that there is in Homer no unified concept of what we

might today call "personality". Perhaps the most prominent proponent of this idea that the Homeric man lacked the sense of a single identity, Bruno Snell,[19] sees the notion of the self (represented by the term psyche), as something that did not emerge until individualism began to arise, during the archaic and early classical periods.[20]

For such a conclusion, however, one has to rely on the assumption that a "person" can indeed be identified with a specific material part of himself in which all his emotions and mental processes occur. Although this assumption has never been proven, to the majority of people it appears as self-evidently true, despite the well-known difficulties any "person" actually has in controlling, if at all, such functions. The lack of name for the notion of the "self", or "personality", hardly necessitates the conclusion that such concepts were absent in Homeric times. After all, something similar operates in Homer's vocabulary regarding the body. No name exists for the living body as such in its entity, but of various different parts of it. In the same - functional - manner, what might well be perceived as one single entity can also be described, in modern psychological terms as "a complex apparatus", or, in more literary language as "a battleground". In fact, while none of the three terms can be absolutely proven as correct, they are all true in terms of human experience.

Homer's vocabulary seems to emphasize that man is not insular to external forces and influences, which have always been experienced and debated in those parts of the self that the Greeks regarded as the seats of emotions : φρήν, καρδία, ψυχή, etc.. The same, virtually, areas on which psychologists today concentrate in researching the physiological changes of emotion, of which one of the most obvious is depth or frequency of breathing. Breath in Homer is θυμός, but

seems to have both a physical as well as a more abstract meaning of consciousness, perception, or emotion, in the same way we may nowadays speak of "a breath of (emotional) inspiration". Θυμός is what one feels with but is nevertheless not an organ, - at least not as we understand the word today. Θυμός is the very essence of the living self, the "stuff of consciousness",[21] yet it is neither the soul nor part of it. This undefinable nature of θυμός is best illustrated in the ambiguous Homeric adjective θυμοφθόρος, which can mean "life-destructive" [*Od.* ii 329] - (death itself is θυμορα·ι·στής [*Il.* xiii 544]) -, or "heart-breaking" [*Od.* iv 716], or could perhaps mean both [*Il.* vi 167-70].

Θυμός can converse [*Il.* xvii 97 διελέξατο] with a man and urge him. Still, it is not a function either, for this urging is felt more as an independent - what we would call "inner" - voice than a part of the man. Confusingly enough, this urging can affect θυμός itself directly or its seats, which can be a man's κῆρ/καρδίη, or, more usually, his φρένες, which are considered to be situated in or near the chest, somewhere between the heart and liver [cf. *Od.* ix 301/*Il.* xvi, 480f.]. Φρένες provide a location for almost the entire range of psychological activities, which are nevertheless not clearly distinguished. Words and thoughts seem to be the same thing in Homer, received or produced by the φρένες as living entities, winged when spoken, unwinged when not [*Od.* xvii 57]. Similarly, emotions are living entities too, one with words and thoughts, present in the same organs [cf. *Od.* xix 516f.] - (and may also have wings too? [cf. Theognis 729]). In Homer there is no separate mental and emotional functioning; they are one and the same thing.

The φρένες in tragedy are, as in Homer [*Il.* i 362, iii 139, 442, xi 89, xix 125, xxii 43, xxiv 514], affected by emotions [*Sept.* 967/*Ion* 766-8/S. *El.* 147]. Homer, as

well as early physiological theories, seem to associate them with the lungs that contain breath, i.e. θυμός,[22] and the lungs are often regarded in tragedy as the seat of life [*Ch.* 639/*Ion* 524]. In later tradition φρένες were regarded as wet when emotional. Archilochus [fr. 9, 4f.] speaks of lungs as watery with pain, while in tragedy all the organs considered as seats of emotion can melt and produce liquid when affected with grief or any other painful emotion [*Ag.* 179f./*Hek.* 433f.]. In Homer a man may melt his θυμός [*Od.* xix 263f.], or indeed feed on it [*Od.* x 378f.].

Θυμός is the essence of life and is therefore destructible. On the contary, ψυχή is not detroyed at death but flies out of the dead man to become an εἴδωλον in Hades [*Od.* xi 219-22]. Ψυχή is never portrayed as a thinking, feeling, reflecting, or deciding part of the person, and in Hades it is a shadow with no substance. It cannot in itself speak, think or feel. The implication is that, although it preserves these functions after death, it is neither their agency nor their faculty, but only a carrier of them. It cannot properly exist, i.e. function, unless it drinks from the blood to acquire, somehow, material substance. This rather literal sense of "immaterial" is suggestive of what develops to be, in a more abstract sense, the immaterial principle of life. From the 6th century onwards, ψυχή is the body's vital principle [cf. Anaximenes], present in all forms of life, not only in human beings as it is in Homer. As the mental correlate of σῶμα, it is used in association or in contrast with it to represent the self. Nevertheless, it confusedly also takes up the appetitive functions of the Homeric θυμός, and this results in its association with the emotional self, as we find ψυχή in tragedy. It is, in fact, only in Plato that it seems to represent the rational self.

Both its progressive development, and not less the confusion, are reflected in this text : "τὴν δ' ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν διηιρῆσθαι τριχῆι, εἴς τε νοῦν καὶ φρένας καὶ θυμόν· νοῦν μὲν οὖν καὶ θυμὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώιοις, φρένας δὲ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώπωι· εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ καρδίας μέχρι ἐγκεφάλου, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῆι καρδίαι μέρος αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν θυμόν, φρένας δὲ καὶ νοῦν τὰ ἐν τῶι ἐγκεφάλωι ... καὶ τὸ μὲν φρόνιμον ἀθάνατον, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ θνητά."[23] Here ψυχή is the essential principle of life that defines the self, but is divided in parts. Its appropriation of φρένες and θυμός, each representing a part of it, is suggestive of the split in the notion of the self. Emotion and intellect become two separate functions, (as they never were in Homer), that together form the self. The concentration of interest is always on the same area, from the heart to the head, as καρδία becomes gradually established as the seat of the emotional self, and νοῦς the seat of intelligence and understanding. Since ψυχή is now ascribed to both man and animal, the vital thing that gives man his humanity and spirituality, the element that turns the living being into a self, is seen to be the intellectual part of ψυχή, represented by the φρένες.

In the presocratic philosophers νοῦς takes over as the image of self-representation. In Homer it was θυμός and the divine intervention that stood for this undefinable part of the self[24] that human beings tend to objectify and relate to as if it were an external power. Whether termed soul, consciousness, mind or spirit in modern terms, the philosophers' νοῦς was conceived, like θυμός, as neither an organ nor a function. On the contrary, in the *Hippokratic Writings* the crucial role of mental as well as emotional activity is taken over by the brain, as a material, and indeed formidable organ : Εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἐξ οὐδενός ἡμῖν αἱ ἡδοναὶ γίνονται καὶ εὐφροσύναι καὶ

γέλωτες καὶ δυσφροσύναι καὶ κλαυθμοί. καὶ τούτωι φρονέομεν μάλιστα καὶ βλέπομεν καὶ ἀκούομεν καὶ διαγιγνώσκομεν τά τε αἰσχρὰ καὶ καλὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ἀηδέα, τά μὲν νόμωι διακρίνοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶι συμφέροντι αἰσθανόμενοι. τῶι δὲ αὐτῶι τούτωι καὶ μαινόμεθα καὶ παραφρονέομεν, καὶ δείματα καὶ φόβοι παρίστανται ἡμῖν, τὰ μὲν νύκτωρ, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέρην, καὶ ἀγρυπνίαι καὶ πλάνοι ἄκαιροι, καὶ φροντίδες οὐχ ἱκνεύμεναι, καὶ ἀγνωσίαι τῶν καθεστώτων καὶ ἀηθίαι. καὶ ταῦτα πάσχομεν ἀπό τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πάντα, ... [*Sacr. Dis.* xvii].

In Homer emotions are often expressed by the use of such terms as νόος, οἶδα, or φρονεῖν, which are also used indiscriminately for all psychic activity [*Od.* i 428f., iii 277, xiii 405].[25] In later Greek, and through to our times, as the notion of the self becomes dependent on its association with a consciousness that comes from knowing and is linked with mental activity and νοῦς [cf. Ar. *Nic. Eth.* 10. 7 1177b33-78a3/Plut. *De Facie Lunae* 945a], the transformation limits the use of such terms purely for cognition.

This step marks the most significant change in the experience of emotion between the Homeric man and later Greeks, as well as modern man. The moment mental and emotional activity cease to be inextricably connected a tremendous detachment is effected. In Homer thought is one with feeling, which is accompanied with the urge to act [cf. *Il.* xxiv 197ff.], while for us, as well as for the classical Athenian, emotion remains motivating, but intellect and emotion are irreparably separated. They may influence each other, but they are regarded as independent activities. A remarkable change in the way emotions were regarded is brought about as the result of this detachment. The new, negative

attitude created, which would reach its peak in classical times and perservere to modern day, seems to me to be the consequence of this split of emotion from intellect, and I shall try to explain why.

The separation of the two creates an independent part of the self that can externally and objectively, as it were, observe and judge the other.[26] Almost inevitably, this newly found ability to observe the self results in a shift of concentration on it. Lyric poetry is perhaps the most characteristic example of concentration on the emotional self, the subjective "I". Lyric poets describe their emotions by the way they affect their body and senses, in very concrete, physiological terms [Anakreon 413/Sappho 31/cf. also λυσιμελής].[27] Still in agreement with Homeric terms, emotion is very much seen as externally triggered. Nevertheless, its invasion now acquires the negative aspects of an attack, for which strong terms from Homeric warfare are borrowed [Archilochos 193, 196]. On the other hand, the effects of emotion on the mind, described in an emotionally colourless tone in Homer since the two are considered one, acquire a fearful, undesirable, and painful or even maddening quality [Ibykos 287/Anakreon 398].

What is it that effects this change? As the subjective self representative of the emotions falls under the observation of the detached intellectual self, a threat seems to be perceived, which finds expression in lyric poetry with metaphorical terms. Similar metaphorical terms may be in operation, perhaps less consciously, as the poet stands back to describe how the feeling experienced by him/her feels, not in directly personal terms, but rather by the observed effects of it on the senses [Sappho 31]. In the expression "I feel . . .", which is so rare, if at all encountered, in the lyric poets, the "I" may be seen to represent the conscious, observing intellectual self.

What is, in real terms, the threat perceived by the intellectual self? As the concentration on the self separates the individual from the group, his needs and goals are reassessed. To be αὐτάρκης, the self has to be "independent of any external needs and free from any external compulsions".[28] Emotions are a significant obstacle to this. Whatever the nature of an emotion (a desire or need for something that the self does not possess, a sorrow over something dear and lost etc.), it denotes external dependence. One of the reasons emotion is seen as attacking externally may be because its stimulus lies outside the self.

The threat is the vulnerability that emotions create for the self. The negative attitude to emotions, however, does not consist only of resentment and contempt for this obstacle to self-control and possession. Its strongest characteristic is fear.[29] The self-conscious observation of the emotional process results in a growing awareness that the responsibility for emotions lies with the individual, and not an external agency. While the person always feels the victim of whatever it is that happens **to** him, the observation of his experience gradually makes him realise that the "to" is no longer indicative of something coming from outside, caused externally. Emotion is now πάθος, still expressive of the passivity but not a god's ἄτη or the work of a daimon. Nevertheless, this realisation offers no help towards understanding the inexplicability or managing the incontrollability of emotions. Man's fear of his emotions emerges as he becomes increasingly aware of his responsibility for something he can barely control.

I feel I ought to emphasize here that this process is of course **slow** and **gradual.** The old way of interpretation proves remarkably resilient and persistent (one could even argue to present day), particularly because of

people's reluctance or inability to face up to responsibility.[30] The emotional language of tragedy is essentially the traditional one, either because of its symbolic force, or because it was still the emotional language the majority of people used. Φρένες, ψυχή, καρδία, or indeed the liver,[31] all maintain most of their Homeric connotations, and they all are seats of θυμός, which remains an important governing force of the emotions and is often recognised as the emotional self [S. *El.* 26, 286/*O. C* . 1193/*Med.* 8, 310, 879].

The one important change that has already been discussed, the use of separate terms for emotion and intellectual processes, had its effect not so much on the language of the emotion as on its presentation in tragedy. However paradoxical it may sound, there is a sense of wholeness in the Homeric person. The Homeric self is not split, while in tragedy the harmony of the self is destroyed. The major difference is that conflict, which in epic is externally imposed, is in tragedy internalised, it is a conflict with the self. This is most strongly felt in the plays of Euripides, perhaps because he is the latest of the tragedians. Indeed the connection between him and the Presocratics is often made, especially with Heraklitos [cf. 119], for they both see "man alone with his passions", [32] as a battleground of opposing forces.

The loss of the Homeric man's positive acceptance of all feeling, illustrated in the possibility for τέρψις even in painful emotions, seems irrecoverable to the present day. An ambivalence is created as emotions strongly and very physically felt and expressed become negatively viewed. This ambivalence is still existent today,[33] and I shall use a quotation from an article that appeared recently in *New Scientist* [34] to illustrate it. "We are ambivalent about our emotions. Sometimes they seem to make us think in a distorted way. To say that someone is being emotional is to be insulting. But on the

other hand, we regard emotions as important to our humanity. To be without them would be less than human. ... So the question is, do emotions impede rationality? If we were fully rational, would we need them? ... Are emotions an important part of being human?"

For Plato too emotions seem to be a characteristic of humanity, but a resented one, as it prevents man from assimilating himself to god.[35] Before Aristotle, who showed the influence of thought, belief and appraisal in provoking an emotion, and proved that our intellect, reason, has a direct bearing on emotional response, emotion was widely considered as the natural enemy of reason, a powerful inhibitor to judgement. It will suffice to remember Plato's views on feelings and poetry [*Rep.* $604^{a}10$- $^{b}4$]. He spoke with contempt of the use of emotional appeals in rhetoric [*Phaidr.* $267^{c}7$-$^{d}1$]. Indeed even philosophers after Aristotle, like the Epicureans, felt contempt for "disturbing" emotions and made ἀταραξία their ideal.[36]

Restrictions of scale prevent me from further or more thorough examination of both ancient and modern attitudes to and beliefs about emotions. I hope, however, that the essential points of similarity between them have emerged from this rather sketchy discussion. There is, nevertheless, one important difference between ancient times and now which is very influential on our understanding of Greek tragedy. It does not have its source in either the beliefs, attitudes, or expression of emotion. It lies not in what causes the emotion, i.e. the stimulus itself, but, rather in its "efficient cause", in how we appraise it. Appraisal can vary enormously, and the two most important factors that influence it are individual personal values and the morality of the society the individual belongs to. In discussions of Greek tragedy, people often become entangled with emotions they find unjustified, not easy to understand, or

"inappropriate". The question of appropriateness of emotion is just one instance where the importance of this difference surfaces. To regard an emotion as 'appropriate' we evaluate the disposition and situation of the person who is experiencing it. This process of evaluation, however, is bound to be affected not only by our sympathetic or otherwise feelings towards this person, but also by our own experiences and prejudices. Since indeed it is not "the emotions that change, it is the human situations which arouse them which change, from culture to culture and person to person",[37] it seems doubtless that we will never be able to experience tragedy in the same way as its original audience. An emotional response presupposes understanding of whatever it is that is responding to, and it is questionable whether we can grasp the full significance and implications of tragedy's events and actions the way its intended spectators did.

iii. Recreating the Experience

I now wish to turn and discuss another factor impeding our experience of tragedy's full emotional impact. This last can only occur in the immediacy that a performance effects, not with the intellectual detachment that creeps in when reading a text. Faced with the loss of all other contributory acts and factors that turned the text we have today into a living performance (music, dance, gestures, costume etc.), we cannot recreate the fullness and totality of an experience that the expressive potential of the text can only suggest.

Nevertheless, in a manner parallel to the way that the expressive potential inherent in the text is suggestive of the total experience, other contributory acts that went into creating the experience may be suggested by the text. Drama is not confined to words for its making. Nevertheless it still makes use of them, even if as one part amongst many, for the two important functions for which literature relies on language : conveying information and giving birth to feelings.

In drama words are meant to be spoken; language becomes speech, a highly developed human activity that in real life retains, at least implicitly, the "intensity of thought" and the "preparation in feeling" that the mental, emotional and bodily response from which they have resulted entails.[38] In drama, this inward activity has to be imitated as part of the act of speaking, otherwise the words would be deprived of their power to provoke an emotional response in the audience. The most obviously helpful means to achieve this is of course gestures. "Gesture is older than words, and in the actor's dramatic creation, too, it must be their herald. Anyone who starts with the words and then hunts for the appropriate

gesture to accompany them, lies to the face of art and nature both." [39]

Gestures then are a natural by-product of emotional activity, and as such the tragedians must have exploited them to emotional effect. O. Taplin believes[40] that all actions mentioned in the text must have been visibly performed, and this is perfectly plausible. Aristotle [*Rhet.* 1386[a]32] provides us with additional certainty, while at the same time hints at the importance of the contribution of other visual aspects to the emotional effect. On the other hand, his claim [*Poet.* 1450[b]18-19/1462[a]11-13] that the proper pleasure of tragedy could be experienced without performance supports M. Heath's argument[41] that : "If a point is important enough to warrant special emphasis by means of an unusual non-verbal effect, it is important enough to be made emphatic in the words as well : for the words do constitute the dominant medium of tragedy."

So there is some suggestion and guidance to be found in a close exploration of the text for reconstructing, even if partly, a performance. Exploring the text for such purposes, however, presents us with another problem. Its very shape, as well as its material, are strongly indicative of forces regulating its expressive potential. The way these forces are understood is of paramount importance to how tragedy is experienced. Whether, in fact, we understand at all these forces that determine both the shape as well as the material of Greek tragedy seems a legitimate question to ask. The inability to interpret correctly the conventions of Greek tragedy could be one of the most influential reasons for our imperfect, to say the least, understanding of it.

We are aware of at least some of these conventions. There could indeed be others we may have proved so far unable to establish as such. Discovered and named,

however, they do not necessarily become comprehensible - or indeed acceptable. Plays still often stand accused of not being "realistic", while in fact the conventions that regulate them clearly imply they were not meant to be. At least in the sense we are accustomed to give to realism, tragedy is by its very nature non-realistic; it is built essentially by conventions, not by compulsive imitation of realistic action. It could, however, be said that Greek tragedy obtained its own kind of realism by obeying the demands of the conventions that the play had to follow.

The fact that the tragedian's sole source of material was traditional myth may seem restrictive to both his choice of characters, as well as to the action he will portray. Nevertheless, it was a powerful link with his audience, helping him to communicate such information to them as shared reality does in our every day life; information which, because of limitations of dramatic nature, would otherwise be impossible to convey.

Action had to follow certain standard and stylized modes of presentation (such as the agon, messenger's speech, supplication scenes etc.). The contrast between the stylization in the presentation of the tragedian's material and the realism of it[42] emphasized the deep reality of what was presented, without provoking a real-life response from the audience.

The conventions governing the "shaping" of his text (e.g. metrical conventions, choral singing, modes of delivery such as stichomythia, lyric emotional monody followed by calm iambic exposition etc.) are perhaps amongst the most perplexing to us. The Greek audiences, however, constantly exposed to such methods of creating, must have been able to assess and appreciate them aesthetically, and probably extracted from them satisfaction when having their anticipation met, while

expectation itself must have increased the emotional impact.

Often conventions seem to us to interfere with characterization. Nevertheless, what is nowadays implied by character is not exactly what was expected in Greek tragedy,[43] where the emphasis was not on consistency of psychological traits that individualized, but rather on generic or typical behaviour that would give dramatic conviction to the action. Not all characters are of course presented as strict generically determined types, but the tendency was to create an "intelligible" character, a character that would react the way people do. This, again, lessens the need for detailing impossible within drama, and discourages decrease of audience concentration or shifting of attention by speculating.

In real life acts have motives but we are only aware either of them, their development or their results; never, at any given moment, of all three simultaneously. In the case of a play, however, the act that derives its importance from past motives is stripped of any irrelevant details that would in real life play a substantial part, so that interest remains constantly fixed on it and its completion, its consequences. For acts to be revealed in their totality, an intense concentration is needed. We never experience them as such in real life because of the length of time they take to be completed. In Greek tragedy this concentration is achieved by the convention of unity, which has been variously seen to be one of time, place, action. Unity seems, in fact, to be a kind of intense concentration of all this to reveal the link between an act's motives, completion and subsequent consequences.[44]

Conventions seem to establish a kind of relationship with the audience that could be paralleled to the one we

have with reality. They were, in a sense, their dramatic reality. At the same time, conventions render the presentation remote from reality, and this is essentially what alienates us. It should not, for conventions were indeed aimed to effect a distancing from reality. The audience should not see what is happening in a play as part of reality, for they are not meant to react to it in the way they would in real life. This regulating function of the conventions is what lies behind the notion of "Psychical Distance"[45] in modern aesthetic theory.

Distance clears our normal outlook from the reactions that would have been present if the observed experience were instead subjective, i.e. if we were going through it and it affected us. Distinguished from detachment by its admittance of degrees, Distance enables emotional response to remain personal, but dependent upon its degree. The proper effect of Distance is determined by its degree, which can be affected not only by those conditions that the play itself imposes (i.e. conventions, as has been seen, or other stylistic devices which I shall discuss below), but also by those that the audience realises from the play. This immediately indicates what our problem with conventions is. While tragedy's formal conventions are meant to create a distancing effect for its audience, in our case we, the "modern audience" suffer from an excess of Distance, largely caused by "temporal remoteness".[46]

We could perhaps get a better indication of the degree of Distance that the conventions of Greek tragedy were meant to impose by comparing it, not with real life, but with another form of drama that also uses conventions to a different effect. It could indeed be argued that tragedy and comedy can be defined by the kind of Distance they impose on their audience, or, as Taplin sees it, by "the relation of the world of the play to the world of the audience."[47] In fact they seem to define themselves in a

predominantly Athenian fashion, by polarity and opposition.[48]

While tragedy expects response to, but no participation in the emotional world of the play, comedy's audience is invited to share emotions. This invitation is always implicit in one of comedy's devices, the "violation of dramatic illusion" and is frequently made explicit through it. This violation of dramatic illusion was itself a convention rather than the 'violation' of a rule.[49] It is used to make fun out of the convention of μίμησις, sacred and inviolable in tragedy. Tragic parody, one of comedy's favourite practices, was one way of doing this. A comic character would adopt tragic posture and vocabulary and get involved in realistic action, only to suddenly break the illusion by a direct audience address and replace the tragic posture and vocabulary for common, even vulgar, behaviour and expression. This vulgarity, unacceptable in tragedy, but still unmistakably realistic, serves at least one purpose : it stresses the fact that realistic presentation was not meant to belong to tragedy's domain.

Other means (such as audience addressing, explicit references to theatrical terms or to the poet himself etc.),[50] are used to achieve the same effect, but the violation of dramatic illusion has another major function. It maintains at the foreground the audience's awareness that they are watching a play and this is perhaps the most significant way comedy has of imposing Distance. This convention of breaking, as it were, the convention, is what allows laughter at the suffering of a character, as it brings to the foreground the fact that "this is not real". It is indeed worth noting that comedy distinguishes itself from reality by breaking the conventions, while tragedy does exactly the same thing by obeying them strictly and fully. Comedy's conventions, however, are of a different nature. They

aim at achieving a kind of under-distancing. Its very subject-matter (direct criticism of people, public affairs, or explicit references to bodily functions, sexual matters) helps lower the audience's Distance.

Comedy celebrates life and invites its audience to share the ordinary pleasures and simple joy, mainly derived from feelings related to the basic human needs for food, drink, and sex. Sex itself creates life, so its connection with the impulse of life is obvious. Comedy's function is to express the lower part of human nature; Aristotle calls it φαῦλα and αἰσχρά [*Poet* . 1449a32], yet it remains the source of ordinary pleasures. What happens to the painful feelings of real life? Are they present at all? Comedy covers a scale of emotions that can be strong and very painful. Through its conventions it manages, however, to transform them. A perfect illustration of how this happens is the agon, a kind of "defence mechanism" for dealing with feelings of anger by playing them out. The word agon itself, as well as the way it is acted out, suggests a game that the audience is invited to enjoy. They know that its resulting consequences will not provoke a painful emotional response either in them or the characters. The agon is an illustration on a smaller scale of comedy's tendency to trivialize the human struggle, while the contrast of its formal construction invites comparison with tragedy's less strictly regulated agon, which nevertheless emphasizes the tragic and irreconcilable aspects of life.

The concentration of tragedy is not encountered in comedy. Changes of place, time, and action occur, and the inconsequentiality or irrelevancy rules out the feeling of determination and fatality that permeates tragedy. The defeat of the protagonist, for instance, is funny because the audience knows that by convention he will be allowed to survive.[51]

iv. The Emotional Expression of Tragedy

Tragedy's high degree of stylization is none the least present, as comparison with comedy hints, in its emotional expression. I hope that the following brief survey of what is most representative in emotional terminology in tragedy will highlight the stylizing, both in the repertory of emotions as well as in the methods used for their expression.[52] Let me begin by reminding us of the main methods, already discussed, that the tragedians use to portray emotion :

1. Emotion may be **expressed**, with literal statements by the character him/herself, or others in the play, or
2. It may be **described**, either directly by the character, or indirectly by others, as betrayed by its emotional activity.

More generally, emotion may be implied in several other manners; by epithets or imagery, with figures of speech (metaphor, simile, etc.), or by the use of certain modes of delivery such as stichomythia or antilabe. Since, however, these are means used to indicate the presence of emotion rather than to portray a specific emotion, I shall not include them in this discussion.

The most common expression of emotion in tragedy, **crying,** is indicative of an extremely wide range of emotions and essentially belongs to the second method, description of emotional activity.

ὥστ' ἐνδακρύειν γ' ὄμμασιν χαρᾶς ὕπο. *Ag.* 541

. . . , κἀπὶ συμφοραῖσί μοι
γεγηθὸς **ἔρπει** δάκρυον ὀμμάτων ἄπο.

S. *El.* 1230f.

κρύπτε· **κατ' ὄσσων δάκρυ μοι** βαίνει,
καὶ ἐπ' αἰσχύνην ὄμμα τέτραπται. *Hipp.* 245f.

. . . χλανιδίων δ' ἔσω
κρυφθείς, ὅταν μὲν σῶμα κουφισθῇ νόσου,
ἔμφρων δακρύει, . . . *Or.* 42-4

. . .· ὡς πεσοῦσ' ἀποφθαρῶ
δακρύοις καταξανθεῖσα. . . . *Tr.* 508f.
. . . , θαλερὸν
κατὰ δάκρυ χέων, . . . *I. A.* 39f.
. . .· θολοῖ δὲ καρδίαν, ἐκ δ' ὀμμάτων
πηγαὶ κατερρώγασιν· . . . *Alk.* 1067f.
. . . φοβερὰ δ' ἐμοῖσιν ὅσ-
σοις ὀμίχλα προσῆιξε πλή-
ρης δακρύων, . . . *Prom.* 144f.
κἀμοὶ κατ' ὄσσων χλωρὸν ὡρμήθη δάκρυ·
Med. 906
. . . τί χλωροῖς δακρύοις τέγγεις κόρας,
Med. 922; [cf. *Hel.* 456, 1189f.]
λείβομαι δάκρυσιν κόρας, *Andr.* 532
μή νυν ἄγαν σὸν δάκρυσιν ἐκτήξηις χρόα.
Hel. 1419
. . . , ὄμμα δ' ἐκτήξουσ' ἐμὸν
δακρύοις, . . . *Or.* 134f.

As the first two examples show, if the tears are of joy this usually is stipulated to distinguish an emotion rather rare in tragedy. Tears of shame also have to be named, as the next couple of examples shows, to specify the emotion that provoked them. The rest of the examples can be seen to reveal a variety in the degree, scale of the emotion (i.e. sadness, pain, suffering, or despair), rather than in the emotions themselves. Crying, which is perhaps one of the least controlled emotional reactions, can equally be a quiet, introvert, private way of expressing emotion, or the very opposite. This distinction seems to be achieved in tragedy by the degree of emphasis given on the activity in its description. Since the description is essential because of the convention of masking, the depth of the feeling can be regulated by the degree of elaboration in the description.

Emotions similar but stronger to those usually indicated by crying, from the higher steps of the emotional scale, are expressed by **wailing and**

moaning (that can indeed be regarded as stronger versions of crying), but also by **tearing of clothes and hair**, or more generally **by abusing one's body** :

ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων ἐπ' ἀμήχανον
ἄλγος ἀεὶ στενάχουσα διόλλυσαι, S. *El.* 140f.
αἴλινον αἴλινον
οὐδ' οἰκτρᾶς γόον ὄρνιθος ἀηδοῦς
σχήσει δύσμορος, ἀλλ' ὀξυτόνους μὲν ὠιδὰς
θρηνήσει, χερόπληκτοι δ'
ἐν στέρνοισι πεσοῦνται
δοῦποι καὶ πολιᾶς ἄμυγμα χαίτας.
Aias 627ff.

κλαίω πανδύρτοις θρήνοις· *Hek.* 212
αἰαῖ αἰαῖ, ποίοις δ' οἴκτοις
τὰν σὰν λύμαν ἐξαιάζεις; *Tr.* 197f.
γόοισιν ἐξώιμωξεν, . . . *Ant.* 427
. , κόνει φύρουσα δύστηνον κάρα. *Hek.* 496
οὐ σπαράξομαι κόμαν
οὐκ ἐμῶι 'πιθήσομαι
κάραι κτύπημα χειρὸς ὀλοόν; . . .
Andr. 1209-11

ἐγὼ δ' ἐς οἴκους βᾶσα βοστρύχους τεμῶ.
πέπλων τε λευκῶν μέλανας ἀνταλλάξομαι
παρῆιδί τ' ὄνυχα φόνιον ἐμβαλῶ χροός.
Hel. 1087-9

κατάρχομαι στεναγμὸν, ὦ Πελασγία,
τιθεῖσα λευκὸν ὄνυχα διὰ παρηίδων,
αἱματηρὸν ἄταν,
κτύπον τε κρατὸς, ὃν ἔλαχ' ἁ κατὰ χθονὸς
νερτέρων καλλίπαις θεά.
ἰαχείτω δὲ γᾶ Κυκλωπία,
σίδαρον ἐπὶ κάρα τιθεῖσα κούριμον,
πήματ' οἴκων. *Or.* 960ff.; [cf. Eur. *El.* 144ff.]
διὰ παρῆιδος ὄνυχι λευκᾶς
αἱματοῦτε χρῶτα φόνιον· Eur. *Suppl.* 76f.;
[cf. *Tr.* 278f.]

As the strength of the emotion increases, more than words are needed to express it, and the emotional activity described in these examples is a very active, totally conscious one in comparison to the rather passive and more involuntary reaction of crying. The inability of words to express emotion seems to emerge in tragedy in the use of **inarticulate cries or screams** [*Tr.* 1287/*Andr.* 1197,1200], that, although of no specific "meaning", are most effective in indicating and externalising the power of an emotion.

Something similar is in operation when characters in tragedy reach ultimate pain or despair, and, in total abandonment, **sink to the ground and/or often remain prostrate.** Description of such activity is frequent in Euripides, while in fact it does not seem to be present in the other two tragedians.[53] What is verbalised in such cases is hardly the emotion but the activity resulting from it. It is in both the activity and its description that the full expression of the emotion lies.

ὦ παῖδες, οἰχόμεσθα· **λύεται μέλη**
λύπηι· . . . *Herkld.* 602f.

ἄνα, δυσδαίμων, **πεδόθεν** κεφαλὴν.
ἐπάειρε δέρην· . . . *Tr.* 98f.

αὕτη πέλας σου νῶτ' ἔχουσ' ἐπὶ χθονὶ, *Hek.* 486
. . . . οὐδέν εἰμ'. ἀπωλόμην
φρούδη μὲν αὐδή, **φροῦδα δ' ἄρθρα μου κάτω.**
Andr. 1077f.

οὐκ ἄν δυναίμην· **ἄρθρα γὰρ πέπηγέ μου.**
Her. 1395

Thoukydides, in book vii [75, 4] describes the suffering of the army as μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα. The expression, also used by Herodotus [iii, 14], is worth noting. It seems to imply that tears express emotions of a certain softness, capable of finding relief through crying. This is an idea that seems to guide the

description of emotions in tragedy, where stronger emotions are expressed either more violently, as has been seen,[54] or in "dramatic" **silence** [*Ant.* 1244ff./*O.T.* 1074f./*Tr.* 462f./*Or.* 958/*Hipp.* 910f./*Ion* 582]. Silence in real life is a passive (i.e. non-active) state. In drama it is highly indicative of emotion, because its passivity ceases to be neutral. Drama admits only of action, so silence too has to be transformed from a passive state into action if it is to "play" any part. Turned into reaction, silence's passivity becomes emotionally coloured. Therefore silence in tragedy is always "externalised" as a character's reaction, and as such it can be portrayed by any of the two methods, either by the character himself verbalising it, or by somebody else in the play describing it [*Andr.* 1078/*Ant.* 1244ff.].

What emerges so far is that the portrayal of emotion relies substantially on description of activity for which there is a standard vocabulary. Literal statement of the emotion by itself does not seem to be prominent. The best reason one could offer for this is of course the fact that emotional activity is well suited to the tragedians' medium, adding to its performability. In tragedy the two methods are, in fact, used in a complementary, not mutually exclusive, manner, but description of emotional activity plays the paramount role, as it is used to support, enhance, or sustain an emotion literally stated, while literal expression of emotion is less liberally used to specify an emotion left unclear by the description of its activity.

Instances of emotions portrayed only by literal statement are indeed few. Pity can be one of them [*Trach.* 298/*Med.* 931], while anger and hatred tend to be named when expressed, since, like crying, their activity could be indicative of quite a range of emotions.

σχάσον δὲ δεινὸν ὄμμα καὶ θυμοῦ πνοάς·

Ph. 454

μῖσός τε γὰρ παλαιὸν ἐντέτηκέ μοι,
κἀπεί σ' ἐσεῖδον, οὔ ποτ' ἐκπλήξω χαρᾶι
δακρυρροοῦσα . . . S. *El.* 1311ff.

Fear, too, may be portrayed both by literal statement as well as by description of its generated activity, which has the tendency to be figurative.

. . . , οὕτως **ἐκπεπληγμέναι φόβωι**
πρὸς πέδωι πεπτώκατ' ; . . . *Ba.* 604f.;

[cf. *Trach.* 24]

τί δ' ἐστὶ χρῆμα; τίς σ' **ἀποστρέφει φόβος;**

Ag. 1306

κραδία δὲ φόβωι φρένα λακτίζει, *Prom.* 881

Restlessness, wildness, or indeed madness, although they can be named, they are mostly portrayed with description, which employs vivid imagery.

ἐλελεῦ ἐλελεῦ·
ὑπό μ' αὖ **σφάκελος καὶ φρενοπλῆγες**
μανίαι θάλπουσ', **οἴστρου δ' ἄρδις**
χρίει μ' ἄπυρος,
κραδία δὲ φόβωι φρένα λακτίζει,
τροχοδινεῖται δ' ὄμμαθ' ἑλίγδην,
ἔξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι **λύσσης**
πνεύματι μάργωι γλώσσης ἀκρατής.

Prom. 877ff., and

. . . · δακὼν δὲ στόμιον **ὡς νεοζυγὴς**
πῶλος βιάζηι καὶ πρὸς ἡνίας μάχηι.

Prom. 1009f.; [cf. *Or.* 35ff.]

. . . καὶ δὴ τινάσσει κρᾶτα βαλβίδων ἄπο
καὶ **διαστρόφους ἐλίσσει** σῖγα **γοργωπούς**
κόρας,
ἀμπνοὰς δ' οὐ σωφρονίζει, **ταῦρος** ὥς ἐς
ἐμβολήν,
δεινὰ μυκᾶται δὲ. . . . *Her.* 867ff.

Description of the face and/or eyes to suggest emotion is essential because of the mask, and the

emotion again has to be stipulated, because of the range the symptoms covered.

κρύπτε· κατ' ὄσσων δάκρυ μοι βαίνει,
καὶ ἐπ' αἰσχύνην ὄμμα τέτραπται. *Hipp.* 245f.
φιλάδελφα κάτω δάκρυ' εἰβομένη·
νεφέλη δ' ὀφρύων ὕπερ αἱματόεν
ρέθος αἰσχύνει,
τέγγουσ' εὐῶπα παρειάν. *Ant.* 527-30
τί γὰρ πέπλοισιν ἄθλιον κρύπτει κάρα;
Her. 1198
τί γὰρ σὸν ὄμμα χρώς τε συντέτηχ' ὅδε;
Med. 689
σκυθρωπὸν ὄμμα καὶ πρόσοψιν ἀγγέλου
Ph. 1333; [cf. *Trach.* 869f.; *Med.* 271]
ὦ δυστάλαινα παρθέν', ὡς ξυνηρεφὲς
πρόσωπον εἰς γῆν σὸν βαλοῦσ' ἄφθογγος εἶ,
Or. 957f.
μέθες νυν ὀφρὺν, ὄμμα τ' ἔκτεινον φίλον.
I. A. 648
στρέψασα λευκὴν ἔμπαλιν παρηίδα, *Med.* 923

Such activity of the head and eyes as could be acted (turning, lowering etc.) is often described by other characters, but can in fact only be found in Euripides. He also seems to have been the only one of the three tragedians to describe the stronger felt emotions, such as grief or mourning, with acts of abuse to one's body (i.e. tearing hair, face, or clothes, beating the breast etc.). There is occasional mention of these in Aischylos, but they seem to be reserved for the chorus. Another means of portraying emotion which has been noticed to be exclusively Euripidean is the collapse to the ground. Clearly, it seems emotional activity in his work is far more prominent than in the other two tragedians. This is not because more of his work has survived; "comparison based on the proportion of lines of emotional material which must be portrayed by each dramatist" yields the same conclusion.[55]

v. Which Emotions and Whose

The high indication, as well as suggestion of action to express emotion in Euripides' plays was the main reason for which his work seemed the most suitable material for an investigation of emotional presentation. Aristotle's description [*Poet.* 1453ª29f.] of Euripides as particularly talented in producing a powerful emotional effect points to the psychological realism of his work. Since it is true that, in real life too, emotional activity is a more natural and eloquent means of expressing emotions, Euripides' use of dramatic resources other than verbal intensity to articulate emotion is a suggestion that his emotional portrayal is realistic, i.e. based on close observation of real life. As I have already said,[56] one intention of this investigation is to explore whether this clear preference of Euripides to portray emotional expression with action could be an indication of his awareness of the human inability to fully express/communicate emotions verbally.

The choice of tragedian had to be followed by the choice of which emotions **in** tragedy were to be examined, since their entire range could not possibly be included within the scale of this research. Another ancient critic who provides confirmation of Euripides' successful presentation of emotions singles out two, in the presentation of which he regards the poet to excel. According to Longinos, an investigation of Euripides' emotional presentation should concentrate on love and madness, since these two emotions are expertly and extensively treated in his work : Ἔστι μὲν οὖν φιλοπονώτατος ὁ Εὐριπίδης δύο ταυτὶ πάθη, μανίας τε καὶ ἔρωτας, ἐκτραγωιδῆσαι, κἀν τούτοις ὡς οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τισιν ἑτέροις ἐπιτυχέστατος, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις

ἐπιτίθεσθαι φαντασίαις οὐκ ἄτολμος. [*On the Sublime,* xv. 3].

Other important reasons, however, were behind my choice of "which emotions". I shall begin my exposition of the process that led to my eventual decision to concentrate on emotions of love and madness, by trying to explain my insistent emphasis on "the emotions **in** tragedy", that is, the emotions that occur within the play and are experienced by its characters. It is an attempt to distinguish it from the "emotions **of** tragedy" as the emotions of the audience response are frequently called. As I have said at the beginning of this introduction, the list of "tragic emotions" has long been kept restricted to the Aristotelian pity and fear, which are most commonly treated as the - only - intended "audience response" to the play as a whole. There are clearly others : Aristotle's own κάθαρσις [1449^{b}28], effected by pity and fear, is itself an emotional response; so are Gorgias' "φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής", or more generally emotions associated with suspense. Indeed, as expanded by Heath[57], they could include "any distressing or painful emotion in general". Nevertheless, "the tragic emotions" are essentially seen to be those of the audience's response.

W. B. Stanford comes a step closer to what I would call tragic emotions, in the sense that he included, under this heading, the emotions presented in the plays.[58] Unfortunately, however, as Heath remarks,[59] "he is only intermittently aware of the distinction" between the emotions of *the audience* response, and those represented as "the emotions of the *dramatis personae* ". He seems to regard these two aspects of emotion as one and the same thing. "The emotions presented in tragedy and felt by audiences" are mentioned in one breath.[60] Emotions like οἶκτος, ἔλεος, φόβος, ἔκπληξις, which

can equally belong to the characters, the audience, or both, are examined indiscriminately with ἔρως and φιλία, ταραχή, στύγος, αἰσχύνη, emotions clearly experienced only by the characters.

The confusion lies in the interpretation of συμπάσχειν as "identification". Stanford gives consideration to the missing element in the antithesis of characters / audience, the chorus, and rightly remarks that they can at times be the object of the audience's emotional reaction or, at others, sharers in this reaction.[61] The chorus do indeed often react to characters' emotions and such reactions may be equivalent to an intended audience reaction or a kind of guide to it.[62] But although Stanford distinguishes these "three kinds of emotionalism", he seems to think that they could consist of the same emotions.[63] The problem clearly lies in his belief that the audience's response is one of identification. I shall try to explain how this belief is mistaken.

I have said, at the very beginning, that observation of emotions in Greek tragedy is not directly involved. As long as we are an audience, however, and not detached psychologists, our observation remains to a degree involved since we experience personal emotions, at the same time and as the result of our observation of outside emotions. Our response to the characters' behaviour may resemble to an extent the way we would react to similar behaviour in real life, but this reaction, as has been discussed, is regulated in tragedy by the Distance effected by convention and stylization.

The fact, therefore, that we are observing a stylized presentation of emotions outside ourselves, and we cannot be, as in real life, emotionally attached with these characters means that our involvement clearly cannot be identification.[64] There is no exchange of

feelings and emotions; we do not take over those of the characters, nor do we give them ours. Becoming involved with something/somebody, means taking an interest (of whichever degree) in **another** thing/person, outside ourselves. As Taplin rightly believes, the emotions of tragedy's audience are "outgoing" rather than an "introvert self-absorption". He calls the emotional response "almost altruistic".[65] Heath agrees that "sympathetic responses are clearly central to tragedy".[66] Both base their conclusions on Gorgias' passage [B. 11. 9], which states that "the audience's spirit feels a *personal* (ἴδιον) emotion on account of the good and bad fortunes of *others*." So, the audience, in Heath's words, does not "undergo" the experiences and emotions of the characters, but **"responds"** to them.

This response, which can be both immediate and/or of a more general nature, seems to me to be of three possible kinds :

I. If the 'derived' emotion is the same as the one that is **thought to** have provoked it, we talk of empathy. However, it is important to clarify that, although the emotion we are experiencing is the same with the one we are observing, our empathy is not a response to this observed emotion, but to the causes of it. For example, the reason we become fearful or angry ourselves as a response to such observed emotions, is that the circumstances that caused these emotions in the individuals we are observing would have produced in us these same emotions.

II. The second possibility is that the 'derived' emotion will 'feel' different from the observed one, but it will bring about a result related to that of the observed emotion. For example, when we are watching Hekabe lamenting the dead Astyanax, we do not feel the same heart-rending grief and exasperation that lead her to wail. We nevertheless still experience a deep sorrow and we are often driven to tears. We respond to her feelings,

we feel **for her** (rather than Astyanax). Our feelings are not the same as hers; they are the result of our sympathising with her state. Trying to name the emotions in question on both sides may at first give the misleading impression that they differ only in degree, not in kind, but in fact they belong to two very distinct categories : Ours are sympathetic ("outgoing"), Hekabe's are personal ("introvert").

III. It is easier to illustrate the final possibility with an example. If we are watching someone in frenzy or extreme anger, this can have the effect of inducing fear, apprehension, or awe in us. Watching Phaidra in love, or indeed Herakles in madness, we do not fall in love, nor do we experience an attack of madness. Our response is completely different from the emotion observed, not only in feeling, but also in its effect. It does not usually produce a single, specific 'derived emotion', but rather an emotional attitude, which may be characterized by elements of suspense, sympathy, wonder, antipathy, perplexity, etc..

This last kind of response presents the least problem of being confused with identification with characters' emotions, and at the same time seems closer than the other two to a more general, overall audience response. This was the reason that prompted me to concentrate my investigation of characters' emotions on those that would produce this kind of response, and the emotions of madness and love are particularly good representatives of such emotions. In a list of emotions in tragedy, those that cannot be passed on to the audience to be experienced as their response are love (στοργή, πόθος, φιλία, ἔρως), hatred, shame, and madness (ταραχή, μανία, λύσσα). By choosing madness and love, hatred and shame will also, even if partly, be examined in their frequent association with both love, and indeed madness.

One final decision that had to be taken was the order of investigation. As I have now reached the end of my introduction, I ought to explain why the first section I shall begin with is dedicated to madness rather than love. The decision to give madness priority was based on its frequent association with love, throughout the ages. Whether considered as the cause of madness, or (mis)interpreted as such, love undoubtedly has certain strikingly similar symptoms with madness. Thus, in order to enable any form of self-contained comparison, I had to turn to madness first. Moreover, emotions of madness often give issue to questions related to love, and once such questions are raised it is easier to further discuss or clarify them without extensive repetition in the following section on Love.

Section A

MADNESS

1. Conceptions of Madness

The term madness is nowadays essentially used for behaviour that is unusual in its extremity, or incomprehensible. Whether interpreted as a threat to other individuals or to the social establishment, or as a condemning withdrawal from the prevailing values of society, madness is the uncontrollable expression of a divergence , from some norm of thought and feeling. The task of defining madness is not easy; nevertheless, for the present purposes, an attempt to qualify what will be treated as madness in the plays is here essential . If a character is portrayed as going through an experience with his/her perception of it altered, and his/her response to it regulated, by unconscious processes to such a degree that when compared to prevailing norms is found, by other characters in the play, lacking in reason, or confused and inappropriate in emotion, then the possibility of his/her insanity will be investigated.

The tragedies dealing with madness naturally reflect contemporary assumptions about it, and it is important to look at the 'mad' characters within their social environment. I have tried to combine whatever relevant sociological information is available about that age with modern psychological theory, in an effort to provide an all-round assessment of the portrayal of madness and its significance. Nevertheless, it must be born in mind that sociological information is, in comparison with modern psychological theory, extremely limited.

Madness could be said to share, to a certain extent, the definition of emotion as one kind of human response to influences from their environment. The connection between madness and emotion is stressed in modern psychological observations establishing strong links

between the causation of madness and human emotionality. This would come as no surprise to either Sophokles or Euripides. Despite the fact that similar insights were absent from Greek medical theorists, or indeed from other contemporary writers, the two tragedians handled their material in such a way as to demonstrate how the strong pressures of familial or social influences can lead to mental disturbance.[1] Their pioneering treatment of the myths has many parallels in modern psychological theories of madness as a phenomenon caused by society, or as the result of social labelling.[2]

Before, however, going on to discuss the presentation of madness in tragedy, it would be useful to look briefly into conceptions of it in popular and medical opinion as well as earlier literature, so as to enable any connections or influences to become apparent.

The popular conception of madness was formed along the same lines as general beliefs about disease and misfortunes. These were regarded as spirits, not in the abstract sense we talk of spirits today, but as real, existing beings. One example of this is the Κῆρες, demons who originated all sorts of evils, and eventually were considered as the spirits of the dead, capable of producing madness as punishment of the murderer.[3] Madness, then, was thought to be caused by some form of external power. Although the belief that a god could be the cause was by no means absent, the very nature of the "disease" made the belief of possession by a demon more plausible and wide-spread.[4]

Emotional states like frenzy or ecstasy related to the worship of a god, (e.g. dionysiac, korybantic), were also regarded as madness, although distinguished from the notion of disease. As the god was believed to enter men (ἔνθεοι), this kind of madness was regarded more as a

form of contact with the supernatural. A reflection of this can be found in Plato [*Ph.* 244-5] : νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θείᾳ μέντοι δόσει διδομένης. This conforms with the earlier belief that all forms of mental and emotional disturbance are caused by a supernatural agency.[5] In *Ion* [533e-534b], in his comparison of the poet to the κορυβαντιῶντες, Plato links poetic inspiration with ritual possession and the concept of divine madness (βακχεύουσι καὶ κατεχόμενοι).

Madness had a spectrum wide enough to cover all acts that betrayed an altered state of orientation to reality, Dionysiac or prophetic frenzy, epilepsy, feverish delirium, hallucinatory symptoms, or delusional insanity. That it consisted for the Greeks, too, as for us, of any kind of unusual, inexplicable behaviour, and more especially one that deviated from the socially accepted 'norms', is obvious in the following extract from Xenophon : τοὺς δὲ μικρῶν διαμαρτάνοντας οὐ δοκεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς μαίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὴν ἰσχυρὰν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔρωτα καλοῦσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν μεγάλην παράνοιαν μανίαν αὐτοὺς καλεῖν. The passage, which sets out what madness generally meant to the majority of people, follows his description of what madness was seen as by Sokrates : τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτόν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι γιγνώσκειν ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι. τούς μέντοι πολλοὺς ἔφη ἃ μὲν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἀγνοοῦσι, τοὺς διημαρτηκότας τούτων οὐ φάσκειν μαίνεσθαι, τούς δὲ διημαρτηκότας ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ γιγνώσκουσι μαινομένους καλεῖν· [*Mem.* III 9, 6f.].

Popular beliefs about madness are reflected in medical treatises mostly with the intention of criticising and discrediting them. For example, in the *Hippokratic Writings,* the most extensive source of

information, it is explained as caused in the same way as any other bodily disease, by a physical cause, such as the excess, overheating, etc., of one of the four humours. In the majority of instances, the humour responsible is indicated as either black bile or phlegm [*Sacr. Dis.* xviii]. Χολή in particular was thought to cause madness with symptoms of violence, while phlegm is mentioned as the cause of epilepsy [*Sacr. Dis.* xiv], loss of memory, or more peaceful kinds of insanity.

In *Internal Affections* 48, the disease described, ἀπό χολῆς, starts off with physical symptoms. The liver swells up and pushes the diaphragm (φρένες), and the consequent pressure results in symptoms of mental disturbance (παραφρονέει), and hallucinations, for which the word predominantly used is δοκέ-ων/ει. In *Epidemics* [iii, case 4], φρενίτις, fever attended by delirium (πυρετός φρικώδης), is described as accompanied by ἀφωνία. Symptoms may affect specific areas of the body : αἱ δὲ χεῖρες ἀκρατεῖς γίγνονται καὶ σπῶνται, . . . , καὶ οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ διαστρέφονται, ἀφρός δὲ ἐκ τοῦ στόματος προέρχεται. [*Sacr. Dis.* x 20ff.]. Nightmares (ἐνύπνια φοβερά) are also associated with mental derangement [*Int. Aff.* 48], while φόβος, or δείματα, which can be of any kind [cf. *Epid.* v. 82], and δυσθυμία are all considered as potential symptoms of madness [*Aphor.* xxiii], of which μελαγχολία seems to have been the standard form to which all else was compared, - something similar to contemporary layman's use of paranoia.

The treatises seem to be restricted to physiological indications and reactions, and there is no consideration of psychodynamic material as grounds for the occurrence of madness. To cure it, restoration of the balance of humours was needed, which again was attempted with physical means, (e.g. purgation), for which the most

popular method was the use of hellebore [*Epid.* vii 45, *Int. Aff.* 48]. In Aristophanes' *Wasps* [111ff.], where we have a list of practical measures for the treatment of madness, restriction, gentle persuasion, washing and purgation, the performance of Korybantic rites, and eventually the help of Asklepios prove ineffective in curing Philokleon's derangement. As can be seen, physical and physiological means were principally used. Nevertheless, the visit to Asklepios, or the λόγοισι παραμυθούμενος ἀνέπειθεν, could be interpreted as the first attempts at psychotherapeutic methods.

An incongruous mixture of the popular and medical conception of madness is found in literature.[6] As restrictions of both space and scope prevent the review here of the entire body of surviving literature, I will briefly concentrate on the portrayal of madness in a form of literature that had an undeniably great influence on tragedy. In epic, madness seems, on a first impression, non-existent. This misleading impression is derived from the fact that, in contrast to comedy,[7] or, more to the point, tragedy, there is no suggestion, or explicit mention of madness as a serious mental derangement. Nevertheless, the folly in certain acts of the warriors is noted [*Il.* xix 87ff., vi 232-6], while strange, unusual, or wild activity is frequently remarked upon, and the gods are always thought its agents :

μαῖα φίλη, μάργην σε θεοὶ θέσαν, οἵ τε δύνανται
ἄφρονα ποιῆσαι καὶ ἐπίφρονά περ μαλ' ἐόντα.
καὶ τε χαλιφρονέοντα σαοφροσύνης ἐπέβησαν·
οἵ σέ περ ἔβλαψαν· πρὶν δὲ φρένας αἰσίμη ἦσθα.

[*Od.* xxiii 11-4; cf. ix 410f., xiv 178f.].

Conflict, the most prominent perhaps root of madness, is a very important element in the Homeric tales.[8] If, however, the hero's tension does not result in breakdown

or madness, this is understandable in the light of what he, as a hero, is required to be capable of enduring. Moreover, an explanation can be found, not only in this context of heroic codes of behaviour, but also in the form of the poems, to justify this 'absence' of insanity. In contrast with the conventionally limited tragic time-scale, the not externally restricted epic one offers several opportunities and alternatives. The *Iliad* itself is an ingenious illustration of how the ample time available to the hero offers the opportunity to heal, and how different forms of activity can provide the means for therapy.[9]

Another important consideration that would explain this uncertainty that surrounds madness in Homer[10] is language. As has already been seen,[11] the Homeric language used to describe mental processes differs significantly from that of tragedy since no differentiation is made between organs of thinking and organs of feeling and emotion. Nevertheless, there is a continuity in the development of certain Homeric words into later terms denoting madness in tragedy,[12] but what is even more interesting to note is the continuity and development of the notion lurking in epic that conflict results in madness.[13]

The divine intervention that seems to govern not only the emotional/mental, but the entire life of the Homeric man, provides the explanation for the external causation of madness that finds its way into tragedy. In Aischylos' portrayals the obscurity of what madness exactly is remains intriguing. Closely associated with his belief in a supernatural world with strict rules of morality, madness seems a kind of contact with the divine world. The symptoms of his "mad" characters are better viewed not as insane reactions, but rather as understandable and normal responses to their situations.

In *Choephoroi* Orestes sees the Erinyes at 1048ff.. Their sight is horrific enough to drive him out of his mind. They are ἔγκοτοι κύνες [1054], κἀξ ὀμμάτων στάζουσιν αἷμα δυσφιλές [1058]. The chorus is not unduly worried about Orestes' situation; εἷς σοι καθαρμός, they say at 1059. It is as the result of the recent murder (ποταίνιον γὰρ αἷμά σοι χεροῖν ἔτι·) that Orestes is experiencing this ταραγμός ἐς φρένας [1055f.]. Orestes points out to the chorus that while they cannot see these horrifying creatures, he can. What he is experiencing is, undoubtedly, an inner disturbance. This disturbance, however, is not, according to him, a hallucination. It has a real external stimulus.

Orestes explains his situation clearly at 1021-25. This is a point where his comments can be relied upon, as he makes it clear that he is still ἔμφρων [1026]. The image of a charioteer driven out of course, by circumstances out of his control, suggests he is experiencing forces that are beginning to take control of him. While, however, his words here imply that these forces are within him [cf. 1023f. : φέρουσι γὰρ νικώμενον/<u>φρένες</u> δύσαρκτοι.], he himself, as "madness" takes control, seems to believe that it is the Erinyes, as Klytemnestra's agents, who bring about terror in his mind; not his own mind initiating hallucinations [1048ff., especially 1054].

The discrepancy between Orestes' two interpretations of what is happening, as well as between these and that of the chorus, highlights the extreme ambiguity with which the play ends. The chorus never mention the Erinyes. They ask what these visions are that cause Orestes such fear. The word they use is δόξαι [1051f.].

In Euripides' *Orestes*, Elektra, like the chorus here, does not see the Erinyes. What Orestes sees, she says, is only in his mind :

ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν <u>δοκεῖς</u> σάφ' εἰδέναι. [259].

Nevertheless, she believes in them as the cause of her brother's madness and refers to the terrifying fear they are causing him : αἵ τόνδ' ἐξαμιλλῶνται φόβῳ. [38].

In *Choephoroi* it is never made clear whether Orestes' state is caused by the Erinyes, visible only to him, or whether it is simply an inner - temporary [cf. 1059] - disturbance (ταραγμὸς ἐς φρένας) resulting from the murder.

Whichever case might be true, Orestes' state would not be the result of insanity, but an understandable response to his situation. There is, in fact, in the play no explicit mention of madness as such. Madness is concluded because traditionally it is what befell Orestes from the Erinyes after murdering his mother. This really presents us with two alternatives : Either Aischylos was relying on his audience's traditional knowledge of Orestes' madness, in which case he wished to portray Orestes' madness as punishment, or else he did not wish to portray him as mad at all.

The image of Orestes as a charioteer off course is used by Sophokles as Orestes' means of false death [*El.* 680-763]. A belied, untrue image, fully in accordance with the negation of Orestes' madness, which, unambiguously, does not exist here at all. In Sophokles, the matricide is left with the horror of his crime and nothing else, while with Euripides a completely different level of reality is in operation. In his *Elektra,* the horror of the crime strikes both protagonists [1177ff.], but Orestes' traditional madness is also subsequently re-instated by the Dioskouroi, in its Aischylean terms :
δειναὶ δὲ κῆρες ‹σ'› αἱ κυνώπιδες θεαὶ
τροχηλατήσουσ' ἐμμανῆ πλανώμενον.[14] [1252f.].

In *Orestes,* however, Orestes' σύνεσις [396], and not the Erinyes, is ultimately revealed as the cause of his state. The emphasis is on the effect of the crime on the

mind and emotions, including moral sensibility. As in Aischylos, the Erinyes are present here only in Orestes' mind. By the use of the same traditional mode of description Euripides introduces the ambiguity of *Choephoroi* as to whether the goddesses are actually there but visible only to Orestes, or whether they are the creation of his disturbed imagination. Nevertheless, as will be seen in the analysis of the play, Euripides combines traditional with innovative modes of description to enhance and expand the ambiguity, which he leaves largely unresolved at the end of the play. Aischylos, on the other hand, seems to use the concluding play of the trilogy to answer the questions raised by *Choephoroi* and dissolve its ambiguities. In *Eumenides* the Erinyes are brought on stage for everyone to see. Orestes' fear, mentioned in *Choephoroi* both by him [1024] as rising towards his heart, internally, and by the chorus [1052] as the result of his δόξαι, is here verified by Apollo as a response to the Erinyes, whose horrific presence is acknowledged both by him [67-73] and Pythia [46ff.].[15] *Eumenides* could perhaps be seen as suggestive of Aischylos' overall traditional view of madness as contact with the divine in general, while in Orestes' case this contact is his punishment.

There is in Aischylos another scene confirming the impression that madness was for him a kind of contact with divinity. This scene also has a parallel in Euripides and their comparison reveals the differences in the presentation of madness in the two tragedians. Kassandra's divine possession in *Agamemnon* and *Troiades* is still a form of madness, although free from the notion of disorder or illness. Her behaviour in *Agamemnon,* even before she enters her prophetic trance, is compared by the chorus to τρόπος δὲ θηρὸς ὡς νεαιρέτου [1063]. It is seen by Klytemnestra as mad (ἢ μαίνεταί γε καὶ κακῶν κλύει φρενῶν) in its

uncompromising unreasonableness in view of her new status [1064-6].

The beginning of her possession is marked by her repeated calls to Apollo [1072f.,1076f.,1080-2,1085-7]. The divine madness of prophecy (φρενομανής τις θεοφόρητος) commands the chorus' awe as well as sympathy [1140-5], since her prophetic experience is emotionally and mentally painful :

ἰοὺ ἰοὺ, ὤ ὤ κακά.
ὑπ' αὖ με δεινὸς ὀρθομαντείας πόνος
στροβεῖ, ταράσσων φροιμίοις ἐφημίοις. [1214-6].

Kassandra's madness in *Agamemnon* is clearly attributed to divine interference [1174f.]. On the other hand, despite possible comments like Talthybios' (οὐ γὰρ ἀρτίας ἔχεις φρένας) [*Tr.* 417], Euripides' Kassandra is not mad. She calls her prophecies βακχεύματα [367], her state is qualified as that of a mainad [cf. 415, 307], but, nevertheless, the god she is possessed by is Apollo; she is Φοίβου παρθένος [cf. 253]. Although Apollo's prophetess, she is predominantly described in terms of bacchic frenzy : βακχεύουσαν ... κόρην [342, cf. 169-72, 349, and also *Hek.* 121, 676]. The same abundance of bacchic terms for madness will be met with in *Orestes* [339, 411, 834], while in *Herakles* Lyssa is portrayed in Dionysiac terms [889-898], and Amphitryon calls his maddened son a βάκχος [1119, cf. 966, 1086, 1122]. Such terms are absent from both Aischylos' and Sophokles' presentations of madness. It is only in Euripides that the association between bacchic frenzy and madness becomes so strong.[16] Talthybios' words at 408 (εἰ μή σ' Ἀπόλλων ἐξεβάκχευσεν φρένας) are indicative of this indiscriminate use of bacchic terms that Euripides makes in his portrayal of madness. The words of another prophet in *Bacchai* [298-301] reflect the belief Euripides was exploiting, that madness and bacchic

frenzy were intricately related. Euripides' use of it here stresses the similarity of Kassandra's behaviour to that of madness, while it is simultaneously pointed out that it is not. *Bacchai,* where this connection between madness, bacchic frenzy, and prophecy is strongly emphasized, is in fact the only play in which Euripides deliberately separates bacchic from madness terms. The intention there, as will be seen,[17] is to distinguish the feeling of the two experiences in his attempt to differentiate bacchic frenzy from madness.

The portrayal of Kassandra's emotional state also includes strong elements of irony, a feeling of bitter joy and superiority to the tragedy surrounding her.[18] Kassandra delivers her prophecies detached and almost indifferent. Hekabe remarks on how her new circumstances have not changed her :

. . . οὐδὲ σαῖς τύχαις, τέκνον,
σεσωφρόνηκας, ἀλλ' ἔτ' ἐν ταὐτῷ μένεις. [349f.].

This stresses that Kassandra has always behaved strangely, she has always been different, seen as unreasonable. By stressing the similarities of Kassandra's behaviour with madness, whilst pointing out that these similarities are characteristics of her nature, Euripides seems to aim at a re-evaluation of her traditional madness. His presentation questions her image as "the mad prophetess". Her behaviour is not mad; it is merely alienating.

It is interesting to note that Klytemnestra's words [*Ag.* 1064-7] provide an accurate description of the manner in which Kassandra is portrayed in *Troiades.* This may be suggestive of where Euripides might have found the inspiration for his presentation from. Nevertheless, the distinctly dissimilar manner in which Kassandra delivers her prophecies in the two plays is indicative of the difference in the portrayal. The terror of the Aischylean portrait is absent from here. Another

difference is that, although in *Troiades* she calls herself ἔνθεος [366], she is not presented as being in contact with the divine world. If she conversed with the god, this had been in the past, when she was actually given the information, the accuracy of which she will question [428-30]. Neither is she portrayed as hallucinating. The visual nature of Aischylos' description is not followed here.

Despite differences in conception and portrayal, however, madness still depends for its recognition on the vocabulary and presentation of its symptomatology. In Aischylos' *Prometheus Bound* Io's madness is a godsent νόσος [596-8], which creates in her the same desire for death [747-50] that is present in both Aias and Herakles. She enters the stage driven by, and suffering from οἶστρος [566f.; cf. 580f. 589, 681f.], - a word used by Herakles for his madness [*Her.* 1144].[19] Other names for her state are φρενοπλήγής μανία and λύσσα, and its manifestations are vividly portrayed as :

κραδία δὲ φόβωι φρένα λακτίζει,
τροχοδινεῖται δ' ὄμμαθ' ἑλίγδην,
ἔξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι λύσσης
πνεύματι μάργωι γλώσσης ἀκρατής· [881-4].

φρένες διάστροφοι [cf. 673] and ἐμμανῆ σκιρτήματα [cf. 675] are some more of her symptoms, all of which are met with in abundance in Euripides' madness plays.

In *Iphigeneia in Tauris* the description of madness is purely physical.[20] The attack of madness on Orestes [281ff.] is sudden and violent, and includes all the traditional elements in the description of madness[21] : The shaking of the head and the trembling [282f.], the shouting and wild activity [283, 296-306], and the falling down and foaming at the end of the attack :

πίπτει δὲ μανίας πίτυλον ὁ ξένος μεθείς,
στάζων ἀφρῶι γένειον· . . . [307f.].

I shall be looking at Euripides' use of the symptomatology of madness more closely in the following chapter, discussing his selectiveness in physiology as part of his method of differentiating between several kinds of madness.

The strong determinant element in the causation of madness in Aischylos' portrayals is also present in Sophokles. The external cause of Aias' madness remains a god. Nevertheless, Sophokles offers another explanation, based on the notion, seen as implicit in epic, that conflict results in madness. The chorus believe in the traditional one of a divinity causing it [cf. 172ff., esp. 185], while in Tekmessa's descriptions Aias' madness is revealed as his own reaction to his situation, emerging from inside him. In this respect, Athena's own words, confirming that Aias went mad χόλωι βαρυνθεὶς [41] are significant, as they point to his own χόλος and not to her intervention as the cause of madness.[22] Athena is presented merely as the external trigger, while Sophokles' psychological insight into both Aias' inner world, as well as his external circumstances, point to the real reasons for his insanity.[23]

The goddess boasts :

ἐγώ δὲ φοιτῶντ' ἄνδρα μανιάσιν νόσοις
ὤτρυνον, εἰσέβαλλον εἰς ἕρκη κακά. [59f.].

As with Lyssa in *Herakles*, Athena talks here of how she induced the madness. Her description, however, does not consist of the physical manifestations, but covers the context and nature of Aias' delusion [51ff.]. Moreover, the scene at 91ff. further illustrates his madness as cognitive delusion. Tekmessa's lines at 233-44, and more extensively at 284ff., offer us a description of the activity of the mad attack, from its first signs to its full development. The wild, murderous, physical activity is prominent; his erroneous cognition and the mad laughter are remarked upon.

Tekmessa's portrayal covers not only the madness but also its aftermath[24]: first Aias' delusion, then the suicidal despair which follows it.[25] As soon as he becomes ἔμφρων again, Aias plunges into despair and silence [308-11]. He realises that what surrounds him is his own deed, but wants to know the details of how it happened [312-6]. When told, his despair reaches its peak [317-25]. As is the case with Herakles,[26] Aias' knowledge of both his madness and its manifestation will turn him suicidal [cf. 326f.]. The first warning sign of Aias' suicidal despair as a result of his madness is already present in Tekmessa's 257-62, and is made specific at 274-6 (λύπῃι πᾶς ἐλήλαται κακῆι). Aias will himself express his desire for death at 394-400.

Having been the great honoured hero, he cannot bear the humiliation by his enemies [cf. ὕβρις, 304, 367, ἄτιμος, 426, 440][27], nor the thought of facing his father, as his speech at 430ff. explains. Despite Tekmessa's love, the consolation of his son, and the supporting friendship of his sailors [cf. 275f.], Aias will not succumb. He can neither accept their help, nor can he live by his new circumstances and status,[28] as he himself magnificently explains at 666ff., which culminates in : ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς οὐ γνωσόμεσθα σωφρονεῖν; [677].

In his own terms [cf. 581f.] Aias' νόσος is incurable. Even when μανία or λύσσα cease, his λύπη, the result of his internal conflict, is unconquerable. Aias feels both that he has failed the requirements of himself, his parents, and his society, and also that he is incapable of living with the shame that this entails.

The newly found intense concentration on νόσος in Sophokles extends to cover not only the incident of his raving attack [59, 66, 271, 274, 452], but also his state after it [581f., 609, 625f., 635]. Aias is not raving mad

anymore but neither is he seen as cured. Madness, rather than a single incident is now portrayed as a disease with stages. Aias' delusion has a recovery [305-11]. But the doubt expressed by the chorus [337f.] introduces the idea that Aias is not back to health and complete sanity [344 ἀνὴρ φρονεῖν ἔοικεν]. He is ἔμφρων [306, cf. 259], but this does not necessarily mean he is in his right mind. His attack is of specified duration and dies down, but the same cannot be said for his disease in general.

Sophokles' study of his protagonist is by far superior to any discussion of madness in the medical corpus, for it is not limited to physiological description of the symptoms present at the moment of the attack. Unlike Aischylos', his portrayal extends to, and one might say, concentrates on how madness affects Aias' whole psychological structure, his thoughts, beliefs, and emotions. For Sophokles madness seems to be a disorder of the human mind, which leads the individual into a world that does not exist but in his own affected mind. Euripides seems to pick up this cue from Sophokles; he develops it further, in two separate plays, into two different kinds of madness. The external trigger in the form of a divinity, the attack of delusion that transports the madman to a world that exists only in his affected mind, the suicidal despair at the recovery; these are all present in *Herakles,* a play whose similarities with *Aias* have been the focus of much more attention than is the case with *Orestes*. There are indeed many and interesting parallels between these last two plays; this will perhaps become more obvious during the analysis of *Orestes*. I will, nevertheless, briefly summarize them here.

What I have said further up of Aias, that when μανία or λύσσα cease, his λύπη, the result of his internal conflict, remains unconquerable, is equally true of Orestes.[29] It is also true that when Orestes is described

as ἔμφρων this does not mean he is in his right mind.[30] In both plays the suggestion that the protagonists are mad even when not in the midst of a mad attack, that they have no way out of madness, is very strong. Moreover, neither of the two will accept change, in contrast with Herakles, whose eventual cure comes from recognition and acceptance of change.[31] Even more interestingly, their madness consists for both essentially in their failure to see things correctly. In *Orestes,* as in *Aias,* the alternative, more metaphorical interpretation of the "world that exists only in the madman's mind" is presented, while in *Herakles* we have only the literal one. Finally, I would like to point out the suggestion present in *Aias* that the divinity "is not producing the intention to murder the Achaean kings; she merely diverts, hinders, checks limits and encourages a force already in motion."[32] The same suggestion is also found in *Orestes*, but it is something that Euripides will go on to fully explore with the presence of Dionysos in Pentheus' portrayal in *Bacchai.*

While it is most probably Sophokles who, for the first time, turns to the influence of internal forces in the process of madness,[33] lack of subject matter in his surviving plays does not enable further comparison. On the other hand, Euripides seems to have dedicated more of his portrayals to madness. As comparison with *Aias* reveals, he plunged even deeper into the exploration of madness as emotional response, not limiting himself to a single uniform account. His portrayals, therefore, offer an almost unique opportunity to examine the introduction, not only in drama but perhaps in the whole of Greek literature, of the emotions as contributing factors in madness.

2. The Face of Madness

Madness is absent from *Herakles* until the sudden appearance of Iris and Lyssa as φάσματα, in the middle of the play [815]. The horror of this most unexpected[1] scene is in marked contrast with the preceding mood. The reaction of the chorus to the horrific sight of the goddesses is one of spasmodic fear :
ἆρ' ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν πίτυλον ἥκομεν φόβου, [816].[2]

Iris identifies herself and Lyssa, emphasizing the darker, negative side of Lyssa's genealogy (Νυκτὸς - κελαινῆς - ἔκγονος [822, 834]). Οὐρανός, her father, will not be mentioned until later, by Lyssa herself (ἐξ εὐγενοῦς μὲν πατρὸς [843]). Her own words [845-58] conform with her overall paradoxical portrayal as a goddess of madness who is composed, and utterly sane. The paradox is stressed by Iris, who reminds Lyssa [857] that she was sent οὐχὶ σωφρονεῖν. This scene seems to reinforce a suggestion of the play as a whole that different standards and laws operate for divinities, for whom unreasonable or unjustified acts are not "madness". As the line itself clearly states, σωφροσύνη is not required of them.[3]

Iris prompts Lyssa not to allow her heart to succumb to any emotions, (ἄτεγκτον συλλαβοῦσα καρδίαν [833]). As discussed in the Introduction,[4] the heart is the seat of emotions that can cause it to soften, 'melt', and, in this particular case, pity the intended victim. Ἄτεγκτος, which Iris describes as the quality that would prevent such a thing from happening, is very rarely used. At 835f., Lyssa is asked to cause μανία in Herakles, and Iris specifies the kind of madness that will lead to the killing of the children (παιδοκτόνους) by both mental (φρενῶν ταραγμοὺς) and physical (ποδῶν σκιρτήματα) symptoms. Lyssa declares her

reluctance once again (οὐ βούλομαι [858]), calling the Sun as her witness. Since, however, she has no alternative but to obey Hera, she will perform her duties impeccably [859-66].

The goddess offers a description of Herakles' madness as she proceeds to cause it. Hers is not an account given in advance of what will happen; it is actually concurrent with the events, as becomes clearer with the messenger's corresponding report [928ff.]. The account first explains the quality of the attack [861-3], then, in future tense, covers its imminent consequences [864-6], finishing off with a graphic description of its symptoms as it begins [867-70]. Images and sounds from nature and the animal world are used to portray the force, wildness, savagery and abruptness of Herakles' madness; the fierceness of waves and the open sea, the tremor and violence of earthquake, the immediate direct striking of lightning. οἶστρος [862][5] is closely associated with the striking of madness [cf. 1144/*I. T.* 1456/*Or.* 791/*Ba.* 665), or indeed of strong erotic passion, [*I. A.* 547/*Hipp.* 1300).

Tossing his head [867f./cf. *I. T.* 282ff./*Ba.* 862-5], rolling his eyes (διαστρόφους), with uncontrolled, disordered breathing which produces animal sounds (μυκᾶται [870]), Herakles is described as a huntsman [860], as well as a bull [869]. Κῆρες are summoned, the spirits associated with madness [870]. The hunting image will be carried on into the choral ode [896], where bacchic imagery is predominant [879, 892-5, 899, cf. also 1119, 1122]. Before entering the palace, Lyssa states that she will intensify her attack [871] : τάχα σ' ἐγὼ μᾶλλον χορεύσω καὶ καταυλήσω φόβῳ. This last oxymoron lays emphasis on the horror she promises will follow. ἄφαντοι [874], seems to suggest how Lyssa, as well as entering the place unseen, will in the same way get into Herakles himself, and

become one with him. This, along with her initial reluctance, - it is Hera who forces her [859] -, emphasizes the external nature of Herakles' madness.

The point described by the messenger at 930f., when Herakles' behaviour changes (οὐκέθ' αὑτὸς ἦν), corresponds with Lyssa's 867f. - σῖγα with ἔστη σιωπῇ.[6] Certain details from Lyssa's account, such as the rolling eyes, are repeated here, but the description extends to other details, such as the foaming at the mouth and bloodshot eyes. Foaming is also mentioned in *Ba.* 1122 and *I. T.* 308.

Herakles, although already laughing with wild, mad laughter (γέλωτι παραπεπληγμένωι, [935/cf. *Aias* 303]) still recognises his father, until the moment that Lyssa actually enters the house and madness takes full control of him. His weapons are handed over to him at his request [942], as it takes some time for the people around him to realise what exactly is happening. At 950, although his delusion has already clearly started, everybody is still confused as to whether he is really mad or is playing a trick on them. He marches madly up and down, believing he is on a journey, stops his "travelling" to eat and rest, takes off his clothes and wrestles with an imaginary person. His father [965-7], astonished at Herakles' strange, alienated behaviour, - for which he uses the highly uncommon word ξένωσις -, thinks it may be the result of the killing Herakles had just committed.[7]

Now divorced from reality, Herakles sees his father as Eurystheus' father imploring for his son's life, and prepares, undeterred, to kill his own children believing them to be Eurystheus'. As they scatter in fear with their mother trying to reason with the madman, amongst Amphitryon's and the servants' shouting [971-6], he kills the first one with an arrow. Wildly proud and triumphant

(ἠλάλαξε κἀπεκόμπασεν) [981f.], he remains violent in what he believes to be his justified revenge. With a savage look at his imploring second child, he shatters his bones. His wife is next to be killed, along with the third child she tried to protect. The killing of Amphitryon is prevented by Athena's last minute intervention [1002-6/906f.]. She throws a stone at him and sends him to sleep. It takes the power of another goddess to stop the madness that was caused by a goddess.[8] The roof of the palace collapses, as described by the chorus [904f.], the result of the earthquake caused by Lyssa [cf. 864]. Herakles is bound on a pillar, to prevent any more insane and violent deeds on his awakening.

He regains consciousness at 1089ff.. He now sees (ἅπερ με δεῖ) the sky, earth, and the shining sun, but he feels that he has been in a terrible mental storm as his breathing is hot and irregular. The effects of strong emotion on one's breathing confirm to the ancient Greeks the belief that the lungs are a stronghold of emotion.[9] Realising that he is bound, he notices the corpses, without however recognising them, and pays them no particular attention. With the arrows scattered around him, he wonders whether he is back in Hades :

ἔκ τοι πέπληγμαι· ποῦ ποτ' ὢν ἀμηχανῶ; [1105]

He is at a loss, unable to make sense of what he sees, genuinely ignorant of his horrendous acts. He calls his amnesic state δύσγνοιαν, and asks for a φίλος to "cure" it (ἰάσεται), for :

σαφῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶδα τῶν εἰωθότων, [1007].[10]

When Amphitryon steps forward [1109ff.], Herakles recognises his father straightaway, and, confused, asks him what reason he has to be crying. Amphitryon procedes with caution, trying to make sure that Herakles is in his right mind [1117,1119, 1121], before revealing to him what had happened. Herakles sounds rather impatient, and especially at 1118 sounds half stoical and

half ironical. The irony is more strong at 1123 (οὐ γάρ τι βακχεύσας γε μέμνημαι φρένας), as Herakles quite clearly remembers nothing of his madness. His reaction on the suspicion that he may - still - be an Ἄιδου βάκχος, has been one of utter disgust : παπαῖ [1120]. Herakles is ashamed to be found bound, but Amphitryon implies that that is the least of his misfortunes. Herakles remarks, ironically, (cf. Bond ad loc.), that silence will not help him find out what he wants to know. As Herakles is assured that his own evils cannot be covered using Hera as an excuse, he realises that what is to be announced to him is a major disaster [1127-9]. Once more (also more indirectly at 1117, 1127), Amphitryon points out the corpses to his son, who now recognises them straightaway. Nevertheless he still has no recollection whatsoever of their killing [1134, 1136]. His father informs him "you have been mad" (μανείς [1137]), and this destructive madness Herakles will call οἶστρος [1144], as Lyssa did at 862.

Herakles begins to talk of ending his life [1146f.], for he could not carry on living with the knowledge, and the δύσκλεια [1152], that he has killed his own children.[11] Suicide seems to be the solution, and three alternatives are contemplated; jumping off a cliff, stabbing his liver with a sword, or setting fire to himself. That would be the only way to punish himself and extract justice for the murder of his children [1150]. Theseus' arrival, however, gets in the way of his suicidal plans [1153ff.]. His shame [1160], as well as his fear lest he pollutes his friend [1155f., 1161f.], create in him the compelling need to fly away or hide underneath the face of the earth [1157f.], and he covers himself so as not to pollute Theseus.[12]

Herakles' physiological symptoms of madness can be briefly summarized as follows :

1. Silence (ἔστη σιωπῇ [930]).
2. Head thrown back, tossing (τινάσσει κρᾶτα βαλβίδων ἄπο [867]).
3. Rolling of the eyes (διαστρόφους κόρας [868], στροφαῖσιν ὀμμάτων [932]).
4. Heavy, irregular, hot breathing (ἀμπνοὰς δ' οὐ σωφρονίζει [869]).
5. Bloodshot eyes (ῥίζας τ' ἐν ὄσσοις αἱματῶπας [933]).
6. Foaming (ἀφρὸν κατέσταζ' [934]).
7. Making loud animal sounds (μυκᾶται [870]).
8. Wild, insane laughter (γέλωτι παραπεπληγμένῳ [935]).
9. Then begin the delusions, hallucinations being the mental symptom of his abnormal condition.
10. On his recovery he is confused [cf. 1094ff.] and amnesic [1105-8], his breathing still hot and irregular [1092f.].

Most of these symptoms have already been discussed.[13] We will meet them again in *Bacchai,* as well as in *Orestes*. Foaming and rolling of the eyes "are traditional and genuine symptoms of abnormal states" (Dodds, *Ba*. 1122f., Bond 868). Both quote Hippokrates [*Sacr. Dis.* vii], but there is also an instance in *Medea* [1173f.], where these are symptoms of poisoning, or merely indication of pain. This, along with what has been seen in the previous chapter, is consistent with Bond's conclusion "that Euripides is using a conventional picture he has created". The insistence, that "it is nevertheless made up of *genuine* epileptic symptoms", however, as well as the general tendency to argue that Euripides wanted in *Herakles* to draw the portrait of an epileptic,[14] is mistaken.

The description by no means entirely consists of epileptic symptoms. To a certain extent the symptoms listed above fit well those of an epileptic seizure. Apart

from rolling eyes and foaming, ποδῶν σκιρτήματα are mentioned in Hippokrates' *Sacred Disease,* as a common symptom of epilepsy. We can also, from a modern, more advanced standpoint, say that the confusion to the point of amnesia, marked after the recovery, and the furor - (criminal acts may occur before or after a seizure) can be symptoms of epilepsy. The description, however, also includes details (i.e. the bloodshot eyes, the mad laughter) that do not occur in epilepsy. Hallucinations, although they could happen before or after a seizure, are not a common epileptic symptom and, if they occur, are of taste and smell rather than visual or auditory. The definition of epilepsy, as a paroxysmal and transitory disturbance of the function of the brain, which develops suddenly and ceases spontaneously, fits the situation in the play, but the fact that epilepsy exhibits a conspicuous tendency to recur does not.[15] More significantly, the description of Herakles' madness would also fit other mental disturbances. To take an obvious example, schizophrenia presents thought disorder and perceptual disturbance (delusion), as well as behavioural disturbance, such as outbursts of violence and senseless criminal acts. Physical symptoms could include almost any of the above listed symptoms, with the sole exception of foaming, which is nowadays viewed as an exclusively epileptic symptom. This, however, as examples such as the one in *Medea* show, was apparently not the case for the ancient Greeks.

Clearly Euripides is using a mixture of conventional traditional symptoms. It is not wise to speculate on what medically specific kind of madness Herakles is presented as struck by, nor on what name modern psychiatry would want to give it. The study of symptoms or variations of named or unnamed mental illness does not seem to have been Euripides' concern. His detailed description seems to have one purpose, the convincing portrayal of his protagonist as mad. Bond (ad. loc.),

comments : "Herakles' hallucinations and delusions are not a natural development of his physical symptoms : delusive mania and epileptic seizures are quite different things. But the initial symptoms are startling, and their development into delusions is impressive, even if medically incorrect. The *Bacchae* gives a strong impression that Euripides was interested in abnormal psychology; *HF* bears this out."

The importance lies not in judging, especially by our advanced scientific standards, whether the description is medically correct or not. The significant point is that, with the use of strikingly recognisable traditional symptoms, the portrayal is thoroughly convincing as that of a madman. Euripides' intention in *Herakles* was to present his protagonist as suffering from a kind of madness that (a) is caused entirely and purely by external factors, (b) is sudden, totally unexpected, and (c) is a transient phenomenon.

I now turn to *Orestes*, where an altogether different kind of madness is portrayed, and compare its physical description with the symptomatology discussed so far. J. W. Gregory writes about the play[16] : "Euripides unfolds a subtle and complex picture of madness as παράνοια - a perversion of the actual process of thought. He makes madness an expression and responsibility of the individual ψυχή. This is a development from the *Herakles*, in which madness came on a guiltless soul suddenly and unexplained." Her observations are right. Each of the plays is an individual, entirely different treatment of a common theme, madness; indeed, one of the main reasons madness is not easily defined, is precisely because it is not of one kind and never affects two persons in the same way. Its cause, symptoms and effects, as well as its treatment/therapy, are conditional upon the individual and his circumstances. Nevertheless, madness has certain common patterns of

manifestation, from which it can be recognised. I begin the analysis of *Orestes* with these common patterns in mind, considering first whether and how Orestes' symptoms are similar to those of Herakles, and then in what way differences between them suggest differences in the kind of madness afflicting each man.

Orestes' madness is not reported to us by a messenger. Its presentation is briefer than Herakles', but it takes place in front of the audience. We can see what triggers it, its development, peak, and dying away - (ἐκ κυμάτων γὰρ αὖθις αὖ γαλήν' ὁρῶ [279]). The introduction of the play begins with words that "are appropriate terms of physical pathology". Elektra is talking from the bedside of her brother, who is lying asleep. The staging provides "the medical context" in which these words "would have virtually technical meanings." [17]

Elektra's monologue is unusual, both in its length and in its opening lines, "in which a somewhat enigmatic blend of traditional and topical ideas and language sets the tone of Euripides' most sophisticated play and enunciates some of its themes." (Willink, ad. loc.). Despite its length, Elektra's speech will not give the full picture and it is not until we have experienced Orestes' madness scene that the presentation of the situation is completed. What will be a major theme of the play, νόσος, is already hinted in the very first lines with words such as δεινὸν, πάθος, ξυμφορὰ θεήλατος. A summarized background which covers Tantalos as well as the Atreus-Thyestes story and mentions the hated Helen, serves as genealogy but also reveals νόσος as a powerful element in the family history. Then the matricide is mentioned, and Elektra describes its consequences on her brother.

Orestes is lying in bed, melting away by a grave, savage disease (ἀγρίᾳ συντακεὶς νόσῳ νοσεῖ

[34]). His mother's blood is driving him out of his senses (τροχηλατεῖ μανίαισιν [36f.; cf. *El.* 1252f./*I.T.* 82f.]). Clearly the blood Orestes has shed is having on him the effect that Amphitryon had considered for Herakles at 966ff. (φόνος σ' ἐβάκχευσεν), although that murder was nowhere as horrific as Orestes' matricide, or indeed the murders Herakles was about to commit. The same idea is expressed, with similar vocabulary, at 338 :

ματέρος αἷμα σᾶς, ὅ σ' ἀναβακχεύει.

The dreadful goddesses that cannot be named,[18] scare him to madness (ἐξαμιλλῶνται φόβωι [38]).[19]

Elektra informs us that six days have gone by since Klytemnestra's burial;

ὧν οὔτε σῖτα διὰ δέρης ἐδέξατο,
οὐ λούτρ' ἔδωκε χρωτί· χλανιδίων δ' ἔσω
κρυφθείς, ὅταν μὲν σῶμα κουφισθῆι νόσου,
ἔμφρων δακρύει, ποτὲ δὲ δεμνίων ἄπο
πηδᾶι δρομαῖος, πῶλος ὡς ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ. [41-5].

Medical terminology is again present (κουφισθῆι νόσου), as well as words associated with bacchic activity (πηδᾶι δρομαῖος, πῶλος ὡς ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ; [cf. *Ba.* 307, 166, 1056]). The animal imagery reminds us of *Herakles* [869].

The direct presentation of Orestes' madness occurs in reverse order from the one in *Herakles* . We have Elektra being extremely cautious with the chorus, trying to keep them from awaking her brother [133f.].[20] The scene that follows [136ff.] is parallel to Amphitryon's scene with the chorus after Herakles' attack of madness. When Orestes wakes up he addresses sleep, as a friend who arrives at the hour of need, and Λήθη, who is so desperately wished for [211-4]. The sweet arrival of sleep is an ἐπίκουρον νόσου, and its tranquillizing effect is emphasized by θέλγητρον. Like Herakles, he

awakes amnesic [215f.], as he will also be after his attack at 277f.. He is in a weakened physical condition :
. . . ἄναρθρός εἰμι κἀσθενῶ μέλη [228];
with foam covering his face :
. . . , ἐκ δ' ὄμορξον ἁθλίου
στόματος ἀφρώδη πέλανον ὀμμάτων τ' ἐμῶν [219f.],
untidy and unwashed :
ὦ βοστρύχων πινῶδες ἄθλιον κάρα,
ὡς ἠγρίωσαι διὰ μακρᾶς ἁλουσίας. [225f.].

Elektra tells Orestes of the arrival of Menelaos, and before he has time to rejoice for what he thinks might be the end of their troubles, she announces that Helen is with him [241-6]. As Elektra indulges in her own hatred of Helen and her mother (γένος θυγατέρων δυσκλεές [250]), something seems to go wrong in Orestes' mind. He abruptly admonishes Elektra to be different from these evil women [251f.]. Orestes is on the verge of insanity; the look in his eyes betrays this [253f.] :
. . ., ὄμμα σὸν ταράσσεται,
ταχὺς δὲ μετέθου λύσσαν, ἄρτι σωφρονῶν.

Orestes' eyes are not "rolling" as Herakles' were. It is not so much their action that is being described but rather their agitation,[21] the disturbance from their usual look. This difference, I believe, emphasizes the difference between Herakles' externally caused madness, and Orestes' one, which is essentially the result of inner disturbance. The same thing seems to me to be pointed out by the fact that Orestes, again unlike Herakles, can feel the madness approaching. Note his panicked reaction at 255f., where, although still aware of reality, his hallucination is beginning to take control over him.

It seems that the ambiguity of 255ff.,[22] as to whether Orestes is actually seeing the Erinyes, is intended to serve two purposes :

(i) Stressing the question of whether Orestes' madness actually consists of seeing the Erinyes because they **are** there causing his madness, or whether he **thinks** he sees them, when they are in fact a product of his mad imagination.
(ii) Conveying the idea that he **feels** the attack of his madness approaching, first by just feeling the Erinyes, and, as the next stage, beginning to see them.

Orestes feels surrounded by τὰς αἱματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας [256], which he goes on to call κυνώπιδες and γοργῶπες at 260f.. In *Bacchai* [977] the frenzied mainads are also called Lyssa's κύνες. γοργῶπες brings to mind Lyssa's description of the mad Herakles [868], but a much stronger, and traditional association, is that of Lyssa with the Erinyes. Daughters of the Night [*Eum*. 321], and madness-causing deities themselves, the Erinyes are described as κύνες [cf. *Ch*. 924, 1054] in *Elektra* [1342], a play that has, as will be seen, numerous connections with *Orestes*. The prediction of the Dioskouroi about Orestes being driven to madness (τροχηλατήσουσ' ἐμμανῆ [*El*. 1253]) again uses the same epithet (κυνώπιδες) for the goddesses.

Elektra tries to reassure Orestes by pointing out to him that, in reality, he is seeing nothing of what he believes he clearly knows :
ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν δοκεῖς σάφ' εἰδέναι. [259].
The sentence reminds us of Herakles' :
σαφῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶδα τῶν εἰωθότων. [1108].
The use here of the same verb, εἰδέναι, stresses the fact that it is Orestes' whole perception and cognition process that is malfunctioning. The difference is of course that what is actually seen by Herakles is reality, while Orestes' is a self-created vision. Elektra's ἀτρέμα [258] describes his trembling, (no shaking is mentioned in *Herakles*), more the result of fear at his

horrifying vision, rather than a symptom of his mental illness.

By 257/9, Orestes' perceptual errors have developed into a full scale hallucination. He insists on the presence of the Erinyes near him. Elektra, holding on to him in an effort to restrain him, is now seen by Orestes, who is trying to break free from her firm grip (ὀχμάζειις), as one of his Erinyes pushing him into Tartaros. This is parallel to Herakles' mistaken perception of his children as those of Eurystheus [*Her.* 969ff.]. Nevertheless, as the despair of 266f. reveals, despite her determination not to let go, Elektra is helpless. Orestes does break free as his attack reaches its climax, and with his imaginary bow chases the Furies away.

His recovery begins at 277, marked with the surprised ἔα. Out of breath, he is wondering what has happened. Like Herakles, he is confused and amnesic [*Her.* 1091-3/*Or.* 215f.], and feels as if he has been in a storm. His hallucinations have been repeated for some days now. This is obvious in the text at 34-45, Elektra has learned to recognise them as they approach [253f.]; there is also Orestes' αὖθις αὖ [279]. Along with the calm comes shame towards his sister for the misery he is causing her [281].

Orestes' disease, then, has been described to us, either directly or indirectly, as repeated attacks of madness (μανία), which consists of terrifying visual-auditory hallucinations, that reduce him to a weak and vulnerable state [218, 227f.]. During the attacks Orestes πηδᾷι δρομαῖος, πῶλος ὡς ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ [44], (cf. 263/5 : σχήσω σε πηδᾶν δυστυχῆ πηδήματα), trembles with fear [258/7], the look in his eyes becomes wild and agitated [253]. Foam is mentioned at 219f.. After the attacks, whether driven to sleep or not, he

suffers from amnesia [215f., 277f.], and in the time in between he refrains from eating and washing, hiding away, ashamed, in his bed [41-4].

The symptoms of Orestes that are similar with Herakles', are, in fact, the ones associated in *Herakles* with epilepsy. There can be no doubt here that Euripides had no intention of portraying Orestes as an epileptic. This supports that : (a) Herakles' portrayal was not meant to be that of an epileptic, and (b) Euripides was using out of the traditionally and medically established conventional symptoms, those he considered most dramatically effective. However, as is the case with Herakles, I believe that he also chose symptoms that seemed to him more appropriate to the kind of madness he wished to depict. It is for this very reason that most of the symptoms of Orestes differ, or are not present in Herakles. Orestes' madness, as already mentioned at the beginning of the analysis of the play, is "παράνοια - a perversion of the actual process of thought", "a perversion of the individual ψυχή".[23] The portrayal here resembles a study of a person in delirium, the "mental state in which altered consciousness is combined with psychomotor overactivity, hallucinosis and disorientation".[24] As has been seen,[25] in the *Hippokratic Writings* there are frequent mentions of delirium, and fear is associated with delirium throughout the treatise on *Sacred Disease* . Euripides' description also follows modern definitions almost perfectly : Awareness of oneself and surroundings is impaired; the patient becomes alarmingly bright-eyed, gross perceptual errors occur, and visual hallucinations are more than common, while states of panic or terror are standard emotional symptoms.

Before, however, discussing in any greater depth the information in the plays regarding the causes and nature of each man's madness, which I intend to do in the

following chapter, I must first examine the symptomatology of madness in *Bacchai*. The discussion of madness in this play can never be an easy task. The tragedy has been called ". . . the drama par excellence of madness, constantly exploring the question of who is truly mad and who is sane".[26] Madness is portrayed with three different faces. That of the real mainads is the frenzied gift of Dionysos; Agave's madness on the other hand, although still god-sent, is a form of punishment. In Pentheus' case the portrayal is even more complicated. The cause of his madness is complex, its boundaries are ambiguous, its beginning is doubtful, and its end irreparably tragic. This is reflected in the distinct lack of clearly defined physical symptoms. For this reason, I shall assess and evaluate the portrayal of Pentheus' madness after I have analysed the psychology of madness in *Herakles* and *Orestes*. Here I will only examine the portrayal of the mainads' and Agave's madness.

There is in the play a conscious effort to distinguish the vocabulary of madness from that of bacchic ecstasy. From the prologue Dionysos states very clearly [32f., 36], that it is not pure bacchic ecstasy but madness as a punishment that he has sent the women of Thebes :

τοιγὰρ νιν αὐτὰς ἐκ δόμων ὦ̓στρησ' ἐγὼ
μανίαις, ὄρος δ' οἰκοῦσι παρακόποι φρενῶν·

In the speech describing Pentheus' death there is important information about these false mainads. Their madness, including that of Agave, is described with many familiar physical symptoms. For instance, 1122f. (ἀφρὸν ἐξιεῖσα καὶ διαστρόφους κόρας ἑλίσσουσ'), 1087 (διήνεγκαν κόρας), and their unnatural swiftness and kicking [1090-4]. Like both Herakles and Orestes, Agave does neither listen nor respond to Pentheus' supplications [1124]. The first sign of her delusion we get at 1107f., where she sees her son both as a beast as well as the human spy that he actually is. This delusion is of the same nature as Herakles' and

Orestes' perceptual errors [*Her.* 969ff./*Or.* 264f.], while its ambiguity[27] is as revealing as Orestes' confusing Elektra as both his sister and an Erinys.[28] Later on, at the scene with Kadmos and Agave, the words used for Agave's and the mainads' madness will be οἰστροπλῆγας [1229], ἐμάνητε [1295].

On the contrary, for the god's true worshippers, the chorus of the real mainads, the descriptions used are quite different. They get compared to a colt or a fawn [166f., 864ff.], but the common link between them and, for example Orestes, who is also compared to a colt [*Or.* 45], is not madness, but the excited state, the emotion, that results in friskiness. In lines such as 80 (ἀνὰ θύρσον τε τινάσσων), or 167 (κῶλον ἄγει ταχύπουν σκιρτήμασι βάκχα), the vocabulary suggesting uncontrolled movement that might be reminiscent of madness is always linked with the excitement and ecstasy of the god's worship. Moreover, the collapse to the ground [cf. 135ff.] is not the result of exhaustion from an attack of madness, but the climaxing point of ecstasy when the ὠμοφαγία begins.

The proper bacchic chorus sing in their parodos of the happy and blissful state (μάκαρ, εὐδαίμων) they experience as bacchants [72-82]. It is obvious from their song that if the participation in the worshipping of the god is willing, the bacchant reaches ecstatic levels (θιασεύεται ψυχάν) through the merging of the self into the group, surrounded by the serenity of nature, which is itself described with utmost beauty [105-19, 135-67]. On the other hand, the paradox of ὠμοφάγον χάριν [138], the strangeness of νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς / ὁσιοῦσθ'· [113f.], suggest the ambiguity in the activities of the mainads. As part of the worship of the god, they are controlled and subdued; but the irrational violence they entail erupt to destruction with the false mainads who are struck with madness by the god.

In the messenger's description [679-768], although the mainads on the mountains are not true bacchants but turned to such by the god as punishment, they do not become violent until they are attacked. Having just awoken, they are described as θαῦμα ἰδεῖν εὐκοσμίας [693], in perfect harmony with animals and nature [695-703], enjoying the water, wine, milk and honey that the earth springs up at the demand of the thyrsos, as gifts of the god [704-13]. At the moment, however, that they are preparing to honour him, with the whole of nature participating in their ecstasy [723-7], they are attacked by the men and turn into hounds (δρομάδες κύνες). Their σπαραγμός of the animals is not the culmination of pure ritual ecstasy as described in the parodos. It leaves the nature around them dripping with blood [734-45]. The weapons that the villagers attack them with prove inoffensive, while the mainads, with their thyrsoi and god's help, prove victorious.

In both *Herakles* and *Orestes* bacchic imagery is used for the protagonists' madness, but here it is quite important that the two are distinguished. In *Herakles* the mingling of the dual aspect of bacchic experience is indiscriminate. The joy that the chorus express at Herakles' victory over Lykos is compared to the ecstatic happiness of Βρόμιος [680-2], while Herakles himself has been a bacchant during his madness [1119] and his madness is bacchic [893, 899, 966, 1085, 1122]. In *Bacchai,* by separating the vocabulary an emphasis is laid on how the god captures, as one essence, the volatility of emotion, which can lead to ecstasy if it is acknowledged and celebrated, or to madness if denied and repressed.

The aftermath of this madness is portrayed in Agave's recovery after the killing of Pentheus. She arrives on stage, her eyes still rolling with madness [1166f.], on the borders of delusion [1169-1171], but recognising, in

the head of Pentheus, his characteristics of youth [1173f., 1185-7] : νέος ὁ μόσχος ἄρ -
τι γένυν ὑπὸ κόρυθα' ἁπαλότριχα
κατάκομον θάλλει.
She is amnesic, but her amnesia is only partial [1209f.], she knows that she has killed and dismembered. It is not the result of madness but of her suppressing knowledge of her deed. This is obvious in the scene that follows in the resistance she shows to Kadmos. The chorus has so far been sarcastically encouraging her manic state, so when Kadmos enters the stage, she notices neither the body nor his distress. She states triumphantly her pride and hands over τἀριστεῖα to him [1233-43]. By projection, she will blame Kadmos[29] for not sharing her joy, but also her son, whom she wishes would be as good a hunter as she [1251-8].[30] Kadmos now realises that he has to intervene to help his daughter who, unless helped, will never come to the truth [1259-2]. In the same way as Amphitryon with Herakles, he tests Agave's sanity. By looking at the sky [1264], Agave is forced to look at reality and dispel her delusions. As G. Devereux comments,[31] the sky being a traditional Greek lever, her culturally conditioned reflexes are bound to react to the apotropaic value of the Sun. She sees it brighter and clearer [1267/cf. *Her.* 1089]. Kadmos suggests to her that, in the same way, her previous state (τὸ πτοηθὲν) must have abandoned her [1268], but Agave resists him, although she admits there has been a change in her. Trying to hold on to her defensive amnesia [1272], she betrays her awareness of the importance of their previous conversation. As a means of forestalling further immediate rejection, Kadmos begins by asking her questions from the past. This also means that everything that Agave remembers will be her own experience. Agave is reminded of her marriage and motherhood, and is then asked to recognise the head she is carrying in her arms [1273-7]. Avoiding to look at it,

Agave holds on to the easiest answer at hand, which also betrays her lack of personal conviction :
λέοντος, ὥς γ' ἔφασκον αἱ θηρώμεναι. [1278].

Left, however, with no choice under Kadmos' gentle but firm insistence, she turns, faces and recognises it [1278-1285]. From the point where Agave starts asking questions, she is prepared to accept the answers, no longer rejecting the truth. She will however, throw the responsibilty on the god [1296], and her question at 1300 reveals that she subconsciously knows the way Pentheus was killed, even if she is still not prepared to admit it. At this crucial point there is a gap in the text. The next line of Agave's shows not only complete awareness and acceptance of her madness, but also of the fact that she and not the god bear the responsibility of it [ἀφροσύνης . . . ἐμῆς, 1301]. From the nature of the question asked at 1300, it is not unreasonable to assume that during the reassembling of the body which must have occured during the gap (see Dodds ad loc.), the σπαραγμός of Pentheus, and probably the ὠμοφαγία are revealed to her.

Kadmos' role in Agave's recovery is similar to that of Amphitryon in *Herakles*. With care and love they both try to bring their children back to sanity from a god-inflicted madness. There is, however, one difference. Herakles is, on awaking, genuinely amnesic. He has no awareness of his deeds, therefore he presents none of the defensive rejection that Agave shows to Kadmos. Amphitryon's task is to reveal to his son the horrendous deeds of his madness so that he will accept them as his own. Agave, on the other hand, needs a different kind of help. Her resistance must be overcome to lead her into recognition of what she knows she has done and acceptance of its responsibility.

In Orestes' case things are rather different. Although he recovers from individual attacks of madness, he never recovers fully from the disease itself. There is indeed enough evidence in the play to suggest that his horrendous deed, which results in madness and for which he denies responsibility, is itself the ultimate manifestation of a more permanent psychopathological state. In the following chapter I shall be examining this evidence and comparing it with information from *Herakles* regarding the nature of the corresponding protagonists' madness.

3. The Psychology of Madness

Modern psychology has established that the major causes of mental illness usually have their roots in either the situational stress of an individual, or his constitution.[1] Using as my source of information the "direct and indirect report level"[2] in the plays, I shall try to assess Euripides' portrayal of the nature of madness for each of his three mad protagonists.

Herakles is someone out of the ordinary. From the beginning of the play, Euripides does his best to ensure that we are sufficiently reminded of his divine origin and supernatural strength. For someone who possesses Herakles' qualities and heroism,[3] the pressure facing him on his return from Hades is no particular stress. What might have caused a more ordinary human being to break down is counterbalanced precisely by his constitution.

Herakles' madness is god-sent. The unusual and dramatically effective scene of Iris and Lyssa dispels any doubts as to whether it was Hera's revengeful hate that wished and caused it. Hera's hostility is briefly introduced in the prologue [20], and acknowledged by everybody towards the end of the play [1189, 1253, 1263-8, 1303-10, 1311f., 1393]. It is only with Iris' words [822-42], for the first time in the play, that her desire to destroy Herakles and her bitter hatred become prominent. At 826 the aetiology for Hera's hatred is provided, while 840 proves that her χόλος is her only consistent motivation for not allowing the interests of mortals to triumph over those of gods [841f.]. Lyssa objects to the injustice of punishing such a glorious benefactor [849-54], but she is reminded that she has not been sent there by Hera σωφρονεῖν. The line seems like a reminder that we are not expected to try and make

sense of what is apparently Hera's caprice, or even irrationality.[4]

There is no sign or hint anywhere else in the play that madness is lurking in Herakles. Madness, then, is an invasion; it does not come from within but externally. Nevertheless, by the end of the play, it will become obvious that the conflicts present, not necessarily within Herakles, but in the texture of the play, played a major part in the causation of his madness. Hera's hatred, motivated by the circumstances surrounding his paternity, caused the madness. This provides the thematic link with the conflict that lies in Herakles' double nature, which derives from his double fatherhood. He has both aspects, human and divine, and this ambivalence is a very important aspect of the play.[5] His double fatherhood is introduced from the very first line, and frequently mentioned throughout [148-50, 170, 339f., 354, 798ff.]. The madness scene serves to emphasize how strong the human element is in him since madness is an aspect of the nature of human beings and not divinities.

Madness, the result of Hera's refusal to accept Herakles' dual paternity, forces the choice on him, and the dominant note of the whole play, affection, leads him to resolve the ambivalence. The cause of his madness is not emotion. Emotion will be the therapy for his despair at the result of madness : (i) His choice of father is based on emotional grounds. The gods' cruelty and indifference, which he finds unbearable and incomprehensible [1243, 1263f., 1307f., 1341-6], help him make his choice of father [1264f.]. He is aware that humanity consists of suffering and need, which is his state now [cf. 1281]. This is incompatible with his idea of god (δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὀρθῶς θεός,/οὐδενός· . . . [1345f.]), but equally incompatible with the god's attitude to him.

(ii) The help he gets from Theseus is based on their emotional relationship.
(iii) The final recognition and acceptance of his mortality occurs when he comes to terms with his emotions,[6] not as a sign of weakness but as an essential, undeniable part of his nature.

Herakles' decision at the point of Theseus' arrival is to kill himself. His reasons for wishing to die are explicitly stated by him as grief [1147], desire for justice [1150], and δύσκλεια [1152]. Amphitryon's supplication [1203-13] describes Herakles' θυμός as that of a roaring lion (λέοντος ἀγρίου). At the thought of his unholy murders it urges Herakles to suicide. Theseus uncovers him, and tries to draw his attention away from the thought of suicide. He challenges Herakles' depression (γέμω κακῶν δή [1245ff.]), by telling him that he is talking like any ordinary person. The intended irony of 1250 (ὁ πολλὰ δὴ τλὰς Ἡρακλῆς λέγει τάδε;) strengthens the insult of ἐπιτυχών, to which Theseus intends his friend to react. A much enduring hero like Herakles should not talk of suicide, a sign of ἀμαθία.

As Herakles puts forward his case, the personal dimension colours it differently. His life has always been unbearable :
ἀβίωτον ἡμῖν νῦν τε καὶ πάροιθεν ὄν. [1257ff.].
After this last labour (τὸν λοίσθιον δὲ τόνδ' ἔτλην τάλας πόνον [1279]) and the δύσκλεια that accompanies it, he can see no reason to carry on living :
τί δῆτά με ζῆν δεῖ; τί κέρδος ἔξομεν
βίον γ' ἀχρεῖον ἀνόσιον κεκτημένοι; [1301f.].
Theseus, however, provides him with a motive; he reminds him that even gods have to give in to fate [1320f.]. Herakles realises that he could not bear an accusation of δειλία as well as his δύσκλεια [1347-50], so he resigns himself :

νῦν δ', ὡς ἔοικε, τῇ τύχῃ δουλευτέον. [1357].

Without ceasing or hesitating to offer essential support [1398, 1400, 1402], Theseus now adopts a firmer attitude to Herakles. He realises that Herakles will have to be dragged away, because, by himself, he will not find the strength to fight his longing to be with his family, even if dead [cf. 1406, 1408]. At 1412 Theseus shows disapproval at Herakles' "effeminate" behaviour, and this makes Herakles wonder whether Theseus' attitude is implying that he should now live in a humble way, in contrast with his previous life [1413]. Theseus' answer reminds Herakles that he is no longer the glorious hero, but an ill, suffering, humble mortal [1414]. What he is trying to do is help Herakles make the transition from his state of glorious hero, the son of Zeus, to that of a crushed mortal. When endurance is needed, he points out his past heroism, to convince Herakles to live and fight his despair. On the other hand, when Herakles finds it impossible to accept his present condition, he reminds him that he is nothing else but a suffering human being.

Despite the fact that it is hard to come to terms with it [1353-56], through the friendship, love, and support of Theseus Herakles learns to handle his despair and survive the catastrophe he caused ([1351] : ἐγκαρτερήσω βίοτον·). This is in complete contrast with Aias' attitude. As previously remarked, there are several similarities between the two heroes, their circumstances, and the portrayal of their madness.[7] Herakles, however, through his labours has acquired an enormous capacity for endurance, something that Theseus keeps reminding him of. His suffering is in fact stronger than Aias' because it does not involve only shame and hurt pride, but the pain, sorrow, and guilt at his family's murder. Herakles' monologue contemplating suicide [*Her.* 1279-310] lacks the hatred and bitter resentment [cf. *Aias* 434-56] which characterizes that of

Aias [457-80]. While Aias is ashamed to face his father [460-6], Herakles has by him, tangibly, the support of Amphitryon [1113] :
ὦ τέκνον· εἶ γὰρ καὶ κακῶς πράσσων ἐμός.

Moreover, Herakles is capable of accepting the love and support of his friend; Aias rejects Tekmessa and the support of the chorus [368ff.], putting his family's love and need of him [587f.] in an inferior position to his hurt pride.[8] While Herakles does not want to be alone, lest something happens to him because of his sorrow and despair at his children's death (λύπηι τι παίδων μὴ πάθω μονούμενος [1388]), Aias, refusing to compromise with his new, human rather than heroic, circumstances, betrays all the characteristics of the Sophoklean hero in his absolute isolation and alienation.[9]

It is rather obvious then, that madness in *Herakles* is not an illness, nor is it a permanent state or characteristic of the protagonist. On the contary, in *Orestes*, νόσος is central. Here madness has characterological meaning, it is part of Orestes' personality. The two protagonists have nothing in common, not even their madness. The only thing they share are the hallucinations that occur during its attacks. Orestes' madness is not god-sent, it comes from inside him. The Erinyes are only one of the symptoms, his persecutory hallucinations which result from his guilty conscience. The horrific deed of Herakles takes place because he has gone mad. Orestes becomes completely insane because of the horrific crime he has committed. In order to make this obvious and stress the importance of Orestes' character in his madness, Euripides provides us with what psychologists would call today Orestes' "case history". The powerfully descriptive account is not limited to the scene of his attack, itself not as central to the play as the one in *Herakles* . It covers the way he looks and behaves throughout the play.

Orestes' hallucinating scene is not reported to us but takes place on stage. It lasts for a considerably shorter length of time, and is not as violent as Herakles'. Orestes' is full of panic, and a desperate need for release, while Herakles' betrays no elements of vulnerability in its triumphant violence and savagery. Orestes can feel the attack coming, in a way that Herakles never does [*Or.* 255-8], because it is emerging from inside himself, and although Elektra tries to reassure him that nothing he sees is real, she cannot prevent his utter horror at the imaginary presence of the Erinyes. At 235f. (μάλιστα· δόξαν γὰρ τόδ' ὑγιείας ἔχει. κρεῖσσον δὲ τὸ δοκεῖν, κἄν ἀληθείας ἀπῇ.)

Orestes states his preference for appearances to reality, which will become more obvious as the play progresses. This is emphasized by Elektra's use of δοκεῖν for his hallucinations of the Erinyes [259].

Elektra's intense and emotional care brings Orestes' fear of women to the surface.[10] His ambivalent relationship with the women in his family is obvious in his mistaking Elektra as an Erinys :

σύ νυν διάφερε τῶν κακῶν· ἔξεστι γάρ·
καὶ μὴ μόνον λέγ', ἀλλὰ καὶ φρόνει τάδε. [251f.].

His hallucination begins, and it will stop only when Orestes uses the bow, which forms part of the same imaginary reality as his Erinyes. By doing this he refers the responsibility to Apollo, and thus gets rid of the guilt that is causing his hallucination. At the same time the bow of the god gives him the 'manly' strength to fight against the Erinyes, who render him powerless, unman him [cf. *Eum.* 185-90, 137f., 184, 264-66, 365].[11]

Both Orestes and Herakles experience shame related to their madness. Herakles' shame is one of the reasons he covers himself. But from what Orestes says [281-3], it is obvious that the shame he feels is not due to his act

of matricide, but to the suffering he imposes on his sister. Also, Elektra's words [42-4] imply that Orestes feels ashamed for no other reason but the state he is reduced to by his disease. Herakles has another, important reason for covering himself; he does not wish to pollute his friend, who is ἀναίτιος [*Her.* 1161f., 1199-1201]. Orestes, however, does not seem to be worried about pollution. A possible explanation for this, of course, could be the fact that his sister is not entirely ἀναίτιος. She has played a part in the matricide, and hence she is already polluted. The same could be said of his friend, Pylades. Menelaos, however, for example, is ἀναίτιος. The fact that Orestes is neither ashamed to come face to face with his uncle, nor concerned lest he pollutes him,[12] seems to me significant for his psychology; it goes some way to prove that he does not consciously feel either shame or guilt for his deed.

At 285-93 Orestes speaks for the first time about his crime. Although he regrets the terrible consequences of the matricide, there is no mention of guilt whatsoever. He blames Apollo [285], and even so the blame as such is not for ordering the crime.[13] Willink (ad loc.) calls Orestes' statements "significantly self-revealing". At least when ἔμφρων Orestes experiences no conscious guilt. There is only one point in the play where Orestes proves unable to repudiate his guilt, despite the many justifications he can invent for his deed[14] :

ἐπεὶ τίν' εἶχες, ὦ τάλας, ψυχὴν τότε,
ὅτ' ἐξέβαλλε μαστὸν ἱκετεύουσά σε
μήτηρ; ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἰδὼν τἀκεῖ κακά,
δακρύοις γέροντ' ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκτήκω τάλας.

[526-9].

Tyndareos, who had refused so far to talk to the polluted Orestes [479-81], having reached the climax of his speech, suddenly turns and addresses him with these tremendously powerful lines. His emotion is strong enough to lead him to defiance of the law against which

he himself had warned Menelaos. Tyndareos' lines echo the question with which Orestes' was left after killing his mother in *Elektra,* at the sudden realisation of the horror of what he had done and the emergence of guilt [*El.* 1206-9, 1214-7]. Similar feelings are expressed in *Orestes* by the chorus [819ff.], but nowhere by Orestes (or indeed Elektra) himself.

Orestes' guilt is something he can block, control when he is ἔμφρων. It surfaces only when he loses control during his madness attacks. It is important, however, to clarify what exactly is meant by ἔμφρων. Elektra uses it [44] as the state that Orestes is ὅταν μὲν σῶμα κουφισθῇ νόσου, as opposed to the one he is in when he is raving. ἔμφρων does not seem to mean in his ***right*** mind. Orestes is not completely sane at any point in the play. He is ἔμφρων, ὅταν ἀνῇ νόσος μανίας [227f.], when he is not hallucinating, but this is not the same as saying he is in his right mind. Orestes would become sane only if he were to admit consciously his guilt and face his shame - which he never does. So all his repressed feelings find their only outlet in attacks of madness. Immediately after the attack, when Orestes is still in an extremely vulnerable state, they surface and prevail. A similar thing happens to Pentheus, as we shall see in the discussion of *Bacchai.*[15] It is important to note here that neither Orestes nor Pentheus are ever in a *healthy* state of mind. The word νόσος, recurrent in *Orestes* [34, 211f., 227, 232,282, 314, 395, 407, 791, 800, 831] is also used in *Bacchai* by Teiresias [311, 327] to describe Pentheus' state. The word seems to imply a permanence in the disturbance of their φρένες.

This very important theme of νόσος is introduced from early on, in the first lines of Elektra's prologue. She begins with words that could be its synonyms, and as she presents her genealogy she stresses the trace of νόσος that runs down the family line [10, 14, 24.]

Although, as Elektra herself is aware, such attitudes and crimes as she is describing are all part of human nature (ἀνθρώπου φύσις), this long line of criminal ancestors seems to imply a tendency for repetition of criminal behaviour. C. Fuqua[16] comments : "... the sickness motif which is to prove so important for evaluating Orestes' conduct for the remainder of the play is introduced in terms of its mythological archetype. It should be noted that at the same time Elektra parallels these various sequences of events from different generations, she also expresses doubts about their propriety, 4-5, 14, 17, 26-7. In this way the ambiguity of the present situation is seen as having its analogues in the past." The chorus refer to Orestes' matricide as νόσος [831-3], and his frantic attempts to justify his crime (τὸ δ' εὖ κακουργεῖν) they call κακοφρόνων ἀνδρῶν παράνοια [823f.].

Menelaos asks Orestes [395] what this illness, this disease he is suffering from, is :
τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος;
The answer :
ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος [396],
reveals how Orestes' awareness of the horrific nature of his deed is causing him λύπη[17]; that is why he appears as someone from the underworld [385]. According to Menelaos, λύπη is δεινή but ἰάσιμος [398f.]. Orestes, however, is incapable of curing it. It has led to μανίαι, which are μητρὸς αἵματος τιμωρίαι. The linking chain is thus explained by Orestes himself. He has reached his present state because he is aware that his deed was δεινόν. Λύπη and μανίαι are the results of σύνεσις. The Erinyes, the persecutory hallucinations, are only one of the manifestations of μανία, the result of σύνεσις, awareness. So his madness comes from inside him.[18] What matters to him more is the consequences of his deed, rather than outward appearances [388, 390]. The triple answer shows that

his distress has its roots both in "thought" (awareness) and feeling. There is a confused blending in him of emotion and reason driving him to madness. His remorse is not intellectual, mental; it is emotionally experienced, even if subconsciously.[19] The emotional suffering is unbearable. Although probably not entirely conscious of it, what Orestes seems to be saying here is that his grief might have been ἰάσιμος if he were able to bring his emotions to the surface, admit and accept them. His mania consists exactly of the refusal of his self to do this, while the other aspect of σύνεσις,[20] the mental awareness, cannot be controlled, blocked or ignored. That is why he went mad.

Willink (ad loc.) believes that "It is more important to appreciate the paradoxical use of language and interplay of themes than to ask whether Or. is 'truly remorseful' in the sense 'repentant'." While appreciating the splendid use of language and the ingenious interplay of themes is undoubtedly important, it seems to me equally so that we address the question of whether Orestes is experiencing guilt or not. In fact, it seems to me that this very ingenuity and complexity of language are there for a purpose. When Euripides "indulges in sophistical word-play (σύνεσις . . . σύνοιδα, implying συνείδησις)", he must be, indeed, counting on the "echo of the sophistical view that συνείδησις may be πολέμιον τῶι συνειδότι (Antiph. 5. 93)" as Willink suggests. I believe that Euripides intended the question of the presence of guilt in Orestes to be asked, and in fact he gives us several clues as to the answer. Willink himself goes on to remark : "he does not use the vb μεταγιγνώσκειν or related words (cf. S. *Phil.* 1270); and even in his 'saner' moments (as 280-300) we feel that he would do the same thing again, given the appropriate ἐλπίς. His apologia to Tyndareus is notably 'unrepentant'."

What Orestes also admits, even if indirectly at 396, is that he is aware of his personal responsibility for committing the matricide. Orestes' situation was based on a choice. He had the freedom to choose. There was no absolute 'necessity' (i.e. there was an alternative) in what he did. The dilemma of whether or not to kill his mother, was placed upon him by his relationships with, particularly, other members of his family, and more generally, the world around him, including the gods. Would it be best not to kill her and be pursued by his father's Erinyes [580-4]? What would be his position in the society if he did not avenge his father? The pressure from the social environment is obvious [917-30, 932-42, 538f., 546f., 552ff.]. At 572, however, Orestes admits the paramount reason for which he killed his mother :
μισῶν μητέρ' ἐνδίκως ἀπώλεσα.
He is desperately trying to present his act as one of heroism so as to regain the position he lost in society. Nevertheless, despite these constraints and pressures, his choice was still free. Its 'freedom' lies in the fact that, independently of them, for or against people's or gods' wish, will, or command, he is the one who makes the choice; nobody else makes it for him.

The question of Orestes' responsibility and divine justification is introduced by Elektra :
Φοίβου δ' ἀδικίαν μὲν τί δεῖ κατηγορεῖν;
<u>πείθει</u> δ' Ὀρέστην μητέρ' ἥ σφ' ἐγείνατο
κτεῖναι, πρὸς οὐχ ἅπαντας εὔκλειαν φέρον.
ὅμως δ' ἀπέκτειν' <u>οὐκ ἀπειθήσας</u> θεῷ· [28-31].
At 285-7 the blame on Apollo is not for ordering the crime but for not helping afterwards :
. . . · Λοξίᾳ δὲ <u>μέμφομαι</u>,
ὅστις μ' ἐπάρας ἔργον ἀνοσιώτατον,
<u>τοῖς μὲν λόγοις ηὔφρανε, τοῖς δ' ἔργοισιν οὔ</u>.
The use of ηὔφρανε is important as it shows Orestes' eagerness to commit the murder; "it throws a revealing

light on Orestes' readiness to commit crimes of violence, given the appropriate ἐλπίς,...", (Willink ad loc.).

Divine justification is used in *Orestes* only as the ostensible excuse. In Sophokles' *Elektra* there are no attempts at divine justification. In that play Orestes and Elektra remain for always the μητροκτόνοι. Their powerful hatred is the only reason given there for the matricide; and it is as solid and conscious a reason for the crime, as the horror they are left with as its consequence. Both brother and sister have been throughout aware of what their act would entail, as well as of its motives. Therefore there is no desperate quest for salvation afterwards, no question of responsibility, no guilt, no madness.

In Aischylos, as I have discussed,[21] divine justification is the only one there is. In *Orestes* the characters in the play do not doubt for a moment that his madness is the result of the Erinyes. The play as a whole, however, questions this. Choosing the matricide and its effects as his starting-point, Euripides' presentation explores Orestes' madness in all its ambiguity. Even if the Erinyes exist it is ambiguous as to what they represent. Are they Klytemnestra's avengers, or Orestes' guilty conscience? Or are they one sign of his madness, itself the result of his guilty conscience? Is indeed his madness the result of guilty conscience, or is it the final stage of a more permanent psychological disturbance? These are all questions that the play presents. They all remain unanswered; some more, others less investigated, but all probable and possible within the play's context. Although brilliantly described, Orestes' madness is unspecified, highly ambiguous. This ambiguity is yet another respect that renders the profound psychological realism of the presentation even more ingenious.

By the end of the play Orestes has managed to convince himself he is not guilty. All his inhibitions disappear; once his mother's blood was enough (ἅλις [1039]), but at 1590 this is no longer so :
οὐκ ἄν κάμοιμι τὰς κακὰς κτείνων ἀεί.
His paranoid[22] condition is emphasized by the play's noticeable shifts from health to disease, sanity to madness, reality to delusion. His disjointed view is reflected in his bitterness at Menelaos' betrayal, illustrating his irrational reaction to the fact that society no longer pays him his due, no longer functions as he thought it ought to.[23] Important notions and feelings have for Orestes altering value and definition. The tenderness between him and his sister at the beginning, turns into self-pity [cf. 1022f./1033f.]. Φιλία, which in *Herakles* provides comfort for despair and madness,[24] is praised by Orestes as it takes the form of conspiracy [cf. 805, 1155-62]. Σύνεσις, the painful awareness of his horrific deed, is used by Orestes for the masculine and inspired mind of Elektra, who conceives the kidnapping of Hermione as a hostage in order to lead to their σωτηρία [1180]. But more importantly, Orestes defines as σύνεσις the strong instinct of self-preservation, which he shares with the Phrygian slave [1524]. This characteristic of his is in fact unique in terms of what has been encountered so far in the symptomatology of madness. Orestes' powerful desire to live, contrasts with other mad characters' wish for death, because of shame or discomfort resulting from their disease.[25] In this play, the characters' obsession with the idea of survival drives them beyond their original intentions to delusional murderous activity. Remarkably, at the end of the play, just before this activity is about to be exposed as "fictional" by Apollo,[26] who restores mythic reality, the guiding force of self-preservation shifts to a sudden urge for death.

Orestes is portrayed, in modern psychological terms, as a paranoid psychotic, a psychopath. His delusions of persecution, (which is specifically what is termed as paranoia today) are the classic sign of a psychotic personality. As the play progresses, after the betrayal of Menelaos, the arrival of new hope with Pylades, the assembly's decision, Orestes becomes more and more paranoid. In his desperate search for σωτηρία his will to live will bring him into a state of mania, in which he clearly is by the end of the play.[27] *The abnormality of his emotional reactions and conduct* is evident in his tender and loving behaviour with Elektra at the beginning [294-306], which is later [1022ff.] to become hard and stubborn, then again weak and broken as he falls into her arms [1047ff.]; also in his attitude towards Tyndareos at 459-69, in contrast with 564f., 568, 571, 583-6. He *does not show any signs of gross intellectual defect.* He can scheme and plan and originally can see right from wrong. Orestes' insanity, unlike Pentheus' (who, from the moment he goes completely mad remains so for the rest of the play - until, perhaps, the moment of his death) is neither even nor constant through the several episodes of the play. Rather, the degree of his abnormality within them fluctuates. Nor is he portrayed in the same way as Herakles, who is mad for a specific length of time within one episode. The fact that drama is by its very nature episodical and selective emphasizes even more that Orestes only *episodically reaches a degree of abnormality that amounts to certifiable insanity.*

Moreover, *he lacks foresight and ordinary prudence* (especially obvious in his almost blind acceptance of Pylades' scheme). *His critical sense fades* towards the end of the play [1166-76, 1204-8]. From the scene with the Phrygian slave onwards he seems to be *entering a state of mania;* and he is clearly *confused,* he speaks of

Helen as dead by his hand [1512, 1534], while at the end he clearly thinks she is alive [1580, 1586, 1614].

At the end of the play Orestes reveals that he feared Apollo was nothing more than a part of his hallucinations [1667-70]. δόξαιμι stresses the ironical ambiguity. Apollo, another example of how gods operate by different laws, their standards having no point of reference to those of ordinary human beings, absolves Orestes and assures him of his external safety and prosperity [1644-65]. But as with all his other orders, he leaves very ambiguous the aspect of Orestes' relief from his inner suffering. Will madness set Orestes free if the Erinyes abandon him? What about his σύνεσις? The question is not whether what he did was right or wrong, or whether what he suffers is just or unjust. The question is about his νόσος; and it remains unresolved like the rest of the ambiguities in the play. Orestes' future is outlined by the god, but it is hardly credible that Orestes' situation will be resolved the way the epilogue outlines. As B. Simon suggests, Orestes' fate is comparable to that of Philokleon in *Wasps* : "One form of madness has been traded for another. The old man has been turned about but has not mastered his impulses or achieved any true inner understanding."[28]

Such an understanding is achieved by the protagonist at the ending of *Herakles* with the help of his friend Theseus. The violence and the suffering are here transformed into security and comfort. As S. A. Barlow comments,[29] the theme of friendship and dependence is stressed in *Herakles* above all other values. Presented as a healthy, rewarding, useful and needed relationship, the influence of φιλία on madness is appeasing and rehabilitating. Theseus' attitude calms Herakles down and his suggestions to adapt, accept himself and his situation bring about the change of Herakles' resolution. On the contrary, Pylades' suggestions indulge Orestes'

desperate attempts to hold on to his own beliefs and attitude, and therefore excite his madness.

Whatever the effects of his friendship on Orestes, it remains true that Pylades' φιλία is genuine and, although he does not have to, he is prepared to die for it [1070, 1072, 1091]. There is in his attitude a contrast with Elektra's reaction. Her relationship with Orestes[30] - whether feminine [1022], with erotic and incestuous overtones [1050-3], or demanding and emotionally suffocating [1027, 1031f., 1047], dependent [307-10, 1041f.], caring, [217ff.], or scheming and influential [1191-1206] - does not achieve, even at its best moments, the unity of heart and mind that Orestes and Pylades come across as naturally sharing. And I say naturally, for it is true that none of them forces feelings on or from the other, as is the case with Elektra.

Φιλία in this play is again seen as a value transcending all others, but although Euripides contrasts the φιλία that inspires Orestes and Pylades with Menelaos' rather cold, practical and self-interested attitude, he does so in order to throw doubt on the value of the latter as well as of the former. The theme is introduced as early as 138f., with an irony which will not be revealed until later :

φιλία γὰρ ἡ σὴ πρευμενὴς μέν, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ
τόνδ' ἐξεγεῖραι συμφορὰ γενήσεται.

This is precisely what will happen later on, when Pylades, through his valuable to Orestes friendship, exerts his influence to inflame Orestes' mind with new plans for revenge. The attitude that true friends should adopt is also stated quite early on [296-300] :

. . . . ὅταν δὲ τἄμ' ἀθυμήσαντ' ἴδῃς,
σύ μου τὸ δεινὸν καὶ διαφθαρὲν φρενῶν
ἴσχναινε παραμυθοῦ θ'· ὅταν δὲ σὺ στένῃς,
ἡμᾶς παρόντας χρή σε νουθετεῖν φίλα·
ἐπικουρίαι γὰρ αἵδε τοῖς φίλοις καλαί.

It is clearly not the one either Elektra or Pylades will follow. Rather than calming Orestes' passion, they will enhance his madness with suggestion and encouragement.

This is quite the opposite of what happens with Theseus [*Her.* 1240ff., cf. especially 1249 : νουθετεῖς], who asks his friend to have patience and acceptance and not yield to θυμός [1246]. Theseus feels pity [1236], a word not frequently used in *Orestes*, at least not to characterize the feelings that either of the three protagonists has for the other.[31] What is also remarkable is the difference of attitudes regarding pollution in the two plays. While Pylades is indeed prepared to ignore it for the sake of his friendship with Orestes [cf. 793f.], Theseus himself believes that φιλία itself is capable of overpowering the transmission of such pollution :

οὐδεὶς ἀλάστωρ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκ τῶν φίλων.

[1234].

Orestes' character is portrayed as weak and easily influenced, both by his sister[32] [211-315, 1018-50; also 615-21], as well as Pylades [1069-1224]. Along with her, he is the brains behind practically every violent act that is to be committed in the play. The stichomythia between the two friends [1100-1131] illustrates how easily Orestes can be led into committing a murder. Pylades' suggestions receive an enthusiastic response from Orestes. The language of Pylades is that of persuasion. The verb πιθοῦ [1101] echoes 29, 31, 593, 594 which talk of Apollo's persuasion. Orestes allows himself to be persuaded with such enthusiasm and naivity, that it is as easy for Pylades to guide and convince him as it is to lead a child. μανθάνω τὸ σύμβολον [1130f.], seems to me a brilliant illustration of this.

From the point where the conspiracy against Helen begins [1098ff.] Apollo is not mentioned anywhere. It is

Zeus, not Apollo, that is called upon in the prayer [1240-5]. The god is not sanctioning this killing, the protagonists are prepared to commit another murder without the excuse they had for the first one. The strange absence of Apollo's influence in this play, where the role of Pylades is most prominent, seems very suggestive. Pylades is put to silence, resuming his traditional role as a mute actor, when the god is about to appear in order to restore the traditional events.

At the final scene, an exasperated Menelaos turns to ask : ἦ καὶ σύ, Πυλάδη, τοῦδε κοινωνεῖς φόνου; [1591].
The arrogant and assured way in which Orestes answers, (φησὶν σιωπῶν· ἀρκέσω δ' ἐγὼ λέγων. [1592]), is suggestive of the process that takes place after the deeds have been accomplished. Pylades, like another Apollo, was the brain behind this other murder which Orestes is all-too-willing to commit. After the completion, Apollo/Pylades step back, and it is Orestes, as the doer, who, instead of winning credit as he would hope, is presented with a responsibility he cannot handle. Perhaps it would not be too far-fetched to suggest that the god (or indeed Pylades) can be seen as a parallel to the way Orestes' emotions operate. Governed by external influence and/or emotional motives, Orestes acts, without, however, a true understanding of what his acts entail. Once the deed is done and the motivating emotions, satisfied, begin to subside, Orestes also expects his rewards and satisfaction. Nevertheless, the emotional experience of his acts, although not fully conscious because of this lack of deeper, inner understanding, still presents him with their responsibility. Since, however, this experience remains subconscious, it cannot be faced or reckoned with.[33]

The question of course is whether there is actually meant to be a parallel between Pylades and the god. The

complete contrast in this play, (where Pylades has a major speaking part, influences the action, almost directs the plot of the second part), with his traditional silence, (mute in Sophokles, as well as in Euripides' *Elektra*), must be of a certain purpose. In all the plays that handle the legend of Orestes traditionally, Pylades has only three, very important lines in *Choephoroi* [900-2], where he becomes the mouthpiece of Apollo and convinces Orestes to go ahead with the deed of matricide. Obviously his words, coming after a long silence and followed by another, assume a gravity that perfectly suits their importance as words expressing the god's will, as well as for the way they influence the future action. In the same way, his words will change the course of action in *Orestes*.[34]

Moreover, the emphasis given to Pylades' silencing[35] might have been intended to draw attention to the fact that the actor who had so far played Pylades is now needed for another role. Interestingly enough, Apollo is soon to appear as the third speaking person in the final scene. If, indeed, the assumption that the same actor who played Pylades takes over the role of Apollo were right, the implications would strengthen the possibility of Pylades' presentation as a parallel to the god, with Euripides placing a pointer of his intention for the audience.

4. A Testcase

A comparison of the portrayal of madness in *Herakles* and *Orestes* reveals that the two plays deal with two different kinds of madness. Nevertheless, what also emerges is that physical symptoms are not the means Euripides uses to distinguish between the character of madness present in each protagonist. There is a certain selectiveness in his choice of symptomatology, which seems to be intended to support the attempt to differentiate kinds of madness, but essentially the vocabulary used for its manifestation is fairly indiscriminate.

In *Herakles,* where the protagonist's madness is established purely by the use of physiological symptoms and his delusion, the physical aspect of the presentation is stronger and more prominent. Imagery from nature portrays the inexplicability, abruptness and violence of the experience. The nature of madness is metaphorically shown, in the face of Lyssa, in all its paralysing horror. Herakles shares some of Lyssa's characteristics, but only during his mad attack, something that along with his aggressive and murderous activity emphasizes the externalised nature of his madness. He is the victim of an attack of madness which turns him into a hunter himself.

In *Orestes* his madness is again established by the use of some of the same conventional physical symptoms and the depiction of his hallucination. Here, however, we notice the first difference. Orestes' hallucination is a self-created vision, while Herakles' delusion consists of a confused, erroneous perception of his nevertheless present children. Orestes' symptoms, moreover, are given a far more extensive and finer-detailed

description. The directness of the presentation allows the audience to see for themselves, rather than have reported, all the stimuli that trigger the attack of madness. This enables a juxtaposition with the traditional explanation of Orestes' madness offered within the play. His external symptoms are the result of an internal disturbance which is hinted by his panic at the approach of the attack. His madness does not have the transient nature of Herakles' and this is emphasized by the stress on νόσος. Madness retains in this play too its horrifying nature, evident in the epithets used for the Erinyes, but as the description extends to Orestes' appearance independent of the madness attack we have another clue of its internalised nature. Orestes is himself the victim of a madness attack but it is in moments of "sanity" that he turns murderous. Moreover, the goddesses are not seen but by Orestes, the audience never sees the actual cause of Orestes' madness. This allows for the introduction of ambiguity.

Clearly there is more than physical description in the play. Orestes' madness is more complicated in its semi-permanent persistent nature than Herakles'. As I have already said, Orestes' madness is portrayed with physical symptoms only in *Iphigeneia in Tauris,* where, not being central to the play, Orestes' affliction is not of a complicated nature. This seems to support the safety of the assumption that there might be some form of hierarchy in Euripides' presentation of madness, in which physical description portrays a lower form of mental affliction, whereas a different process is used to describe psychopathology.

The difference then in the portrayal of the characters' madness lies in the nature of their mental disturbance. The question that arises is how the distinction is achieved if not through literal description of the manifestation of madness itself. The answer should, by

now, have become apparent. Nevertheless, it is in the portrayal of Pentheus that it becomes most obvious. The lack of physical symptoms in the description of his madness, again indicative of a hierarchy in Euripides' method, also reveals most clearly that differentiation is achieved through detailed emotional portrayal of the characters. The portrayal of Pentheus' permanent psychopathology, which I shall now turn to examine, is built with this method of emotional description, already encountered in *Orestes*. There, we have seen how external triggers can result in paranoia in a disturbed psychotic personality. The portrayal relied on a combination of both physical symptoms, as in *Herakles,* and emotional/psychological information, which is the sole means used for Pentheus' portrayal.

Pentheus' excited state is manifest from his very first appearance on stage. Even before he speaks for the first time, his behaviour as he approaches in haste is remarked upon by Kadmos (ὡς ἐπτόηται [214]), suggesting a vehement emotion, an agitated state.[1] To a certain degree Pentheus' agitation is justified as he returns to his city to find it abandoned by its entire female population and learns from hearsay that the women are up at the mountains honouring a new god [215-25]. This gives him reason to be concerned, but does it justify such an extreme excitement? Unlike the cases of both Orestes and Herakles, we have no background information about Pentheus against which to assess his reactions. All our information about his character is to be collected as the play progresses.

From the beginning of his speech it becomes obvious that he is mainly annoyed by the belief that the women are "serving the lust of men" [223]. This belief, along with the claim that the women are using mainadism as προφάσιν, while in fact it is Aphrodite they are worshipping [224-5], are in fact mentioned by Pentheus

as part of the information he was given. Nevertheless, they are to be proven thoroughly unsustained. Nowhere in the servant's speech will we find the women described as indulging in such activities. The messenger will point out to Pentheus that he is totally wrong in his beliefs about the women (οὐχ ὡς σὺ φῂς [686-8]). Nor is there anything in the play to suggest that that was part of the women's worship of the god.[2] While Pentheus' speech betrays that his main reason for anger is the sexually immoral aspect he attaches to the worship of this new god, its presentation suggests even more about the speaker's psychology. This is the audience's first clue to Pentheus' suppressing tendencies. He does not allow himself to openly reveal that he is the one who is primarily suspicious of the nature of the women's activities, which seem to hold a particular fascination for him.

Later on, it will be revealed that Pentheus has a powerful imagination for matters related to sexuality, as he borrows elements from the messenger's report to create a picture according to his personal views and taste. Compare :

χωροῦσι δ' ὥστ' ὄρνιθες ἀρθεῖσαι δρόμωι
πεδίων ὑποτάσεις, . . ., [748f.]

with : καὶ μὴν δοκῶ σφᾶς ἐν λόχμαις ὄρνιθας ὡς
λέκτρων ἔχεσθαι φιλτάτοις ἐν ἔρκεσιν.
[957f.].

The fact that he pays foremost attention to this theme of sex is very revealing for his psychology. Like Hippolytos, he shows a strong repulsion towards sexual activity. Like Orestes, he fears women and femininity [353, 785f., 803]. But his dislike of women seems to act as a cover for his fascination, while his revulsion towards sex is accompanied by passionate unconcious desire. It is this compelling desire that will prove his ruin.

Teiresias adds to our information on Pentheus with his remarks that there is absolutely no sense in his claims and attitude :
ἐν τοῖς λογοῖσι δ' οὐκ ἔνεισί σοι φρένες. [269].
His speech [272-85] talks of the greatness of the god, who along with Demeter is seen by him as most powerful and influential in what is most essential in human life (τὰ πρῶτ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισι· [275]). His reminder to Pentheus that force has no actual hold over human matters [270f., 310] points to Pentheus' typically tyrannical attitude, as in fact the messenger's comment [670f.] does. Pentheus' portrayal as a tyrant presents many conventional elements and some of his responses are generically conditioned. His lack of self-control,[3] arrogance, blind stubbornness, abuse of power, insistence on personal standards of judgement and morality, fear of conspiracy, isolation, are characteristics that are present in tyrant figures not only in Euripides (e.g. Lykos), but also in Sophokles (cf. Oidipous, Kreon). Interestingly enough, however, in Pentheus' case all these elements are powerfully combined with youth. He is addressed by Teiresias as ὦ νεανία [274], and referred to as such by Dionysos [974].
Note also the description of his youthful characteristics at 1185-7 : νέος ὁ μόσχος ἄρ-
τι γένην ὑπὸ κόρυθ' ἁπαλότριχα
κατάκομον θάλλει.

He is obviously still immature. The instability he shows throughout the play brings to mind Orestes' volatility, Hippolytos' imbalanced attitude, and also Hermione's immature and unstable attitude blamed by Andromache mainly on her youth [*Andr.* 183-5,192, 238]. None of these characters is a free agent, and the reason for this does not so much seem to be the interference of a divinity or the inevitability of circumstances, but rather the fact that their motives are not free. Their failure to distinguish between motives is at least partly

due to their youth. As has been pointed out in the introductory discussion of emotions, the role of emotion in the sphere of motives is all too influential. The younger a person is, the more difficult it becomes to give reason its fair share, and the easier it is to allow emotion to govern. It seems that Euripides, aware of the links of instability with youth,[4] exploited them to the maximum.

Nevertheless, what makes Pentheus' portrayal even more interesting, and individualizes him from other young characters, is the fact that he presents his own psychological peculiarities. Although aware of his youth, Teiresias will still insist on warning Pentheus that he must not rely on a **sick** mind, for apparently such ideas as those Pentheus holds seem to the prophet to belong only to a sick mind [311f.]. He tries to reason with Pentheus and give him advice, but in fact he feels it is in vain, since he knows the king **is** mad, he is **ill** :

μαίνηι γὰρ ὡς ἄλγιστα, κοὔτε φαρμάκοις
ἄκη λάβεις ἄν οὔτ' ἄνευ τούτων νοσεῖς. [326-7].

Kadmos' observations [332][5] are again interesting to note in this context :

νῦν γὰρ πέτηι τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς.

"Your mind is in the air, flying, and in your senses there is no sense", words which could well refer to Pentheus' fantasies in which there is nothing reasonable or justified. Pentheus, however, will not even listen to the two old men, let alone pause for a minute and think along their line of argument. He has, on his behalf, reached the conclusion *they* are out of their minds and does not wish to be contaminated by their folly :

οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, βακχεύσεις δ' ἰών,
μηδ' ἐξομόρξηι μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί; [343-4].

The same revolted reaction, full of indignation, is shown by Hippolytos, (οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα μηδ' ἅψηι πέπλων; [*Hipp.* 606]), at the nurse's attempt to touch him. Like Pentheus, he seems to believe that physical

contact can "contaminate" him, change his "right" attitude into that of the person who will touch him, which he loathes.[6]

Pentheus' "violent horror" and indignant reaction at the thought that he may get this "disease" by contact, reveal, as Dodds suggests (ad loc.), that "something in him knows already the fascination and the moral peril which the new rites hold for him". This becomes even more manifest in the last speech of his, as Teiresias points out that his state of mind is going from bad to worse. The prophet is convinced now that Pentheus is completely insane; note the permanency suggested by μέμηνας [359]. It is immediately noticeable, and significantly so, that while Pentheus' accusation that the old men are out of their minds is actually phrased with lighter terms like μωρία and ἀνοία, which reveal nothing more than foolishness, Teiresias has already spoken of Pentheus' madness in strong terms, using verbs like μαίνηι, and even more importantly, denoting disease, νοσεῖς. There are also several other words with medical connections; (φαρμάκοις, ἄκη [326f.]). The chorus will also express their feelings in lines reminiscent of *Orestes* [823f.], about Pentheus' irrational attitude, which they regard as ἀφροσύνη [388] and the result of μανία: . . . μαι -

νομένων οἵδε τρόποι καὶ
κακοβούλων παρ' ἔμοι -
γε φωτῶν. [399-401].

The chorus' emotional description here presents us with an aspect of the god other than the maddening or ecstatic. Their concern is with peace and calm [419f.] and the simple joys of music, dance [378-81], wine [382-6, 421-3], and love (θελξίφρονες Ἔρωτες [404f.; 413f.]). The fertility, love, and desire associated with Dionysiac worship, is contrasted with the folly and irreverence (οὐχ ὁσίαν ὕβριν, ἀφροσύνα [374f.,

386-8]) of Pentheus, whose response to the god is aggression, rejection and violence.

The contrast theme of the ode is carried on to the following scene of the first encounter between the Stranger and Pentheus. The appearance of the god, as Winnington-Ingram suggests, "might well arouse conflicting emotions in a male Greek audience".[7] This is clearly what happens within Pentheus. He will immediately make it apparent that he sees the Stranger almost exclusively as a sexual being [453-9]. His extreme fascination with the Stranger has already been revealed in the way he spoke firstly and mostly about his looks and their erotic connotation [233-8]. Excited, he has planned the punishment deserved for this γόης, from which he seems to derive a peculiar pleasure [239-41]. There is much brutality in his remarks [cf. also 231]; Pentheus finds the Stranger's claims about the god δεινῆς ἀγχόνης ἄξια [246]. He is the only one in the play who finds the ὄργια unhealthy [262]. His fascination is also hinted at by the fact that he pays absolutely no attention to the soldier's information, he has no comment on the women's escape. The detailed description of the Stranger's sensual appearance [453-9] may be intended by Pentheus to show contempt, but the implications of his remarks reveal that they are also derived from the obsessive ideas he holds about the Stranger, and strongly suggest an unrealised desire :

τὸ μὲν σῶμ' οὐκ ἄμορφος εἶ, ξένε,
ὡς ἐς γυναῖκας, ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐς Θήβας πάρει·
πλόκαμός τε γάρ σου ταναός, οὐ πάλης ὕπο,
γένυν παρ' αὐτὴν κεχυμένος, <u>πόθου πλέως</u>·
λευκὴν δὲ χροιὰν ἐκ παρασκευῆς ἔχεις,
οὐχ ἡλίου βολαῖσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σκιᾶς,
<u>τὴν Ἀφροδίτην</u> καλλονῇ <u>θηρώμενος</u>.

The god cleverly plays with Pentheus' curiosity, and stimulates it to a degree that will render him frantic by

holding back information [469-80]. Although Pentheus is aware of the trick [475, 479], he still goes on asking questions. As Winnington-Ingram has brilliantly explained, "the warning insight is too weak for the emotion that drives him on. So it is now and so it will continue to be till it is too late." [8] Pentheus can see the trick and the motive behind it, but does not have the ability to read and understand the message his inner self is sending, nor does he have the awareness, the sensibility, to feel that something inside him is growing and threatening to get out of control. The only emotion he is aware of is his excited curiosity.

Reaching exasperation, he turns to his favourite means of establishing superiority; he imposes punishment. At 489, Pentheus is clearly searching for an excuse to punish. We have already witnessed his taste for arms, violence, restriction, imprisonment and repression [226-8, 231, 258f., 451f.], which will be confirmed in other instances, and as we are to learn towards the end of the play [1320-2], was a characteristic of him from childhood. The Stranger responds to punishment ironically, yet calmly [492-502], thus asserting that although Pentheus might claim superiority [505], he actually possesses none. As Pentheus pays no attention to the warning that he is not self-controlled [504], the Stranger concludes [506] :

οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅ τι ζῇις, οὐδ' ὅ δρᾷις, οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ.

The line presents difficulties of interpretation regarding the οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅ τι ζῇις, (see Dodds ad loc.). οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ, I think implies Pentheus' lack of knowledge of his inner self, οὐδ' ὅ δρᾷις, must be referring to his irrational and violent actions that will lead to his ruin. As to the οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅ τι ζῇις, I think it implies that Pentheus is ignorant, unaware of what he is experiencing at these particular moments. Although spoken by the Stranger as a conclusive statement, it will be given an answer by Pentheus, who does not understand what was

meant and needs to reassert himself. His answer is superficial, while the Stranger's comment [508] echoes the earlier one about his ill-fated name [367f.].

The Stranger is led away to prison, and the chorus express their feelings towards Pentheus [537-549]. They regard his behaviour as monstrous, and they link that with the fact that he is the son of Echion. Pentheus is un-human (ἀγριωπὸν τέρας, οὐ φῶτα βρότειον), an ἀντίπαλος θεοῖς. Winnington-Ingram remarks that it is peculiar that the chorus is accusing Pentheus of ferocity, blood and violence, for the ferocity of their emotion is equal. His origin should not disturb them since the snake is an avatar of Dionysos. The accusations, however, as he very rightly concludes, bring out the fact that Pentheus possesses Dionysiac traits of character. He also points out that "the guileless concentration upon the emotion of the moment to the exclusion of self-knowledge is characteristic of them. None the less their words have a true application to Pentheus, who is also the prey of his emotions and is led by them to corresponding bestiality and violence; he also is devoid of self-knowledge, as he persecutes those with whom he has a close spiritual kinship."[9] The bound Stranger being led to prison warns [518] :

ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἀδικῶν κεῖνον εἰς δεσμοὺς ἄγεις.

Pentheus is not aware of this, but neither is he aware of what is equally true, that the bound god is the embodiment of his own, repressed, self.

The scene that follows gives us another indication of Pentheus' disturbed mind. I have said, when comparing the madness of Herakles and Orestes, that, despite the fact that several of their physical symptoms were similar, the only common element in their madness was the hallucinations that occured during its attacks. Since I have been treating the presence of hallucinations as a kind of confirmation of the presence of madness, this is

where I should turn now, for Pentheus' case, to look for such confirmation. As I have already mentioned, however, nothing in Pentheus' case regarding the question "Is he mad?" is as straightforward as in either Herakles or Orestes. I have, of course, talked of ambiguity, especially in *Orestes,* but there it involved the nature of madness rather than the existence of it. Here, nevertheless, caution is required in deciding whether part of the palace miracle scene could be regarded as Pentheus' hallucination.

A hallucination is a sensory vivid perception or mental impression, occurring in the absence of an outside, external stimulus. Here, on first impression, there seems to be such an external stimulus for Pentheus. The god himself confirms this with his report to the chorus :

κἄἱθ' ὁ Βρόμιος, <u>ὡς ἔμοιγε φαίνεται, δόξαν λέγω,</u>
φάσμ' ἐποίησεν κατ' αὐλήν· . . . [629f.]

The underlined words, however, imply a certain ambiguity. The Stranger probably speaks them as the representative of the god to the chorus, but the audience knows he himself is the god. Is there some implicit suggestion - (note the ambivalence of δόξα) - that what Pentheus experienced only took place in his own mind, with the god's provocation? Herakles' delusions were put in his mind by Lyssa, Orestes' by the Erinyes. In Orestes' case we never see the goddesses, their real existence is left ambiguous, but still, they are generally regarded, within the play, as the cause of his madness. In *Herakles* the presence of Iris and Lyssa is as unquestioned as that of Dionysos here.

Unlike Lyssa, however, Dionysos will not, until after the hallucination, specify that he will induce madness in Pentheus. Nevertheless, the fact that Pentheus, while binding the bull believes he is casting his knots around

the Stranger [618-22], is evidence that he is not in his right mind. This evidence is the culmination of what has already been suggested several times. The physical symptoms described here are not just the result of exertion; they have already been encountered in other descriptions of madness[10] :

θυμὸν ἐκπνέων, ἱδρῶτα σώματος στάζων ἄπο,
χείλεσιν διδοὺς ὀδόντας· . . ., [620f.].

The god is playing his tricks on an already confused mind. What we know with certainty occurred, on the evidence of Dionysos [585, 594f.] and the chorus [586ff.], is the earthquake and fire. The phantom might only have existed in Pentheus' mind. Whether, as in *Herakles,* a mistaken perception, or, as in *Orestes,* a self-created vision, or indeed a combination of both, Pentheus remembers nothing of it when he reappears on stage. He seems genuinely perplexed as to the way the Stranger managed to escape from his bonds [645-50].

Therefore, I think it could be concluded that the palace miracle scene can be regarded as the equivalent of Pentheus' hallucination scene. The presence of the god throughout the play, although extraordinary in itself, acquires, I believe, its significance in the fact that he represents the natural, rather than the supernatural. He explains what happens to Pentheus in human terms, without the external interference of divinity. Dionysos symbolises all the impulses of Pentheus, the natural instincts of sexuality and emotionality he struggles so hard to suppress and deny. The ostensible reason for the god's vengeance on Pentheus' stubborn refusal to accept and honour him [45f.], is the thematic link with the actual cause of his ruin, his refusal to accept his repressed emotions.[11] The image of the bull in the prison is an additional suggestion of Pentheus' efforts to keep his emotions suppressed. Pentheus binds the bull in the same way he tried to repress himself. As the bull is yet another aspect of the god, it symbolises here Pentheus'

repressed animality and sexuality. It is certainly not a symbol of aggressiveness, since that is not for a moment held captive in Pentheus. It is one of the emotions that he most openly expresses, and uses as his major weapon.

The whole scene of the miracle has, I believe, a deliberate ambiguity, emphasizing the confusion in Pentheus, who proves incapable of realising that the threat he is presented with is not external, but comes from within him. The palace is strongly connected with Pentheus. As in *Herakles,* where the destruction of the palace coincided, symbolically, with the destruction of Herakles himself, here the destruction of the palace symbolises the danger of destruction that Pentheus is presented with, not from outside, but from within. The earthquake and lightning symbolise here, not the wild power of striking madness, as they did in *Herakles,* but the amazing strength with which Pentheus' repressed emotions will destroy him. Pentheus' adversary is not the god; it is his very own nature turned hostile by endless suppression.

The messenger's arrival diverts Pentheus' attention from the Stranger back to the women. By the end of the speech Pentheus' rage has reached its peak; he is now at his most vulnerable. The Stranger's remark [640] is revealing in this context :
ῥαδίως γὰρ αὐτὸν οἴσω, κἄν πνέων ἔλθῃ μέγα.
Pentheus will prove from now on totally incapable of thinking and reacting reasonably. His mental faculties are clearly not functioning properly. He will not understand, although he has just been told in the most convincing manner, that force against the women will not work. As is characteristic of him he will try to solve yet another situation using arms and violence, proving that he will not learn from experience. His insanity is obvious in his response to the Stranger's

advice to sacrifice to the god. His very words are :
θύσω, φόνον γε θῆλυν, ὥσπερ ἄξιαι,
πολὺν ταράξας ἐν Κιθαιρῶνος πτυχαῖς. [796f.].

Dionysos has tried to subdue Pentheus' aggression with persuasion, suggesting a balanced control of his emotions. This method fails, the Stranger reaches the limit of his patience and begins the alternative process. This is unmistakably marked by the break in the stichomythia introduced by ἆ, at 810. Pentheus' answer to his new suggestion is far too eager :
βούλῃ σφ' ἐν ὄρεσι συγκαθημένας ἰδεῖν;
μάλιστα, μυρίον γε δοὺς χρυσοῦ σταθμόν.
[810f.].

Is Pentheus' irresistible desire to secretly watch the eventual manifestation of his sexuality? Or is it nothing more than another compromise? In his refusal to let his sexuality emerge normally, his aggressiveness and violence had acted as substitutes for his unacknowledged desires. Is his voyeurism the only indulgence he will allow them? Or is it from the lustful desire itself that Pentheus derives his pleasure? There is indeed no direct mention anywhere of a desire to participate [cf. especially 957f.]. On the other hand there is strong emphasis on the voyeuristic desire :
ὅμως δ' ἴδοις ἄν ἡδέως ἄ σοι πικρά;
σάφ' ἴσθι, σιγῇ γ' ὑπ' ἐλάταις καθήμενος.
[815f., cf. 954].

Nevertheless, his keen response to the Stranger's propositions, as well as the eagerness and anxiousness at 925ff. to be a perfect mainad, suggest a powerful hidden desire to participate in their activities as one of them. Which of the two might be the case is indeed difficult to decide. If we do accept Pentheus' transvestism as the result of a pathological progression from childhood,[12] then his voyeurism is indicative of

the curiosity and desire of the child to participate [cf. 965-70].[13] It does not seem unlikely to me that Euripides was aware that such possible interpretations are entailed in his portrayal of Pentheus. With the many and different levels of consciousness in operation at the writing, performance, and experience of a play, however, it is not possible to say what out of all this would have been obvious to his audience. In a literary interpretation of the text, or perhaps even at a performance today, audiences 'enlightened' by psychology and psychoanalysis are indeed alert to such possibilities.

The progression and conclusion of this scene [810-61], however, seem to me to support the view that Pentheus' voyeurism is a substitute for his suppressed desires. At the Stranger's irony and the mention of ἔρως, Pentheus will remember his inhibition and in a retreating effort he will try to present his secret and strong desire as "a painful duty" [813-5]. He will also react to the idea of dressing up as a woman [821f.], his masculine pride outraged. He fights with his αἰδώς [828] as he abandons his previous desire to punish and capture [837f.]. As we shall see is the case with Phaidra, Pentheus' αἰδώς is the only thing holding him back; they both have a hostile attitude to their emotions, but the difference between them is that Phaidra acknowledges their influential power [*Hipp.* 377ff.], while Pentheus refuses to. Next time we see Pentheus he will no longer be in his senses or a person of his own volition. It is only with god's interference and Pentheus' subsequent total loss of control over himself that he will allow his desires to emerge, uncovered, to their full extent.

. . .. πρῶτα δ' ἔκστησον φρενῶν,
ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν· ὡς φρονῶν μὲν εὖ
οὐ μὴ θελήσῃι θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι στολήν,
ἔξω δ' ἐλαύνων τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐνδύσεται. [850-3].

What Dionysos is saying here is not that he will get Pentheus out of his *right* mind, but rather that he will change his present state of mind, drive out of him any capacity to think. ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν does not suggest that Pentheus is going to be struck with insanity; as Dodds says, it suggests a "dizzy fantasy". The god is not sending madness to a sane, composed individual in order to get his way. Winnington-Ingram's explanation of what happens here is based on dramatic grounds and seems to make most sense : "The god is dramatising himself and the situation. He has been close at hand acting upon Pentheus, since king and god first met on the stage; . . . Pentheus, the arrogant blusterer of the earlier scenes, is already half-way to insanity. But to put the whole process of dissolution upon the stage would have been tedious and perhaps unconvincing, whereas the sudden irruption of a helpless Pentheus dressed as a Bacchanal is a striking, if horrible, dramatic effect."[14]

The chorus will see Pentheus' punishment as deserved through his ἀγνωμοσύναν, and because of μαινομέναι δόξαι. He is blind to the fact, reflected by the chorus' words, that the essential governing laws of the dionysiac religion emerge from basic human attributes :

τί τὸ σοφόν; ἢ τί τὸ κάλλιον
παρὰ θεῶν γέρας ἐν βροτοῖς
ἢ χεῖρ' ὑπὲρ κορυφᾶς
τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρείσσω κατέχειν;
ὅ τι καλὸν φίλον ἀεί. [877-881/897-901].

Also 890-6, especially : ὅ τι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιμόνιον,
τό τ' ἐν χρόνωι μακρῶι νόμιμον
ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός. [890-6].

The same belief has already been expressed to Pentheus by Teiresias [274-85]. The ode is an appropriate prelude to the following scene, in which Pentheus will start the process of bringing about for himself the consequences of the human violence that the dionysiac laws he defied were created to control.

Dionysos' nature is determined by man's ambivalent mind. This is further attested by the frequent oxymora in the choral odes, expressing the paradoxical contradictions entailed in the worship of the god.[15] Here, in encouraging Pentheus' fantasies, Dionysos' other aspect, as the terrible god he has himself admitted being in the prologue, is surfacing.[16] Pentheus reappears on stage, dressed as a female bacchant (σκευὴν γυναικὸς μαινάδος βάκχης ἔχων [915]). In his sarcasm Dionysos stresses Pentheus' humiliation, now the image itself of everything he despised : women, mainads, bacchants. Pentheus, however, is not in a state to appreciate any of this.

καὶ μὴν ὁρᾶν μοι δύο μὲν ἡλίους δοκῶ,
δισσὰς δὲ Θήβας καὶ πόλισμ' ἑπτάστομον·
καὶ ταῦρος ἡμῖν πρόσθεν ἡγεῖσθαι δοκεῖς
καὶ σῷ, κέρατα κρατὶ προσπεφυκέναι.
ἀλλ' ἦ ποτ' ἦσθα θήρ; τεταύρωσαι γὰρ οὖν.

[918-22].

Pentheus' double vision suggests a state of intoxication, dizziness. Double vision can be a common symptom of hysteria.[17] Hysterical symptoms are provoked by the stressful emotional effects of conflict. Suggestion also plays an important part in hysteria. It is the condition par excellence of large-scale and continuous repression, which is itself often called "the disease of motivated ignorance". And Pentheus' entire attitude seems to result from repression. However, although his vision of the Stranger as a bull could also be seen as symbolic of his conflict, it is not a sign of intoxication. The god is manifesting himself in one of his many shapes, as he himself confirms : ὁ θεὸς ὁμαρτεῖ [923]. Now that Pentheus' repressed nature has been set free, he can see the god in his true nature [924] :
νῦν δ' ὁρᾷς ἃ χρή σ' ὁρᾶν.

The attention that the Stranger now lavishes on Pentheus in order to turn him into a perfect victim for the sacrifice that is to follow, suggests the identification of the god with Pentheus. This seems to be emphasized by 934 :

ἰδού, σὺ κόσμει· σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακείμεσθα δή.

Their detailed and extensive interaction throughout, unique to this play, also suggests this identification, a kind of "interpenetration".[18] The god praises Pentheus [944], but his ironically ambiguous words (αἰνῶ δ' ὅτι μεθέστηκας φρενῶν) can mean both "you have changed your former φρένες", or "you have taken leave of them altogether".

. . . · τὰς δὲ πρὶν φρένας
οὐκ εἶχες ὑγιεῖς, νῦν δ' ἔχεις οἵας σε δεῖ

[947f.],

the Stranger goes on to say. What can that mean? Dionysos is pointing out that Pentheus is now in the state of mind needed for his complete ruin, but at the same time he is remarking on the change in him since he has abandoned all his previous inhibitions and released his repressed desires.

Pentheus is ready and keen to go, and the pride betrayed by his words at 962 (μόνος) is typical of other "warrior-king" portrayals in tragedy. The Stranger's assurance emphasizes that he is indeed the only one who will suffer too much (ὑπερκάμνεις) on behalf of the whole city [963.]. For the ἀγῶνες that await him are the result of the refusal of the god. He will be led by the Stranger, with the promise that his mother will take care of him once they arrive [965f.]. It is in fact Pentheus himself who will point to his mother - the cause of his curiosity and desire [965f.] :

Δι. . . . · πομπὸς ‹δ'› εἶμ' ἐγὼ σωτήριος,
κεῖθεν δ' ἀπάξει σ' ἄλλος. Πε. <u>ἡ τεκοῦσά γε</u>.

Pentheus finds the Stranger's promises a luxury (ἁβρότητ' ἐμὴν λέγεις). When the Stranger adds that

he will be brought back in the hands of his mother, Pentheus is overwhelmed (καὶ τρυφᾶν μ' ἀναγκάσεις.).[19] His words at 970 (ἀξίων μὲν ἅπτομαι) are chilling; he cannot possibly imagine what deserved treatment awaits him.

In the stasimon that follows the chorus express their revengeful emotions against Pentheus. Λύσσας κύνες are summoned to goad the mainads on the mountains with madness (ἀνοιστρήσατε). The vocabulary has become familiar to us as that accompaning the beginning, striking of madness. This madness is directed against Pentheus, who is described as :

. . . τὸν ἐν γυναιμομίμωι στολᾶι
λυσσώδη κατάσκοπον μαινάδων. [980f.].

Pentheus' own madness in opposing the god is stressed again : ὅς ἀδίκωι γνώμαι παρανόμωι τ' ὀργᾶι
περὶ ‹σὰ› Βάκχι', ὄργια ματρός τε σᾶς
μανείσαι πραπίδι
παρακόπωι τε λήματι στέλλεται [997-1000].

His major mistake has been his irrational belief and attempts to master the uncontrollable with force (τἀνίκατον ὡς κρατήσων βίαι [1001]). This is a powerful hint of his constant repression of the natural, inconquerable forces inside him.

The chorus offer us an imaginary description of the events happening on the mountains [982-90]. This description will not correspond to the messenger's in the same way it did in *Herakles* ; it expresses more what the chorus wish will happen. Nevertheless, the irony of 986-9 will come true (τίς ἄρα νιν ἔτεκεν;/λεαίνας δὲ τινος). The messenger's magnificent report reveals what actually happens to Pentheus. Brought down, by frenzied mainads, along with the tree on which he was miraculously put, Pentheus regains his sanity as he takes off the μίτρα so as to be recognised and not killed by his

mother, and dies as he becomes aware of and admits his ἁμαρτίαι [1120f.].[20]

The portrayal of Pentheus' madness seems to rely entirely on information we derive progressively from the verbal interaction and emotional activity of the play. The god's arrival at Thebes creates for Pentheus a situational stress not strong enough in itself to cause madness, but whose combination with his psychologically disturbed nature results in madness. Therefore the portrayal concentrates on revealing Pentheus' psychological peculiarities. Euripides' portrait of Pentheus appears at first selective, incomplete. For instance, Pentheus is already emotional when he first appears; his state is clearly a response to the situation, but a response determined and conditioned by certain factors until that moment unknown to us. The play, however, is by nature a symptomatic construction. By the end of it, more than sufficient hints have been gathered to support the view that Pentheus' psychological state is the result of a "pathological progression", which, as W. Sale suggests,[21] we experience in the play in reverse form. "The dramatic breakdown of his psyche has brought us back close to the beginning of Pentheus' life and to the very beginning of the illness that in this scene is costing him his life."[22]

Nowhere, I think, has Euripides represented more manifestly that "madness may be excited from outside, but it is also the expression of ourselves".[23] Sale applies this specifically to the scene where Pentheus appears dressed as a woman. It is in fact one of the points in the play where it is most obvious that Dionysos, - the longing, the desire -, is inside Pentheus as well as outside. Pentheus, who refuses to honour a god who is 'bisexual', presents himself as both male and female. His 'transvestism' is part of his madness, and this is made clear by the god himself [850-3]. This

suggests that it is pathological, and this is supported by Pentheus' excitement and enthusiasm once he has feminine clothes on [925ff.].[24]

Although the god is presented as the obvious cause of his madness, it is stressed throughout the play that Pentheus is mad because he lacks the clarity to tell where the boundaries between his own self and otherness lie. Dionysos is presented as the part of Pentheus' self that has been repressed and rejected. In the same way that we have seen in the Erinyes the embodiment of Orestes' unnaccepted guilt, the god here represents all of Pentheus' unconscious desires, unaccepted emotions, and secret fears. Once Pentheus isolates and alienates himself from his emotions (which is suggested by his hostility to Dionysos), it is inevitable that the boundaries will shift, disintegrate, and that will be his ruin. The nature of the god itself embodies this disintegration of boundaries; calm and frenzied, civilised and primitive, man and animal, mortal and immortal, male with female characteristics. Pentheus' confusion of his own identity, (magnificently hinted at 506f.), is suggested by Dionysos' constant changes of shape; first as a mortal, then into a bull, while Penteus himself will be disguised into a woman.

The extreme ambiguity is present in all aspects of the play. Boundaries shift between the most elementally antithetical emotions, but the interesting thing to note is that there is no conflict between reason and emotion. Pentheus' destruction is not the result of a conflict between emotion and reason. It is the result of pure emotion that will see no reason. His repression of his desires and needs is not motivated by reason, it is emotional. Everything in the play derives from, is based on, or results in emotion. This seems to highlight again in a paradoxical way, the play's depiction of both frenzy and control. One of the most important words in it is

σωφρονεῖν; τί τὸ σοφόν is a most persistent question throughout the play which leaves so unclear who is σώφρων and who is mad.

Frenzied violence is presented in *Bacchai* side by side with rational judgement, self-control and temperance. Reason is revealed as nothing more than a fine balancing of emotion, while emotion is shown in its real nature, both devastating and liberating. Ecstasy is attained by an uncompromising abandon to emotion, but it is shown to have potentially disastrous results. It becomes madness, in the same way that repression does when the conflicts remain unresolved. In Winnington-Ingram's words, what we see in the play is "an appreciative insight into the qualities of emotions, not a merely objective understanding of their effects".[25]

The whole play seems to bespeak something implicitly lurking behind the action portrayed, that the vocabulary by itself leaves somehow unexpressed. It is in fact in the relationship between words and action that the suggestion as to what this might be lies. The essence of it seems to be related with the way the myths about Dionysiac power and madness convey the efforts of human beings to regulate their own feelings. Dionysos in his dual aspect embodies both the human capacity to understand perception and motivation, as well as to control and regulate emotion and action. Madness is equally shown to result from the need to control feelings, as well as from the strenuous effort of unconscious drives to be released. The similarity in ritual action of the two groups of mainads is contrasted with the difference in their emotional experience of it. This paradox highlights the essential meaning of the Dionysiac and expresses a perception of how Dionysiac rites come to terms with the two fundamental, and seemingly contrasting, human needs for emotional expression and rational control.

The intensity of emotional description in Pentheus' portrayal is an excellent illustration of Euripides' introduction of the emotions as contributing factors in the portrayal of madness.[26] As we have seen, his formulae of the symptomatology of madness are the result of close observation of real life. So is, in fact, his portrayal of the feeling, as well as of the nature, of madness. Again, the feeling is portrayed through emotional activity rather than literal statements. Action emerges as emotional response and this is psychologically consistent, since emotion translates itself into activity. The ingenuity of the portrayal lies, I believe, in the fact that by adopting this method Euripides manages at the same time to portray the inexpressibility of the feeling. The result of unexpressed emotions, madness itself remains inexpressible.

Ambiguity is the element mostly used by Euripides to enhance the realism of his presentation of the nature of madness. Whether Hera, the Erinyes, Dionysos or Lyssa, the divine intervention is there to provide the thematic link with the real causes of madness, (double fatherhood, σύνεσις, or the repressed self), while at the same time introducing their ambiguity. More importantly, as we have seen, the nature of madness is intricately related with the manner itself in which the deity is presented. On the other hand, while all three plays examined deal with how the psychological process of madness is connected with human relationships, the ambiguity is stronger in *Orestes* and *Bacchai,* where the emphasis is on how this process accounts for the particular behaviour of the mad protagonists.

The strong psychological realism of Euripides' emotional portrayal owes a lot to his choice of method, which is indeed similar to the one Weinrich uses to detect emotion.[27] A combination of physiology,

characters' introspections and emotional activity is used to reveal the feeling, but Euripides also juxtaposes one against the other to measure each element's truth and realism. The question that arises is what is meant by realism in the representation of emotional activity within the context of tragedy. Is it a straightforward imitation of natural behaviour? In the same way that, for dramatic purposes, the internal process of madness has to be intensified, externalised to a great degree, the realism of the representation has to rely on a deeper, more profound kind of realism than that of ordinary, everyday reality. Tragedy does not deal with this reality; tragedy is an artificial creation reflecting on "the already formulated realities of the tradition to which <it> belongs."[28] Myth is tragedy's reality. But myth itself, as is most brilliantly illustrated by Dionysiac myths, to mention but one example, is essentially nothing else but a profound reflection of human nature.

In other words, the realism in the representation of emotional activity in tragedy lies in following the patterns of behaviour in myths, paradigms themselves of human behaviour. That Euripides is working from this principle is evident in his handling of the myths. By choosing to emphasize, or even manipulating, aspects of the myth that coincide with the emotional activity in his plays, he manages to highlight the associations between them. The psychological/emotional reasons for a particular presentation harmoniously coexist and support functional ones. One good example of this is in *Orestes*. As will be seen,[29] from a psychological point of view, Orestes' behaviour can be explained as one of compulsive addiction to role playing. In his presentation, however, Euripides aims to reveal how the myth exists because of the given personality of Orestes. There is no other deed Orestes could have done and remained Orestes; no other facts in his story could make him Orestes. By saying

"Orestes", matricide, Erinyes, madness are automatically implied. Does the myth make Orestes or Orestes myth? What becomes evident in the play is that Orestes' mythical identity depends on the repetition of the same acts, the acting out of his identifying deed.[30] Nevertheless, Euripides' analysis of Orestes does not stop at exposing the theatricality of the myth. By identifying this repetition as Orestes' emotional activity, Euripides reveals how it is derived from Orestes' particular psychology. The inextricable associations between myth and human nature become thus manifest.

Another example where Euripides uses patterns of behaviour from myth to give realism to his emotional portrayal is in *Bacchai*. Pentheus' emotional activity in the play is violent and destructive, full of hostility and aggressiveness. This activity stems from the presence of Dionysos, who represents a rejected part of Pentheus' self, and is identified with the nature of the god when rejected, as known from myth and as presented in the play. Through the other aspect of the god's nature, again according to his mythic identity, we know that the rejected part of Pentheus' self represents emotions related with love and sexuality, and this is supported with several clues throughout the play. Clearly, Pentheus' emotional behaviour follows the pattern of the god's behaviour in myth. It seems to me that in a play that attempts to portray the influence of the two basic but conflicting emotions of love and aggression on human thought and resulting behaviour, there is nothing that could bestow the emotional portrayal with more realism than basing it on the behaviour of Dionysos, whose mythic existence itself is in essence the result of the human attempts to understand and conquer these emotions.

Section B

LOVE

5. Notions of Love

Although the feeling of love is unmistakable, its analysis and definition presents almost insurmountable problems. Most people will answer the question "what is love?" with an effort to describe personal experience of this feeling. The attempts at a definition, however, remain unsuccessful, and the essence of the feeling irretrievable, because its privacy and intimacy render it incommunicable. Another problem originates from the fact that, although the word primarily conveys to us the notion of erotic love, there exist numerous other kinds of love; between parents and children, brothers and sisters, friendship, love of god, nature, country, love of an occupation, and so on; the list is practically interminable. Love, in very general and broad terms, is our emotional response to whatever we value highly.

For the largest part of this section on love, I will be dealing with the kind of love which presents us with most problems, especially as to its definition. Erotic love can be variably called romantic, passionate, sexual or sensual, affectionate, etc.. We cannot possibly use its antiquated narrow definition as love between the sexes, for indeed there seems to have never been a time when erotic love manifested itself solely between different sexes. What essentially differentiates this kind of love from all others is the possibility of sexual involvement that it entails. Another of its important elements is sentimentality, which becomes immediately obvious in any casual definition. Nowadays, we tend to restrictively, and perhaps not very honestly, call this kind of love "romantic"; what it actually is, is a passionate emotional and sexual attachment between two people.

Romantic love as such, (which is only one aspect of erotic love), an erotic involvement based on sentiment, is difficult to tell apart from passionate love because of its element of intensity. Both are types of love that occur at the beginning of a relationship, but while passionate love is largely focused on sexuality, romantic love leans towards idealisation. Fantasized ideal qualities are bestowed upon the beloved, and any real positive qualities are apt to be exaggerated, while negative ones are ignored if they are an obstacle to idealisation. The need to be with the beloved is usually insatiable, and the preoccupation with the feeling of romantic love excludes almost any other experience.

Romantic love is an overwhelming experience which brings about loss of control. The most obvious illustration of this is the phrases used to describe its feeling, such as "falling in love", being "swept off one's feet", or "head over heels". This is one characteristic of romantic love that is almost uniformly regarded as negative. It constrains, at best, the internal control and defensiveness of an individual. In cases where the need for personal control is strong, romantic love is inhibited. The reason for this is that interdependence and emotional vulnerability increase along with intimacy as an individual becomes increasingly involved in a romantic relationship.[1]

The negative presentation of passion, (often as madness), which we encounter in Greek tragedy is not unique to the ancient Greeks. Distrust of passionate involvements has persisted into the modern Western world. For example, the control of such passions is of foremost importance in the preachings of almost all major religions. Also, the majority of psychologists, clinical rather than social, seem to have a negative attitude to passionate love, viewing it as immature and undesirable, produced by personal inadequacy or

psychopathology and leading to exploitative or destructive behaviour toward the 'beloved'.[2] According to them, dispassionate love, with "true" caring for the other, is by far preferable.

Such love is the so-called "conjugal" love, often considered the least intense form of love. As a couple spend time together they become accustomed to each other, and fantasies are replaced by real knowledge; strong passionate desire is replaced by more stable and permanent bonds, of affection and trust. Consideration, courtesy, even returning passion may persist in this relationship which is created out of shared experiences and does not feature the ephemerality of romantic love. Society's pressure on a couple to develop this bond and get rid of their insatiable need and emotional intoxication is what lies behind the idea of the "honeymoon". It provides the newly-weds with the opportunity to get rid of their insatiable need and desire for one another, and to return to society, no longer as lovers, but as wife and husband, to attend to all the obligations that their new bond entails.

J. R. Averill[3] argues that "Love . . . is a complex syndrome composed of . . . biological, psychological and social factors, but no component by itself is a necessary or sufficient condition for the entire syndrome. Moreover, the way the components are organised into a coherent whole is determined to a large extent by paradigms, of which the romantic ideal is one illustration." Averill, who seems right this far, also claims that the Greeks did not have this romantic ideal, but that it was introduced by either Dante or the medieval idea of courtly love.[4] What Averill seems to be confusing is the question whether the concept of romantic love as such existed, with its use as the bonding agent in marriage. As will become evident, in the discussion of ancient notions of love that will

follow, romantic love was by no means unknown to the Greeks. On the other hand, it would not be reluctantly conceded that it did not serve as a basis for marriage. Its use as such is, in fact, far more recent than the medieval, or indeed Dante's, notion of love.

Culture is undoubtedly the most decisive factor formulating all love's variations. In the same way we learn a language and acquire social habits, we 'learn' what to expect and what to give in love. In other words, we can say that love fundamentally is a contractual relationship. In modern societies, romantic love is supposed to lead to marriage, which is again an exchange relationship. Love and marriage, then, are two interdependent institutions. In basic outline, marriage is two persons of opposite sex living together and being loyal to each other, having sexual intercourse and producing children, providing one another emotional support. Although any modern person presented with the question why they abide by marriage's governing laws will answer by quoting love, the truth remains that such laws defined marriage long before romantic love was used, presented, or prescribed as the ground for abiding by them. It is only over the last two hundred years or so that the theme of romantic love in Western culture has become more and more prominent.

D. E. Orlinsky[5] writes on the current function of this kind of relationship in Western societies : "The external or contextual structure of a relationship is set by its functional position within a larger institutional matrix. The constrains imposed by this larger matrix have a powerful formative influence on the relationship. Viewed in this perspective, we can see that the romantic love relationship is essentially an interstitial or transitional form - one that serves as the port of entry to or exit from a major institutional role, or as a covert adjunct to an established institutional group, or as an

interim involvement bridging the gap between institutional commitments. In Western Societies, at least, the main institutional context of romantic love is the family or kinship system. As a transitional device, the romantic love relationship may serve as a vehicle for forming, and for dissolving a marriage. As an adjunctive device, it takes the form of an illicit extramarital affair, but when the affair is really an intimate rather than a casual relationship it is unstable and is either quickly terminated or transformed into a vehicle for terminating an unsatisfactory marriage."

Romantic love as an intense and mysterious external force, involving the individuals concerned in an overwhelming, idealised experience surpassing ordinary pleasures, is a prevalent Western cultural stereotype.[6] The presentation of this intense emotional experience as the basis for an exclusive commitment to one's partner in marriage or a long-lasting relationship is a modern phenomenon not, by any means, universally shared. Cross-cultural comparison reveals marked diffferences in the concept of love and its relation to marriage. For instance, a comparison between American and Chinese beliefs and values about love and marriage highlights the marked differences that can exist between cultures, and offers plausible suggestions as to the source of such differences. In his comparative analysis of American and Chinese ways of life, the psychological anthropologist F. L. K. Hsu[7] suggests that the concept of romantic love fits in well with the North American cultural perspective, which concentrates on the individual, but not the Chinese, where one is expected to consider obligations to others, especially one's parents, before personal feelings. "A male Chinese would consider himself a son, a brother, a husband, a father, but hardly himself."[8] In China romance is not listed in the desirable qualities in a prospective mate. Importance is laid on pragmatic attributes. "Love" typically signifies an illicit liaison

between a man and a woman,- (he notes the disapproval of public expressions of affection) -, rather than a respectable, socially sanctioned relationship.

The above discussion yields two main conclusions :
(a) Nothing in the concept of marriage itself necessitates the contemporary Western use of romantic love as the underlying bonding agent in marriage. The prominent alternative to this bonding agent has, in fact, been family duty.
(b) Love itself, as well as the way it is conveyed or expressed, can differ immensely from culture to culture.

With these two important conclusions in mind, I shall now turn to discuss ancient Greek notions of love. The aim of the discussion will not be to provide evidence for the existence of romantic love in ancient Greece;[9] rather, it will concentrate on love's portrayal in literature, and its evaluation by both ancient Greek society and ours.

οὐκ ἔστι τοῦδε παισὶ κάλλιον γέρας,
ἢ πατρὸς ἐσθλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ πεφυκέναι
[γαμεῖν τ' ἀπ' ἐσθλῶν· ὅς δὲ νικηθεὶς πόθῳ
κακοῖς ἐκοινώνησεν, οὐκ ἐπαινέσω,
τέκνοις ὄνειδος οὕνεχ' ἡδονῆς λιπεῖν].

[*Herakl.* 297ff.]

The lines, (even if the authenticity of 299-301 is doubtful), are a genuine expression of the ideas of the time and they speak for themselves. In Greek society the importance of marriage as an institution was paramount, as its main purpose was the production of legitimate citizens and family heirs. For the state, and the family to survive, it was essential that love remained socially regulated. Arranged marriages was the means to control and maintain the social, political, as well as financial status quo, while romantic love presented a serious threat of social disruption. Falling in love was regarded as a misfortune because its consummation was

frequently fraught with danger; of adultery, disgrace, or even financial ruin.[10] Therefore, it was neither welcome nor acceptable to the eyes of the Greek society.

This is evident, for instance, in the depiction of the relationship of Helen and Paris throughout Greek literature. In Homer, seen as nothing more than strong sexual desire, it is by no means glorified. Such lust endangers the military prowess of the heroes and is to be opposed by them, (after all, it was 'love' for Helen that resulted in the fall of Troy). The treatment of the story in tragedy, although it possesses romantic elements, has again as its most prominent characteristic the overpowering lust and its disastrous consequences.

This fear of ἔρως, one example of the fear of the threat by the emotions to the integrity of the self,[11] seems to have close associations with the climate of misogyny that governs most of Greek literature. Its prominence is remarkable in Hesiod's poetry [cf. *Theogony* especially 592-9], where it most probably made its first appearance - there is no misogyny in Homer. This is interesting to note, not only because it will be carried on in subsequent literature to become a τόπος, but also because Hesiod's poetry, with its preoccupation with household life, is closer to that of a classical οἶκος than the Homeric. With the focus on women's increasingly important role within the smaller unit of the house and the dependence of the family for its continuation on them, a fear emerges, related to their ability and trustworthiness in facing up to their obligations.[12] This fear is centred around their sexuality, which posed the strongest threat to the fulfilment of their role (cf. the example of Pandora in *Works and Days* 57f.].

Portrayals of women in lyric poetry can be divided into two categories. They are either seen as the

idealised wives, mothers or goddesses of heroic poetry, or, if they are 'real' women, the preoccupation with them has pronounced the element of sexuality. If they attract the poets' attention for any length of time it is largely because of misogyny,[13] which reaches its height with Semonides [Diehl, 7. 7ff.]. He casts women into types related to animals, in a manner reminiscent of Hesiod [e.g. *Theog*. 48f., 53/cf. Phokylides 2]. It is interesting to point out that what both poets foremostly attack is women's sexuality. Semonides, however, at least admits of a kind of woman that is good; her main characteristic is that she does not take pleasure in discussing sex [7. 90f.].

Beautiful women were a "pain to the eyes" according to Herodotos [v.18.4] : a mild, even complimentary, statement compared to the general way women were regarded - which clearly reflects this fear of love.[14] The beliefs and ideas invented about women to rationalise segregation of the sexes made romantic love, (which usually precedes marriage), almost impossible. The marginalisation of women[15] was partly due to the fact that their intellectual capacity and emotional stability was largely doubted as a result of their inadequacy as defenders of the state. The separation of the sexes can be seen as responsible for perpetuating a vicious circle of unfamiliarity > fear > devaluation > hatred > segregation. Generally speaking, it would seem that for the male Athenian marriage, or at least the incentive for it, had no sentimental value.[16] Its greatest significance was seen in the begetting of children who would continue the family name. Divorce became almost unavoidable if a woman remained childless. The law even attempted to regulate the frequency with which an Athenian citizen should have intercourse with his wife [cf. Plut. *Sol*. 20. 3]. This would suggest that the physical act of love was not primarily regarded as an intimately shared emotional experience,[17] but rather that it had the main purpose of

producing an heir, - the ultimate goal and confirmation of a marriage.

Herodotos' above quoted comment acquires added significance in the light of the strong Greek belief that the eyes were the carrier of love. Hesychios [iii 203] comments on Sophokles [fr. 161] : ’Ομμάτειος πόθος : διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ἁλίσκεσθαι ἔρωτι. ‘ ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ ἐσορᾶν γίνεται ἀνθρώποις ἐρᾶν.’ Gorgias also suggests that Helen was conquered by love for Alexander through her eyes [*Helen* 19]. This idea, manifest throughout Greek literature [Pindar *Nemea* viii 1/Ibykos 287/*Antig.* 795/*Hipp.* 525//Ach. Tatius i 4, 4], that love attacks through the eyes, is associated with the notion of ἔρως as an invasion, conquering and subduing its victim. In Hesiod's *Theogony,* ἔρως, centred around the eyes [910f.], is a powerful divinity, that has as victims both gods and mortals [120-2] :

κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι,
<u>λυσιμελής</u>, πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ’
ἀνθρώπων
<u>δάμναται</u> ἐν στήθεσσι <u>νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα</u>
<u>βουλήν</u>.

In Homer, declining from the divine sphere to the human level, ἔρως is not idealised. The word is frequently used for desire in general, whether for food, drink or sexual love. Nevertheless, erotic desire has the same "loosening" effect on someone's members as in Hesiod : τῶν δ’ αὐτοῦ λύτο γούνατ’, ἔρωι δ’ ἄρα θυμὸν ἔθελχθε. [*Od.* xviii 212f.]. Again it subdues, as γλυκὺς ἵμερος, men and god alike [*Il.* iii, 441ff., xiv 316, 328.]. Sweet, joyful and described with beautiful imagery, ἔρως has the power to affect (the "mind") even (of) the most "thoughtful" (νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων [*Il.* xiv 217]).

The lyric poets borrow their vocabulary and expressions from Homer and Hesiod :

ἀλλά μ' ὁ λυσιμελής, ὦ' ταῖρε, δάμναται πόθος [196].

Archilochos replaces here ἔρως with πόθος. Nevertheless, still with the same meaning of strong erotic desire, it is expressed as an all invading power, that leaves him wretched, vulnerable and powerless :

δύστηνος ἔγκειμαι πόθωι
ἄψυχος, χαλεπῆισι θεῶν ὀδύνηισιν ἔκητι
πεπαρμένος δι' ὀστέων [193].

Like most of the lyric poets, he also borrows the imagery of warfare to illustrate ἔρως as an attack.

Sappho's poems, full of refined feeling, create a convincing picture of love as a genuine emotion through selective description of love's striking and intense physical symptoms.[18] In her emotional descriptions she blends the reactions of all senses. Nevertheless, her poetry is not limited to the physical aspect of the effects of love. She turns to its mental effects too, while the bitterness of love is the new element she introduces into poetry :

πόλλα δὲ ζαφοίταισ', ἀγάνας ἐπι-
μνάσθεισ' Ἀτθιδος ἰμέρωι
λέπταν ποι φρένα κ[ᾶ]ρ[ι σᾶι] βόρηται
[96, 15-7].

Ἔρος δ' ἐτίναξέ μοι
φρένας, ὡς ἄνεμος κὰτ' ὄρος δρύσιν ἐμπέτων.
[47].

Ἔρος δηὖτέ μ' ὁ λυσιμέλης δόνει,
γλυκύπικρον ἀμάχανον ὄρπετον [130].

Eros is seen yet again as a power that conquers the body, affects the mind, and subdues emotions.

Ibykos' poetry, intense and passionate, seems to concentrate on the inescapable strength of ἔρως, and its fearful, maddening, and often undesired effect :

Ἔρος αὖτέ με κυανέοισιν ὑπὸ
βλεφάροις τακέρ' ὄμμασι δερκόμενος

κηλήμασι παντοδαποῖς ἐς ἄπει-
ρα δίκτυα Κύπριδος ἐσβάλλει·
ἦ μὰν τρομέω νιν ἐπερχόμενον,
ὥστε φερέζυγος ἵππος ἀεθλοφόρος ποτὶ γήρᾳ
ἀέκων σὺν ὄχεσφι θοοῖς ἐς ἄμιλλαν ἔβα· [287].

The feeling is expressed in a manner suggestive of the poet's passivity. He sees himself as a victim - ([cf. 286, 6f.] : ἐμοὶ δ' ἔρος/οὐδεμίαν κατάκοιτος ὥραν·) -, impotent against the desire attacking (ἐπερχόμενον) him from "underneath blue eyelids". Ἔρως is not presented as being born within him; once again it invades him setting off from the eyes of the beloved. This external nature of the attack is in Ibykos, as in Sappho [cf. 47], also conveyed through metaphors from nature [286, 8ff.].

The kind of love portrayed in lyric poetry retains to a large degree the joyful and leisurely feeling of the Homeric descriptions, now applied to mortals, and expressive of the personal dimension. Although the poets begin to mention the madness and pain of love, (cf. ἀστραγάλαι δ' Ἔρωτός εἰσιν/ μανίαι τε καὶ κυδοιμοί [Anakreon 398]), it is not for them a destructive condition since it is by no means lasting. Rather than on the suffering of love or the negative effects of passion, the stress is on pleasure and the eternally recurring desire [cf. δηῦτε, αὖτε].

This is not the case in tragedy, where the fear, suffering and madness of love is the all pervasive feeling. The portrayal of love in tragedy is probably the best literary expression of the equation ἔρως = insanity, which was a standard belief of the Greeks. Although in the vocabulary and imagery used for its description the tragic poets imitate substantially lyric poetry, their conception seems to be based on the lines of Prodikos' definition, of ἔρως as desire doubled and ἔρως doubled as madness [Stob. iv 20, 65].

One of the most famous descriptions of ἔρως in tragedy is in Sophokles *Antigone* [781ff.]. The portrayal summarizes all the conventional and literary notions. The main characteristics stressed are again inescapability (ἀνίκατε μάχαν, φύξιμος οὐδείς), and the power to affect the mind (ὁ δ' ἔχων μέμηνεν). Centred as ever around the eyes of the beloved (νικᾷ, δ' ἐναργής βλεφάρων/ἵμερος εὐλέκτρου/νύμφας), ἔρως befalls its victim from externally (πίπτεις), and it is indeed pointless to fight against the invincible power of the god's teasing play (ἄμαχος γὰρ ἐμ-/παίζει θεὸς Ἀφροδίτα).

The description here has a great deal of romanticism, which somehow helps to transform the fear of ἔρως into respectful awe. Its insanity is mentioned, but nonetheless it is not until its results crush Haimon, Euridike and eventually Kreon, that its destructive power is thoroughly unveiled. This power is what is portrayed in *Trachiniai,* where Sophokles offers a more extensive treatment of ἔρως with no romanticism to appease its terrifying nature. Here ἔρως is emphatically νόσος [445, 491, 544] and connections throughout the play between madness and νόσος seem to highlight that ἔρως is no mere temporary insanity.[19] Deianira herself, however, associates madness with resisting ἔρως [441-8].

The idea of ἔρως as νόσος could be seen as the first hint in the process of its 'internalisation'. Nevertheless, it is still referred to divinity [492, 497, 860f.]. The play could be seen in a sense as a tragedy of love : All action seems to stem from ἔρως; its destructiveness is powerfully symbolised in the poison that kills Herakles and effects Deianira's death.

In Euripides, who, according to Longinos [*On the Sublime* xv 3], is an authority on the presentation of

love, the process of 'internalising' ἔρως is more explicit, and, one might even say, perfected.[20] In *Hippolytos,* ἔρως is presented as a disease born within the individual, a burning passion with immense suffering and dire consequences. This innovative mode of description, however, coexists with traditional literary notions about ἔρως, mostly borrowed from the lyric poets : the imagery of warfare to suggest the attack of ἔρως, who invades from the eyes, its bittersweet quality, the physicality in the description of its symptoms are all present in the play.

In fact, traditional notions relating to the external nature of ἔρως are particularly emphasized. Phaidra is described as struck with ἔρως, (κἀκπεπλημμένη/ κέντροις ἔρωτος [*Hipp.* 38f., cf. 27f.]), and similar expressions are used in *Medea* (ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ' [8], ἱμέρῳ πεπλημμένος [556], μήποτ,'. . ., ἐπ' ἐμοὶ . . . τόξων ἀφείης/ἱμέρῳ χρίσασ' ἄφυκτον οἰστόν [634f.]). These, however, are juxtaposed with the characters' own interpretation of their situation, for which they assume responsibility. Medea's terms, for example, at 475ff. where she is describing how she saved Jason, strongly imply personal responsibility for the emotion that destroyed her (especially 483-5, cf. 800-2 ἀνδρὸς Ἕλληνος λόγοις/πεισθεῖσ'). On the contrary, Jason refers her actions to Kypris and Ἔρως [527; 530f. Ἔρως σ' ἠνάγκασε/τόξοις ἀφύκτοις . . .]. The same is true of Phaidra [cf. 247-9].[21]

This juxtaposition with tradition seems to be intended to highlight the eventual revelation of ἔρως as an impulse, born within the individual as the result of emotional needs. It stresses the difference as well as the similarity : Whether god-provoked or not, ἔρως remains undesired and irresistible. Its overpowering feeling victimizes as it blinds any other motivating

factor - whether emotional, logical, or practical. As has been said, loss of control has always been the most negative aspect of this kind of love. Its attribution to divinity was the traditional way not only of accounting for the compulsiveness of the feeling, but also of justifying why men should not be held accountable/responsible for the consequences of such loss of control.

Euripides' method of presentation is very interesting in the close comparison it affords to Gorgias' *Helen*, where the heroine is absolved from all blame for her passionate desire of the lover who swept her away. Gorgias' exposition acknowledges the overpowering force of love, whatever its nature, and the human inability to resist it : ὅς εἰ μὲν θεὸς θεῶν θείαν δύναμιν, πῶς ἄν ὁ ἥσσων εἴη τοῦτον ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἀμύνασθαι δυνατός; εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον· ἦλθε γὰρ ὡς ἦλθε ψυχῆς ἀγρεύμασιν, οὐ γνώμης βουλεύμασι, καὶ ἔρωτος ἀνάγκαις οὐ τέχνης παρασκευαῖς. [19. 7ff.]. Indeed, in his portrayal of Phaidra's ἔρως Euripides follows precisely this line. Ἔρως is presented as a human sickness, a mistake of the soul through ignorance.[22] Aphrodite's presence illustrates how it is not to be blamed upon Phaidra, for her love is not the result of crafty deliberations, a conscious intellectual decision, but rather, in its inevitability, her ἔρως is the result of emotional needs.

Euripides' treatment of ἔρως seems to be unique, not only because it is innovative, but also in its apparent extent. Surviving evidence can be misleading, but the subject does not seem to have been popular in tragedy. Aristophanes attacks him [*Clouds* 1371f., *Frogs* 850, 1043ff., 1081] for conquering the stage with the representation of the passion of love, and for his

treatment of it as the centre and driving impulse of a play. The implication of *Frogs* 1053-6 is that the passion of love is foreign to the true spirit of tragedy. Indeed, on a first impression, it seems to receive no treatment in Aischylos, the more traditional of the poets. Nevertheless, the objection in the *Clouds* is against portrayal of **women** in love, and with the implications of this as guidance, a closer examination reveals that surviving plays are indeed misleading. There is evidence that Aischylos turns to the subject of love, but this love is of homosexual nature. In accordance with social disapproval, the dismissal of the passion of erotic love in tragedy is valid only for such love[23] between man and woman.

It is worth mentioning here, however, that Aristophanes, who criticises Euripides on the above given grounds, is himself ambiguous. The very name of his heroine in *Lysistrate* is significant of women's power to dissolve armies. The disruptive implications of the name, however, contradict the eventual unity and harmony which Lysistrate effects. This ambivalence seems to be reflected in her character portrayal. She is clever, with strong leadership qualities, persistent and perceptive. Or, as one might argue, mischievous., manipulative, mean and crafty would perhaps be better terms to use for her description. The same kind of ambivalence is found in *Medea,* where women's qualities are revealed in their double-edged nature, and this is related in the play to the ambivalence of what a woman's love can achieve : harmony or destruction.

I have just said that there is evidence suggesting that erotic love was perhaps portrayed more frequently in tragedy in its homosexual nature. This would not be surprising in the light of the subject's prominence throughout Greek literature, which must be a reflection of the fact that in Greek society homosexuality was a

strong characteristic. One of the earliest, perhaps, love-stories is that between Achilleus and Patroklos.[24] In *Odyssey* [xxiv 78, cf. also iii 109, xi 467, xxiv 15] Antilochos takes the place of Patroklos, since clearly for Achilleus a close, loving companion is essential. Although not pronounced, it is not true that homosexuality is not present in epic (cf. the story of Ganymedes *Il.* xx 231, xix 193]. That is perhaps the reason that Homer can, on a first reading, give the impression of never anywhere describing the feelings, unhappiness or torments of someone in love. Such a conclusion, however, is misleading, in view of Achilleus' feelings and suffering out of love for Patroklos.[25]

Ibykos [cf. 288] dealt essentially with homosexual love, which seems to have been not only a favoured subject of the lyric poets, but a similarly favoured practice of the aristocrats of the time. The law introduced by Solon, himself a homosexual [cf. 25], to regulate paiderasty may have been a response to this. Anakreon, who seems to have been the first to individualize the particular emotion of sexual love towards women, wrote poetry τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ σώματος, for boys [Aelian *Var. Hist.* ix. 4].

Aischylos' *Myrmidones,* which dealt with the story of Achilleus and Patroklos, Sophokles' *Niobe* and the satyric play *Achilleos Erastai,* as well as Euripides' *Chryssippos* are some of the lost plays where homosexual love provides a central theme. Such plays did in fact contain sexually explicit language [cf. A. fr. 136, S. fr. 388, 390], but were nevertheless accepted by the Athenian audiences [Athen. xiii 601]. Aristophanes' testimony is overwhelming in its explicitness.[26] The argument between Dikaios and Adikos in *Clouds* [961ff.], is resolved by the undisputed evidence, pointed at by Adikos, that the Athenian citizens, regardless of their

occupation or class, practised, in their devastating majority, homosexuality [1089-1101].

It is perhaps in the "romanticized"[27] version of homosexuality present in the philosopher's work where ἔρως is used with the meaning closest to the modern notion of romantic love.[28] In Plato, eros seems to acquire this meaning as a result of his dislike and contempt[29] of any physical expression of sexual passion. Love is stripped from any real, earthly components, and spiritualised.[30] In Sokrates' speech in the *Symposion* love is seen as embracing every desire for good (which is identified with beauty), and happiness, while it can express itself in various ways, such as love of a person, a concept, or a thing. The object of Love, derived from the powerful human desire for immortality and renown, is procreation in beauty. This might seem indeed more expressive of how love should be, than what it actually is. Aristophanes' speech makes perhaps the real nature of love more tangible. The allegory behind his story expresses most successfully the yearning of a human being in love to be eternally united with the beloved in the belief and feeling that they are "one".

Speeches in the *Symposion* are meant to be in praise of love. Nevertheless, as Phaidros' remark reveals, Greeks do not seem to have been very successful in praising "real" love. I shall try to show here what it is that they considered "real" love, and why indeed there does not seem to be extensive representation of it.

The kind of love between man and woman that was acceptable by the Greeks was the one that worked as a bonding agent after marriage, and was seen as a dynamic relationship that can grow. The term that would perhaps represent it better is φιλία. Theseus uses its epithet in the superlative to describe his feelings towards his wife [*Hipp.* 838]; φιλία itself and its derivatives abound in

Alkestis. The word, however, also prominent, for instance, in *Herakles*, can reveal a huge scale of different shades of affection - in the same way that 'love' can be used today for parental, romantic, or friendly feelings, or admiration of beauty, truth, etc.. Precisely because of its wide-ranging meaning, it is descriptive of the kind of love that developed within the marital bond, and expressive of what this relationship should, ideally, entail.

The limited number of surviving examples in literature might have something to do with social conventions' requirement that decent, noble women should not be heard of [cf. *Funeral Speech*, Th. ii 45,15ff.]. One of the best illustrations of this kind of love we have is Alkestis' sacrifice for her husband. Perhaps the best known treatment of the story can be found in Euripides' *Alkestis*. Nevertheless, as I shall be discussing in the following chapter, modern criticism and interpretations of the play raise objections as to whether indeed it was out of love that Alkestis died. Two reasons seem responsible for such objections : contemporary notions of love and social conventions, - (which are in fact also reflected in dramatic ones).

Alkestis does not offer any passionate declarations of her love, in the same way that Deianira does not speak of her ἔρως for her husband, although she does love and desire him - the chorus confirm her longing at 103-11. Both are portrayed as noble and virtuous wives, and as Plutarch in his Ἐρωτικός explains, "respectable women cannot properly bestow or receive passionate love".[31] If this seems difficult to accept or too remote to understand, K. J. Dover[32] offers a clear analogy in the presentation of respectable British society in the literature of the nineteenth century, and significantly adds:"Elements to this moral schema persist to this day, varying from country to country and from class to class."

Interestingly enough, however, Plutarch's ideas do not stop him from believing that a happy, indeed ideal relationship can exist between a married couple that has achieved κρᾶσις [᾽Ερωτικός 769F-700], a paramount requirement for marital harmony, as, for example, Odysseus' advice to Nausika shows [*Od.* vi 182-5] :

. . . οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρεῖσσον καὶ ἄρειον,
ἢ ὅθ᾽ ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχητον
ἀνὴρ ἠδὲ γυνή· πόλλ᾽ ἄλγεα δυσμενέεσι,
χάρματα δ᾽ εὐμενέτῃσι, μάλιστα δὲ τ᾽ ἔκλυον
αὐτοί.

A prerequisite for it was that women should think alike with their husband [Plut. *Moralia* 139C-140A/Xen. *Oikon.*/ cf. *Med.* 13-5]. Nevertheless, from a modern point of view, this standard demand of married life for Greek women seems worse, in many respects, than death. It is frequently interpreted as a sacrifice of their individuality, giving up existence as persons of their own right to become wives, or mothers. M. Lefkowitz[33] traces, in the patterns of myths, only two options available to women who have reached maturity :

(a) Marriage and childbirth, resulting in their death (literal or figurative) as individuals, or
(b) Withholding/destruction, resulting in the preservation of their individuality.

If they choose to marry, they may either die themselves, or kill their husbands and/or children. If they choose to remain celibate, they must do men's work or become frozen in some aspect of their maiden state; for example, they turn into trees. There seem to be no other possibilities. Some of the examples offered are those of Persephone, Semele, Danae, Io. Life stops for these women with marriage (or sexual union) and/or childbirth, while Klytemnestra, Medea, Agave kill their husbands/ children.

These interpretations, however, best suit how a 20th century A.D. woman might feel if placed in such an

environment. The picture drawn in Aristophanes' *Lysistrate* contradicts the popular modern argument that an intense, intimate, devoted and reciprocal relationship does not seem to have been possible for the Greeks within marriage. As Dover argues,[34] it may be only an inconsequentiality that in the sex-strike forced on the men by their women, they do not turn their attentions elsewhere, (i.e. slaves, homosexuality, etc.). Dover, however, rightly comments, that even if we allow for comic convention, "the central idea of the play, that a sex-strike by citizens' wives against their husbands can be imagined as having so devastating an effect, implies that the marital relationship was much more important in people's actual lives than we would have inferred simply from our knowledge of the law and our acquaintance with litigation about property and inheritance; more important, too, than could ever be inferred from a comprehensive survey of the varieties of sexual experience and attitude which were possible for the Greeks."

Regardless of how credible it may seem to us today, 5th century B.C. women may have felt satisfaction and contentment in fulfilling their roles towards society and family. The ancient Greek society differed from modern Western ones, which tend to be individualistic and selfish in the search and demand for personal satisfaction. The questioning of ancient social norms as well our interpretation of love in ancient Greece is largely influenced by comparison from this standpoint. For critical detachment to be achieved, the "provisional and culture-bound nature of any definition of love" [35] should be born in mind. A re-evaluation of modern notions of love is needed, especially in order to get rid of the notion of love as a single entity, which wrongly leads us to regard differences in experiences of love as differences in quantity.[36]

This "true" love of the Greeks, φιλία rather than ἔρως, is in fact the so-called "conjugal" that psychologists recommend.[37] Sociologist J. A. Lee[38] sees such love deriving from what he calls **storge**, which is an attachment of loving affection developing slowly over time with nothing feverish or incontrollable; viewed indeed as "true" love, it is considered an excellent basis for marriage. It is in a sense pragmatic. As it allows for emotional control it comes about only if the specific practical (socially conforming, useful) qualities required in a beloved have been established as present. Storge, combined with eros can grow into what Lee calls **agape** : selfless, giving, altruistic love, often thought to be guided from the head rather than the heart, and perhaps more expressive of good will and kindness than pure emotion. Faith, fidelity, duty and devotion are paramount elements. One of its characteristics is that affection tends to expand to anyone who may need it rather than toward just the beloved. Giving up or sacrificing everything for what is viewed as best for them is another, almost exclusive, characteristic of people who experience agape.

In the light of these last remarks I would like to look again at the portrayal of Alkestis' love and compare it with that of Evadne in Euripides' *Suppliants*. The death of both women is the result of their love. Evadne mentions, like Alkestis, honourable reputation (εὐκλε·ί·ας χάριν, ἀρετῆι [1014f./1059-63]) as her reason for jumping into the fire. There is, however, in objective terms, no necessity for her deed. Evadne's death is not a sacrifice; it is her emotional reaction to her husband's death [cf. 1000-8]. Her words, loaded with feeling, reveal, perhaps in a more convincing and unrestrained way than is the case in *Alkestis*, her desperate love [1019-24].

Like Alkestis, she will never betray her husband, even in death. But her eagerness to die contrasts with Alkestis' well weighted decision to sacrifice herself. Evadne pushes aside any consideration for her orphaned children and her old father, while for the dying Alkestis paramount considerations are her concern for her children and her husband's very life. The fact that Alkestis' attitude is composed, while Evadne's is almost irrationally emotional highlights the contrast. Alkestis' admirable composure reflects the awareness of her responsibility as a mother and this is an essential component in the complete portrayal of Alkestis' love which, as said above is characteristic of agape, extends to her entire family and home rather than just towards her husband. Not only does it allow Alkestis to judge what is best for them all, but it also gives her the strength to sacrifice herself in order to achieve it.

Before I turn in the next few chapters to examine Euripides' presentation of love both as φιλία and as ἔρως, I would like to make one last point clear. In discussing ancient Greek awareness of what the nature of true love should be, I am not suggesting that in everyday life occurrence of it was the norm. Neither that it is something they particularly strove for. It certainly seems to have been a requirement from Greek wives, but how much did the husbands share its mutual obligations? If it were indeed possible for women to feel satisfaction in their roles as wives, how often was this the case? As I shall go on to argue, the finger that Euripides points to male attitudes in *Medea*,[39] as well as part of his portrayal of Admetos seem to indicate that a considerable few among them might have felt resentment instead.

6. Love's Φιλία

"In its technically brilliant fusion of romanticism, with its wish for the impossible; of satire, with its dissection of conventional values; and of the heroism in the person of Alcestis, Euripides gives the play a disturbing quality which, as in so many of his works, still challenges the honesty of our response ."

J. R. Wilson
Introduction to "*20 th Century Interpretations of the Alcestis*"

Love is an emotion encountered in Euripides' plays in its numerous and complex forms and varieties. The playwright seems to be particularly concerned with love's negative emotions, frequently derived from betrayal and abandonment, frustration, or seclusion. Love as a healthy, mutual and rewarding experience is rarely presented in his work. One of these rare exceptions is in the portrayal of love in *Alkestis,* where love is highly idealised. Alkestis is selflessly willing to sacrifice herself so that her husband can remain alive - something that not even his parents are prepared to do. Nevertheless, many modern interpretations of the play tend to challenge the view that Alkestis' motive for her sacrifice was love for Admetos.[1] A brief summary of such arguments would run roughly along the following lines : Alkestis knows her sacrifice is expected of her in compliance with her role and image as an ideal wife. Her deed bears throughout the play an unquestionable seal of approval. Alkestis, then, dies out of loyalty to the ideal of what a good wife should be. While this is what makes the story possible, it is at the same time seen to be robbing it of its passion. Alkestis is also suspected of not caring for the man but for the praise she will gain in dying for the family ideal. On the other hand, Admetos'

feelings for his wife are doubted even more. This interpretation[2] finds Alkestis dying in bitter disillusionment in the lack of reciprocity to her own feelings.

There are, I believe, two important and quite distinct reasons for such conflicting interpretations. Firstly, the discordance between general modern response to the play and the one that seems to have been intended seems to have its roots in the differences between contemporary and fifth century notions of love. Alkestis is required to demonstrate all the symptoms of romantic love familiar to us, for this is the relationship we have come to automatically expect between a man and a woman.[3] More importantly, it is romantic love that we would like to think as the only form of heterosexual relationship that might possibly lead to the extremes of self-sacrificing.

This first reason would explain why such diverse interpretations of the play are possible amongst its general audience. However, it still remains a fact that even scholars, familiar with the sociological evidence regarding fifth century notions of love, disagree immensely in their views of the play. The conflict about *Alkestis* is rather exceptional. But after all, the play is exceptional in itself. Although the fourth play of a tetralogy, *Alkestis* can be called neither a satyric drama nor a tragedy. Before I go on, however, to investigate how the unique and undefined nature of the play leaves it open to such variety of interpretations, I would like to concentrate first on my attempt to show how modern individual notions and definitions of love influence views on the play.

Let me start first by examining Admetos' case, as it indeed is far more complicated than Alkestis'. The main accusation against him is that he does not have any genuine love for his wife, or else he could not possibly

have accepted her death for his own survival. His 'selfishness' cannot possibly be co-existent with love. R. B. Heilman's description of the character of Edward in T. S. E liot's *The Cocktail Party* might apply for Admetos too. "Edward is vastly self-centered; the phase of self-discovery that goes on after Lavinia's return is a lamentation on the theme, 'Hell is oneself', so painfully carried on that Lavinia's reply has justice, 'Could you bear, for a moment,/To think about me?' To be self-centered is to be lacking in love; Lavinia says that Edward 'has never been in love with anybody.' He lives not understandingly but mechanically; . . .." [4]

In his own lamentations, Admetos seems to be talking mostly of the suffering that his wife's death is causing **him** :

οἴμοι· τόδ' ἔπος λυπρὸν ἀκούειν
καὶ παντὸς <u>ἐμοὶ</u> θανάτου μεῖζον.
μὴ πρός ‹σε› θεῶν τλῇς <u>με</u> προδοῦναι,
μὴ πρὸς παίδων οὕς ὀρφανιεῖς,
ἀλλ' ἄνα, τόλμα.
σοῦ γὰρ φθιμένης οὐκέτ' ἄν <u>εἴην</u>, [273ff.].

Not a single word about Alkestis' pain and suffering. Instead, he inconsiderately begs her not to "betray" him, and, for the sake of their children, whom she will leave orphans, asks her not to die, for he would not be able to carry on living once she was dead. Alkestis is perfectly aware that her death means orphanhood for her children and this causes her much pain [304ff.]. But it was part of her decision to die for Admetos, and the reflection of this makes his comments even more selfish and inappropriate. He even needs to be reminded by Alkestis that she is dying so that he could remain alive [383].

During his lament, after Alkestis' funeral, he seems to become more aware of his loss. Even so, it is more of the 'use' of Alkestis that he talks than the emotional meaning of her life in his own [941ff.]. His ἄρτι

μανθάνω is seen as limited, for, rather than going on to say that he should have never accepted his wife's life in exchange for his, he reaches the conclusion [935f.], that her fate is much happier than his.[5] Note also that his major concern is not so much whether he has actually done wrong, but what his "enemies" will accuse him of [954ff.].

Extravagance is another thing that is often seen as losing him credibility. Alkestis asks him not to marry again, so that the children will not have to experience the cruelty of a step-mother [304-310]. Admetos grants this promise to his wife [328-31], since he has had his heirs (ἄλις δὲ παίδων [334]). But he goes on to declare how he will show his grief in the most extravagant ways [336-47]. He goes one step further and promises something he has not actually been asked for by Alkestis - who knows that another woman will find her way to her bed anyway [181f.] - : undying loyalty and sexual fidelity [348ff.].

He is very much aware that taking another woman into his house would be considered a betrayal of Alkestis [1057-1060]; nevertheless, despite his previous oaths and declaration (θάνοιμ' ἐκείνην καίπερ οὐκ οὖσαν προδούς. [1096]), he betrays her in the end. Alkestis never betrays her husband, but Admetos seems to do so twice. It is by betraying her that he loses her, and by betraying her that he wins her back, for he decides to take her, not in the knowledge that she is his beloved wife, but as the strange woman that Herakles presents him with.

The doubts about Admetos increase, especially in view of what his offer of hospitality to Herakles negates : his own promise to Alkestis for eternal personal mourning [336ff.], as well as the yearly one imposed on his subjects [425-31]. Herakles' testing of Admetos'

feelings [1034ff., especially 1079-1097] seems highly ironical as Admetos yields to his pressure [1101-1110] in a way that can be seen parallel to Pentheus' submission to Dionysos [*Ba.* 810]. Both give in to what seems external pressure, while it is in fact nothing but disguised personal desire/willingness.

Carefully scrutinized under the light of the discussion in the previous chapter, however, such interpretations remain unconvincing. I have said in the opening paragraph that Alkestis' loyalty to the ideal of a good wife is what makes the story possible, but it is at the same time seen as robbing it of its passion. Why, though, should we necessarily expect passion? Surely, one might argue, even if not passion, we should expect to get a few words of Alkestis' strong love for Admetos, if nowhere else at least in their parting scene. Why this serious lack of any signs of love on Alkestis' behalf? Her feelings are of great importance, and if those feelings included love, one would be entitled to think it should not be omitted. A. M. Dale reminds us of all the customary conventions seen in the previous chapter regulating love and its manifestations : "Our speech, songs and literature are so saturated with this theme (love) that we are apt to forget how unaccustomed Greek eyes and ears would be to the spectacle of a high-born young wife expatiating in public to her husband upon such a subject." [6] Moreover, she hints indirectly at the point that I wish to emphatically make clear. Love, as we have learnt to expect it today, either through experiencing it or through having it portrayed for us in our speech, song and literature, is indeed absent from the *Alkestis,* but this does in no way negate the fact that in *Alkestis* real love is present. We must try and re-interpret the play from a different viewpoint, as it would have appeared to the eyes and sensitivities of its intended audience, with their own notions and expectations of love.

Alkestis knows love's essential components. She prays that her children will find a φίλην ἄλοχον and a γενναῖον πόσιν [165f.], and this request, which is directly relevant to the theme of this play, reveals that she knows what is important for determining happiness. But what are her own feelings toward her husband? Is it it true that they are nowhere present? Alkestis' love for Admetos may not be explicit in words or physical behaviour, but it is revealed by her whole attitude towards him.

Ὦ λέκτρον, ἔνθα παρθένει' ἔλυσ' ἐγὼ
κορεύματ' ἐκ τοῦδ' ἀνδρός, οὗ θνήισκω πάρος,
χαῖρ' · οὐ γὰρ ἐχθαίρω σ' · ἀπώλεσας δέ με
μόνον· προδοῦναι γάρ σ' ὀκνοῦσα καὶ πόσιν
θνήισκω. . . . . [177-81].

ἐγώ σε πρεσβεύουσα κἀντὶ τῆς ἐμῆς
ψυχῆς καταστήσασα φῶς τόδ' εἰσορᾶν
θνήισκω, παρόν μοι μὴ θανεῖν, ὑπὲρ σέθεν,
ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τε σχεῖν Θεσσαλῶν ὅν ἤθελον
καὶ δῶμα ναίειν ὄλβιον τυραννίδι. [282-6].

Her words betray loyalty, reverence, respect, altruism. What 287 (οὐκ ἠθέλησα ζῆν ἀποσπασθεῖσα σοῦ) betrays is not dependence. Alkestis says she would, and not could, not live without Admetos. More evidence, and of a more 'sentimental' nature, of Alkestis' feelings, is her breaking into tears [175f.] when she bids farewell to her marital bed; uncontrollable tears [183-5], which, however, she had for long managed to hold back [173f.]. Other, and more direct (physical) symptoms of love we cannot find in the play. Alkestis' love is not portrayed by a presentation of her physical reactions to her feelings, but through an analysis of their nature and consequences.

What is important to note is that Alkestis clearly states that she wants to betray neither her λέκτρον **nor** her husband. This is the best answer to our doubts. For her both her love for Admetos and her obligation to her

marriage carry equal importance, are inter-related. Alkestis is aware of the fact that fulfilling her 'duty' to the maximum should be, as it actually is, recognised as ideal, and she is proud of it. Although the truth remains that it was society, and not herself who set this ideal, the fervour and willingness with which she follows it do credit to no one but her. With her sacrifice she brings her role as wife to perfection.[7] Her married life seems to have been the ζηλωτὸς αἰών that Medea refers to [*Med.* 243] when she is describing the two alternatives that women are faced with in marriage; the "enviable life" and "living death".[8] This is what sets on Alkestis the obligation to die, as a way of consummating this ideal union. But the decision is not imposed on her, it is her own choice.

Alkestis' devotion is based on her perfect understanding, (even if to us passive acceptance), of how an οἶκος should be. Her perception of commitment to her marriage extends to the whole family, children as well as husband, and to fulfil this commitment she is prepared to sacrifice herself. The importance of the family in marriage has been discussed in the previous chapter, and this importance is reflected in the play in the numerous references to the house.[9] Other characters in the play express feelings that reveal this perception of home as a quality of life with the woman at the heart of it;[10] her son's lament (οἰχομένας δὲ σοῦ,/μᾶτερ, ὄλωλεν οἶκος [414f.]), the servants' descriptions [192-6/767-70/825]. Euripides constantly allows us glimpses into the house. Through detailed description of both the active and passive aspects of a home, the ordinary, daily activities of the house, as well as of what can occur within it, Alkestis' home is probably the only house in surviving tragedy to lose its impersonality. It becomes a reality ideal and convincing enough to motivate Alkestis' self-sacrifice.

We have already seen one of the reasons for which Alkestis' love is not portrayed as passionate. Such love was regarded as a disruptive element and thus unworthy of a noble and controlled Athenian. However, it seems that Euripides, despite such limitations, also had other reasons for choosing not to portray Alkestis' love as blind and passionate. He was not one to leave society's beliefs and customs unchallenged[11] and his compliance here must surely mean something. His portrayal of Alkestis' emotions, has, I think, the purpose of illustrating that the kind of love that is real and true, that provides happiness, security and continuation can only be the one described here. Not blind, but enriched by reason, it can withstand even the ultimate test. Such love cannot be ἔρως, but φιλία. Not "romantic love" as we would like to see it, but rather a kind of Storgic Eros as described in Lee's categories.[12] With all the characteristics of agape, Storgic Eros does not demand demonstrations of love or commitment, and its emphasis is on caring feelings rather than sexual intimacy. This kind of love, for which we often use the uninspired name "conjugal", develops, as has been said, over extended periods of time, and is based essentially on feelings of loyalty and appreciation, stemming from the sharing of common experiences.

Alkestis' love presents three important components : intimacy, commitment **and** passion. Alkestis' love is not limited to the physical; she loves Admetos for the value he has as an individual person, which renders his life worthwhile. As a husband, caring for his house, father, caring for his family, and king, caring for his people. *Alkestis* is not lacking in passion; it is the passion of idealism. Her devotion to her marriage overshadows any personal, self-preoccupied passion. Alkestis is aware that, despite any personal considerations, she and her husband share a commitment towards their family and their community. And she is also aware that this

commitment would be best served,[13] if Admetos was the one of the two to survive.

Having tried to remove some of the misconceptions regarding Alkestis' feelings, I want to now try to reassess the opinion formed of Admetos based on a modern interpretation. It would not be an easy task, and not one I am going to attempt, to prove him the considerate, loving husband of Alkestis, self-critical and beyond reproach. On the other hand, to claim he is the opposite, and accuse him of conscious selfishness, insensitivity, or inconsideration, would be misguided. What I would like to argue here is that Admetos' portrayal was intentionally and carefully drawn to leave us with an uncomfortable feeling of uncertainty. As I have already said, what is most interesting about this play is its openness, almost invitation, to double interpretation. The ambiguity at the end, to which I will come back later, sustains this possibility of double interpretation and so does the portrayal of Admetos as a whole.

Admetos' character, unlike indeed most of the characters known to us in tragedy (with the exception perhaps of Orestes in the play named after him), abounds in ebbs and flows. While the other characters around him, Herakles, Pheres, or indeed, paradoxically, Alkestis, are merely functional, he changes and develops. Admetos is the only character in the play with a dynamic, rather than static, portrayal. He may sound thoughtless in his suffering, but he is neither selfish nor calculating. His remarks sound odd, inappropriate at the given time and circumstances, but appropriateness of emotion cannot be judged.[14] The limitations already mentioned regulating Alkestis' expression of her feelings are equally valid for Admetos. He stands accused of selfishness at 273ff.. But what he says towards the end of this [277-9] is revealing :

σοῦ γὰρ φθιμένης οὐκέτ' ἄν εἴην·
ἐν σοὶ δ' ἐσμὲν καὶ ζῆν καὶ μή·
<u>σὴν γὰρ φιλίαν σεβόμεσθα</u>.

He respects, honours, is true towards φιλία, and φιλία is precisely mutual feeling, it is the relationship they share. σήν is not there to qualify it as something only coming from, belonging to Alkestis. φιλία is more of a reciprocal relationship than a feeling, and σήν indicates that his feelings are towards this φιλία he shares with her. He sincerely expresses the feeling that without her he could no longer be.[15] I am not denying that there is a contrast with Alkestis' attitude. She achieves an admirable balance in the conflict of her emotions between her wish to save his life and her grief for what she leaves behind. Admetos' emotional tone is different from Alkestis', who never utters any complaints, but the contrast is intended to highlight Alkestis' attitude, idealise it, and not to discredit Admetos.

It is this difference in emotional character that explains Admetos' extravagance, as we have called it. Alkestis is calm and controlled, he is almost irrational. This is obvious not only in his response to her request not to remarry, but also in his feelings towards his parents [336-9, cf. the scene with his father 629ff.], compared to those of Alkestis [290-99]. There are of course many ways to interpret this extravagance, but to take it as a sign of insincerity would be misguided. "This devotion . . . he is prepared to take to truly extraordinary lengths", "this extravagant, passionate loyalty to her, excluding him not only from marriage but from any sexual relationship with women (1056-61), and even from their company (950-4)"[16] Admetos feels to be the very least with which he can respond to Alkestis' unlimited love and reward her unmatched sacrifice.[17]

Hospitality is one of Admetos' prominent qualities, but it is often seen as his perfect excuse for the betrayal

of his wife, yet another sign of selfishness. This quality of Admetos, however, is described with vocabulary similar to that used for his wife. She is ἐσθλή, he is γενναῖος [857-60]. The chorus praises Alkestis for the strength and nobility of her commitment [460-3 ἔτλας/741 σχετλία τόλμης]. Although they do react (τί μῶρος εἶ; [551f.]), to Admetos' decision to provide hospitality while mourning, seeing it as an extreme act (τολμᾶις), they will praise him for it in the choral ode that immediately follows [569-77]. But again note the ambiguity introduced by the servant's comment [809] : ἄγαν ἐκεῖνός ἐστ' ἄγαν φιλόξενος.

His greatest virtue then, hospitality,[18] is put to the test along with his love, in the last scene of the play. He passes the test with his virtue unharmed, but does this mean that he betrays his love? There are many factors to be considered here before reaching a decision. Despite all his previous declarations he accepts another young woman into his house, and agrees, although aware of the disrepute such an act will bring, to take her into the house himself. But he does not give in easily [1037-1108], and when he does, it is on the grounds of respect to the laws of friendship and hospitality, in order not to affront his guest [1106/1108]. Even then, additional persuasion is needed [1111-8] to convince him to lead her into the house himself, and his unwillingness is obvious in his βιάζηι μ' οὐ θέλοντα [1116], and Γοργόν' ὡς καρατομῶν [1118]. The ambiguity, however, cannot be totally eliminated. It is there to be exploited by both those who want to believe that Admetos' last act is one of betrayal,[19] as well as by those who see it as an act of obedience to the ideal that Alkestis died for, guided by his love and respect to her.[20]

Everybody in the play seems to either have forgotten or to ignore the background of which the events are a consequence. There is an almost complete silence about

the implications of Admetos' acceptance of his wife's sacrifice. Almost, but not entirely, complete silence. There is Pheres, who, although he is in the wrong morally, is right about his answers to Admetos' attack. We cannot dismiss his accusations on the grounds that he is answering back to abuse with abuse. Whether either of them has the right to criticise the other is a different matter, but it remains true that what is exchanged between them is nothing but the bitter truth. Neither resorts to untruthful accusations. Their anger prompts them to say things that everybody else seems reluctant to remark upon. We do not question the fact that Pheres is a coward and a hypocrite.[21] Nevertheless, there is nothing to give Admetos the right to demand from his father the sacrifice of his life, and nothing, by implication, to stop him from being revealed as a coward himself. The scene is a very good illustration of Euripides' ingenious ways of accentuating ambivalence.

The agon with Pheres has another important, and more obvious, function. It helps force on Admetos the realisation that his attitude would be criticised. And it is this realisation, seeing himself in the light in which other people see, or might see, him, that shocks Admetos out of this "mechanical" way of living. As would be expected, he is angry with his father. The extremity of his anger, however, is best understood in terms of his shame and guilt. "The self-questioning of Admetos clearly is a pregnant dramatisation of the dawning of guilt upon a soul in the process of conversion." [22] He realises, as he will admit later [960f.], that his father is right in his accusations against him [699-702, 716-8, 728-30]. "(Pheres') refusal to participate in the fiction which his son has elaborated for himself shocks Admetos into first compounding and then surrendering his fantasy, into turning from delusion to knowledge."[23]

The play, however, is more concerned with a far more important realisation by Admetos. His own suffering at the loss of Alkestis leads him to it. What Admetos seems to have been totally unaware of, when accepting his wife' sacrifice and up to the point when he realised she was irrevocably going, was the meaning of his wife and her φιλία in his life. He gradually works his way to understanding, and he reaches full awareness when he returns from the funeral to the house where she no longer is. Alkestis has been a genuine companion to Admetos. She was aware that life without him would not be life (οὐκ ἠθέλησα ζῆν ἀποσπασθεῖσα σοῦ [287]), and thus proves herself loyal in her φιλία far more than Admetos' own parents. Lack of this awareness, which will eventually come about with her death, is what allows Admetos to accept her sacrifice. But the consequences of this accceptance will turn his life into a living death. Incapable of facing whatever he was previously happy and content with [941-54], he renders her sacrifice pointless. The first signs of this are already present at their parting scene [336ff.]. Admetos is no longer interested in life [380, 382, 386 and more so at his kommos, especially 866-71, 960f.]; he is beginning to realise the real meaning of what he had said at 277-9: σοῦ γὰρ φθιμένης οὐκέτ' ἄν εἴην·

ἐν σοὶ δ' ἐσμὲν καὶ ζῆν καὶ μή·
σὴν γὰρ φιλίαν σεβόμεσθα.

To love someone, as he himself will say, in full consciousness (ἄρτι μανθάνω [940]) in his kommos, is to share everything, life and death, to become one ψυχή:

δύο δ' ἀντὶ μιᾶς Ἄιδης ψυχὰς
τὰς πιστοτάτας σὺν ἄν ἔσχεν, ὁμοῦ
χθονίαν λίμνην διαβάντε. [900-2].

Phaidros, in Plato's *Symposion*, uses the example of Alkestis' deed to praise the power of ἔρως. Diotima, however, finds Alkestis herself worthy of praise for she

acted out of virtue, for immortal renown (ὑπέρ ἀρετῆς ἀθανάτου). This, rather than deny Alkestis' love, clarifies even better the point I am trying to make here. If we look at Diotima's comment in the context of the kind of love she is describing, we will see that Alkestis virtue and glory is nothing but her love.[24] For the Greeks a woman would make a "good wife" if she was faithful, a good housewife, and, more importantly, if she produced heirs. Euripides, however, looks beyond this. His presentation intends to reveal that there is more in the relationship between husband and wife. Φιλία as illustrated in the play seems to be based on mutual commitment; fulfilment of its demands is the ultimate virtue. What Admetos finally realizes is that whatever he may be, - a king, a father of heirs -, he is unhappy without his wife. External happiness is nothing if internal happiness is lacking, and this internal happiness is that of a husband who has a loving wife with whom he can share the raising of children. This is the real happiness that lasts, bringing a feeling of security. Such happiness is, perhaps uniquely with Euripides, based on φιλία.[25]

It is time now to turn to the second reason for which so much scholarly diversity exists regarding interpretation of the play. The exception that I have mentioned at the beginning that this play presents in its portrayal of love, might have something to do with the fact that the play is an exception in itself, in the sense that it is not a tragedy. Presented last in a tetralogy instead of a satyr-play, *Alkestis* is a problematic play that has been called, like some later Euripidean tragedies, a tragi-comedy and a melodrama, a romantic comedy, a hybrid. Dale[26] calls it a "pro-satyric play". Despite its happy ending, she says, it still retains a bitter flavour, and its characters, although puzzling, are still characters, not caricatures. Being the only play we have of such nature, *Alkestis* becomes difficult to

assess in dramatic terms. It does indeed present elements from a satyric play.[27] Set in the traditional world of myth, it has several intruding comic elements. The scene with Herakles is of course one obvious example,[28] but there is more here that does not truly belong to tragedy .

A light-hearted tone is introduced at the very beginning, in the scene with Apollo and Death, who is portrayed here as a "creature of popular fancy".[29] What is significant is that Death's finality is questioned, and from that point onwards nothing in the play can be seen as really tragic, nothing is final, absolute. The whole play stresses this by constant ambiguity : Alkestis is dead and isn't [141, cf. the first choral ode; Alkestis' view of Charon, an intermediate agent of death; the way Admetos extends her life at 348ff.; also 521]. Despite Herakles' words [528], and the chorus' [962ff., 985f.] Thanatos is still defeated.

The light-heartedness emerges again in the scene with Herakles and the servant, and finally towards the end, Herakles back on stage, in the teasing of Admetos. Nevertheless, the dramatic seriousness of the play as a whole does not seem to suffer; it still obeys essential rules of tragedy. In the case of emotions, for instance, we have seen how the limitations on presentation and expression remain valid. Also, the mode of stylization followed is clearly tragic. At the pain of losing his mother, Alkestis' son exclaims : . . . ὦ πάτερ,
ἀνόνατ' ἀνόνατ' ἐνύμφευσας, . . . [411f.];
the chorus, who witness the family's suffering express similar thoughts : οὔποτε φήσω γάμον εὐφραίνειν
πλέον ἢ λυπεῖν, τοῖς τε πάροιθεν
τεκμαιρόμενος καὶ τάσδε τύχας
λεύσσων βασιλέως, ὅστις ἀρίστης
ἀπλακὼν ἀλόχου τῆσδ' ἀβίωτον
τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον βιοτεύσει. [238-43].

Admetos utters similar sentiments at the height of his suffering : . . . μή ποτε γήμας
ὤφελον οἰκεῖν μετὰ τῆσδε δόμους.
ζηλῶ δ' ἀγάμους ἀτέκνους τε βροτῶν·
μία γὰρ ψυχή, τῆς ὑπεραλγεῖν
μέτριον ἄχθος· . . . [880-4].

The insensitivity and inconsideration often seen in Admetos here may of course be nothing else but the result of stylized expression, obeying tragedy's limitations.[30]

That this is the case becomes more obvious in a comparison of his emotional expression with that of Theseus in *Hippolytos,* after discovering his wife's death. His words share Admetos' sorrow and despair at the loss of his wife (ἥ με κατθανοῦσ' ἀπώλεσεν. [810]). His kingship and glory no longer have any meaning and importance [807]. The death of Phaidra is the worst that could happen to Theseus; it means to him the destruction of his happiness, the death of his own life :
ὤμοι ἐγὼ πόνων· ἔπαθον, ὦ τάλας,
<u>τὰ μάκιστ' ἐμῶν κακῶν</u>. . . .
. . . . . .
κατακονὰ μὲν οὖν <u>ἀβίοτος βίου</u>·
κακῶν δ', ὦ τάλας, πέλαγος εἰσορῶ
τοσοῦτον ὥστε <u>μήποτ' ἐκνεῦσαι πάλιν,
μηδ' ἐκπερᾶσαι κῦμα τῆσδε συμφορᾶς</u>. [817-24].

These feelings are similar to those Admetos experiences at the return from his wife's funeral [861ff.]. Admetos' longing for death [864-7] is shared by Theseus :
τὸ κατὰ γᾶς θέλω, τὸ κατὰ γᾶς κνέφας
μετοικεῖν σκότωι θανὼν, ὦ τλάμων,
τῆς σῆς στερηθεὶς <u>φιλτάτης ὁμιλίας</u>·
ἀπώλεσας γὰρ μᾶλλον ἤ κατέφθισο. [836-9].

Admetos in his kommos laments the end of a marriage and the loss of a faithful and noble wife [879-88, cf. also

915-21]; the destruction of the family and orphanhood of the children are mentioned by Theseus too [*Hipp.* 845, 847]. Both, however, also express similar feelings of a more personal nature, those of a husband towards the destruction of a relationship that was of utmost emotional value. Theseus' κατακονὰ μὲν οὖν ἀβίοτος βίου [821f.] summarizes Admetos' repeated descriptions of an unlivable life [861f., 868-f., 897-9, 911-3, also 939ff.]. Admetos' hint at 925 (λέκτρων κοίτας ἐς ἐρήμους) is also implied by Theseus' φιλτάτης ὁμιλίας [838].

In both cases the personal element is accentuated by moving sentimental touches [*Hipp.* 828f., 862f./*Alk.* 870f., 897-902]. Nevertheless, what is more important to note is the frustration of the inability to express their emotions in both Theseus and Admetos [*Hipp.* 826f., 844-6/*Alk.* 862f.]. The verbalising of this complaint seems to me a way of highlighting what I have discussed in the case of madness as Euripides' method for bestowing his portrayals with realism.[31] There, the inexpressibility of the feeling was not remarked upon by the characters, but it was passed on by its portrayal with action rather than words. Here, although the feeling does find words, their limitation as experienced by the characters portrays not only the inexpressibility of emotion but also ingeniously offsets the limitations of tragic convention. Whilst the psychological reasons for the presentation are made to support the structural ones, the paradoxical effect is the highlighting of stylization, the one major thing that marks the difference between tragedy and documentary record of real life.

The ambivalence in the nature of the play seems to invade everything. I have already mentioned the ambiguity surrounding Alkestis' death, which is in fact enlarged, in the agon, to cover its motives. Pheres suggests that Alkestis' sacrifice is neither the result of

an admirable, heroic decision, nor the only, natural alternative that she sees it as, but naivity, sheer folly [728]. Towards the end of the play, the ambiguity extends from whether Alkestis is dead or not, to whether the woman that Herakles brings back with him is Alkestis or not. The means of identifying Alkestis are her mask, figure, and voice. For the audience of Greek tragedy, however, mask is transferable. A κωφόν can play Alkestis with her mask on.[32] The voice of the actor is not heard for confirmation of identity. Alkestis is required, be it by tragic or ritual convention, to remain silent. Admetos firstly notices how like his wife this woman is, so much, in fact, so that :

δοκῶ γὰρ αὐτὴν εἰσορῶν γυναῖχ' ὁρᾶν
ἐμήν· . . . [1066f.].

His words, however, are inconclusive even after he has looked at her straight in the face. Is it really his wife or

ἤ κέρτομός μ' ἐκ θεοῦ τις ἐκπλήσσει χαρά;
[1125].

Euripides has been found to use the conventional limitation on the number of actors to the same advantage of accentuating ambiguity before, at the ending of *Orestes*.[33] An additional method seems to be used here to load his presentation with ambiguity of interpretation. As I have discussed, Euripides' portrayal of emotion relies more heavily on description of emotional activity than actual vocabulary. This is the case with Alkestis, whose actions, not her words, betray her feelings. It has also been seen, especially in the case of Admetos, how words can be variously interpreted, or appear inappropriate, wrong. So genuine, sincere emotions are portrayed throughout by action. This is clearly the case, for example, with the child's lament. But it seems to me to be so also with Admetos' kommos. These outbursts of emotion are, in fact, in performance, activity, not just mere words.[34] Euripides is again using tragic convention as a medium for ambiguity. The change into action, -

from speaking into singing -, acts as a catalyst for the abandonment of emotional self-expression, which is often at variance with whatever was expressed in the more restrained, spoken, exposition.[35]

The incredible melange of mood (alternating light-heartedness and tragicality) and mode gives *Alkestis* a most peculiar tone, which results in a unique range of emotions.[36] It is as if the ambivalence in the nature of the play is reflected in the ambivalence of its feelings; not just the feelings within the play, but also of it. At the end of the play we are left perplexed, not quite knowing how to respond. Should we rejoice at the couple's rediscovered bliss, marvel at love's achievements, or ponder upon the intense double-edged irony of the play?

7. The Transformation of Ἔρως

I have discussed in *Notions of Love* Greek society's reluctance to present its women with the right to passionate or romantic love. Nevertheless, as has been seen in *Alkestis,* this same society did not hesitate to place upon them the strongest obligations. The consequences of this are dramatized in *Medea.* Her love for Jason is passionate and dedicated. While her passion is made to serve her blind dedication,[1] all is well and welcome. When, however, her devotion is betrayed, this passion becomes a negative, unacceptable, and excessive characteristic. *Medea* presents us with the negative form that strong and unappreciated, unreciprocated feelings can take. It is, in a sense, the reverse of *Alkestis,* presenting us with the opposite side of the coin, the ζηλωτὸς αἰών that Alkestis' married life was. It is a unique and ingenious illustration of the differences in the way that the relationship of man and woman as husband and wife was viewed and experienced by each sex.

The two plays share a major common theme : the importance of φιλία in achieving real happiness, based on stability and security. In *Alkestis* φιλία is a word that occurs in the play numerous times. It is how Admetos views his relationship with his wife and vice versa. It is what the chorus praise and what makes a couple's life together happy, enviable, worth living. There is no occurrence of ἔρως as passion[2] nor are there any expressions suggesting the blind irrationality of passion. On the other hand, Medea's love is described as having been passionately strong and irrationally blind. It started off with all the symptoms of romantic love (ἔρωτι θυμὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ' Ἰάσονος [8], and note also μαινομέναι κραδίαι [432]). It is only to be

expected that such love would naturally include jealousy, for while Alkestis' love is portrayed as ideal, Medea's is thoroughly realistic. However, it is none the less sacrificing for that matter. Her passionate love was put entirely in Jason's service, inspiring cruel deeds with no hesitation on Medea's behalf, for his best advantage (αὐτή τε πάντα ξυμφέρουσ' Ἰάσονι· [13]).

It is nevertheless of significance to note here, that as it is made clear to us from the very beginning, Medea's love had developed into real, conjugal love, and expanded to encompass the characteristics desired by an ideal wife. The Nurse reveals how Medea's love conformed with the prevalent morality and sentiments of the time, with a woman's required role of obeying and following her husband's wishes, not only without complaint, but actually learning to earn her own pleasure and happiness in doing so : ἥπερ μεγίστη γίγνεται σωτηρία,
ὅταν γυνὴ πρὸς ἄνδρα μὴ διχοστατῇ. [14f.].

In following the above rules, Medea believed she had achieved σωτηρία, that she had formed a close, loving relationship, providing both herself and her husband with security. The relationship is acknowledged by the Nurse as such with τὰ φίλτατα [16]. Unexpectedly Medea discovers that this relationship, dearest to her heart, is not mutual. This sudden realisation that her feelings are not reciprocated results in their reversal. Her bitter resentment at Jason's betrayal gives birth in her to a new and violent passion. The frustration of her loving feelings transforms them into hatred :
νῦν δ' ἐχθρὰ πάντα, καὶ νοσεῖ τὰ φίλτατα. [16].

Jason, the man whom Medea loved passionately and sacrificed everything for, is now to her ἄνανδρος, no longer a man, [466].[3] Jason dishonoured Medea (cf. ἠτιμασμένη [20, 33, also 1354]),[4] and this is why he has become ἔχθιστος [467]. He behaves with

ἀναίδεια, μεγίστη τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις νόσων πασῶν [471f.]. Medea has her finger on Jason's major fault : His audacious ingratitude, which is essentially nothing but a total inconsideration of feeling. His whole attitude in the play will constantly confirm how right she is, as do her words at 476ff. She had saved him, betraying family and country to do so, eager rather than wise (πρόθυμος μᾶλλον ἤ σοφωτέρα [485]). Passion's disastrous results are made obvious here, as well as 502f. and 506-8, where Medea talks of the obligations and respect to family that her passionate love ignored. She murdered Pelias for Jason's advantage, and, most importantly, she has given him children, male heirs. Yet, despite all this, he betrayed her [488f.].

Jason's act is one of betrayal, not only towards Medea but also towards his children. There is no doubt as to that for either the nurse (προδοὺς γὰρ αὑτοῦ τέκνα δεσπότιν τ' ἐμὴν [17]), or the chorus of women, who regard Jason an ἐν λέχει προδόταν κακόνυμφον [207]. There is, however, a remarkable difference in the paidagogos' mild judgement of his master. He admits that there has been a change in his affections [76f.], but finds that such a disappearance of φιλία is only natural and to be expected from any mortal. Jason is not to be blamed :

τίς δ' οὐχὶ θνητῶν; ἄρτι γιγνώσκεις τόδε,
ὡς πᾶς τις αὑτὸν τοῦ πέλας φιλεῖ,
[οἳ μὲν δικαίως, οἳ δὲ καὶ κέρδους χάριν,]
εἰ τούσδε γ' εὐνῆς οὕνεκ' οὐ στέργει πατήρ;
[85-8].

These lines, spoken by a man, lack the nurse's and chorus' emotional concern about the situation. It is the male opinion being expressed here, and its conclusion is in agreement with Jason's view and attitude to life. The paidagogos' comments expose Jason's feelings towards his children almost as negligible, if he is prepared to put

them aside so easily, for something new and more profitable. The nurse comments :
καὶ ταῦτ' Ἰάσων παῖδας ἐξανέξεται
πάσχοντας, εἰ καὶ μητρὶ διαφορὰν ἔχει; [74f., cf. also 82]. Attitudes are portrayed in this scene in the same manner that Jason's and Medea's attitudes are contrasted throughout the play, suggesting the difference in mentality between man and woman.

Jason's concern for the children and Medea is expressed in purely materialistic terms (προσκοπούμενος, ἐνδεής, [459-64]). In answer to Medea's charge of abandonment and exile [603f., 606] he explains how wealth will buy her refuge [611]. Wealth, of course, cannot cure Medea's pain, she needs back the love she thought they had in their family, as well as her blemished honour (τιμή) restored. Jason does not understand; all he can offer her is a materialistic solution to what he considers an irrational passion : λήξασα δ' ὀργῆς <u>κερδανεῖς</u> ἀμείνονα. [615]. He also claims : . . . . καὶ γὰρ εἰ σύ με στυγεῖς, οὐκ ἄν δυναίμην σοὶ κακῶς φρονεῖν ποτε. [463f.]. He is not lying. He has no particular reason to feel hatred towards Medea. In fact, he never seems to have held any deep and real feelings for her. Jason is not presented once in the whole play as having been in love with Medea, not even with a blind, ephemeral passion. In fact, his entire portrayal reveals him as incapable of love not accompanied by profit or a certain advantage.

οὐχ' ἥι σὺ κνίζηι, σὸν μὲν ἐχθαίρων λέχος
καινῆς δὲ νύμφης ἱμέρωι πεπληγμένος
οὐδ' εἰς ἄμιλλαν πολύτεκνον σπουδὴν ἔχων·
ἄλις γὰρ οἱ γεγῶτες οὐδὲ μέμφομαι· [555-8].
It is neither hatred for Medea, nor, for that matter, love or passion for his new bride that motivate Jason; it is never a question of feelings for him. What matters is what is most profitable [559-64, 593-7, cf. Medea's

700]. While he despises and condemns the female sex [569-74], he will still use it to gain his advantages from it : Children are important to Jason as they are essential elements in continuing his family, (which is for him, noticeably, γένος [564], not οἶκος), as well as advancing himself socially, as head of a dynasty [557-67]. That Jason sees children as something to be used for his own advantage, is manifest at 565-7. He cannot see what possible need Medea might have of them. His suffering after the children's murder is at odds with his mild efforts to change Kreon's decision [cf. 941]. He had accepted Kreon's sentence of punishment, that would take his children away from him, in the prospect of begetting new children from Glauke. His indignation and hatred in the final scene are more understandable : his interests have been harmed.

Jason sees Medea's attitude as the result of μωρία, (sexual) folly [457, 614].[5] He denies any obligation for gratitude to Medea as he regards Kypris as his saviour [527f.] [6] :

. . . ὡς Ἔρως σ' ἠνάγκασε
τόξοις ἀφύκτοις τοὐμὸν ἐκσῶσαι δέμας. [530f.].

Medea's love is no credit to her. She is not considered responsible for her behaviour; her passion is. Jason will not stop at that; he goes on to reverse the argument :

μείζω γε μέντοι τῆς ἐμῆς σωτηρίας
εἴληφας ἤ δέδωκας, ὡς ἐγώ φράσω. [534f.].

The claim seems outrageous, but, given the Athenian sense of superiority, especially regarding barbarians, the reasons he brings forward to support it may have sounded acceptable to a 5th century audience. Besides, Medea's love and motivation is not expected but to conform with his own. Jason is limited to his own mentality and blind to anything different from his own experience.

Medea constantly expresses and underlines the importance marriage has for a woman [263-6]. Wronged

in her bed, although weak, she may even become murderous. On the other hand, this is totally beyond Jason's understanding, who regards women as nothing else but a means of acquiring children [573f.] :

ἀλλ' ἐς τοσοῦτον ἥκεθ' ὥστ' ὀρθουμένης
εὐνῆς γυναῖκες πάντ' ἔχειν νομίζετε,
ἢν δ' αὖ γένηται ξυμφορά τις ἐς λέχος,
τὰ λῷστα καὶ κάλλιστα πολεμιώτατα
τίθεσθε. . . . [569-73].

Equally understandable and justified is the importance Medea lays to ὅρκοι [492-5]. For the relationship she shared with Jason was not an ordinary marriage within a certain society. It was sanctioned by gods and oaths, stronger than human laws [cf. 161-3]. Jason, however, totally ignores them; there is further ironical proof of his contempt at :

πρῶτον μὲν Ἑλλάδ' ἀντὶ βαρβάρου χθονὸς
γαῖαν κατοικεῖς καὶ δίκην ἐπίστασαι
νόμοις τε χρῆσθαι μὴ πρὸς ἰσχύος χάριν·
πάντες δὲ σ' ἤισθοντ' οὖσαν Ἕλληνες σοφὴν
καὶ δόξαν ἔσχες· . . . . [536-40].

At 1367f., Jason exclaims :

λέχους σφε κἠξίωσας οὕνεκα κτανεῖν;

This reveals how for Jason his λέχος could never have the importance and value it had for Medea. She explains how differently a woman feels [1368f.] :

σμικρὸν γυναικὶ πῆμα τοῦτ' εἶναι δοκεῖς;

He insists that for a σώφρων woman λέχος should not have such importance. He believes [1339f.] that no Greek woman would have ever done what Medea did. But it seems that he may be somehow wrong in his conclusion. It is only a woman who would have the Greek women's attitude to marriage that could find the conviction to commit Medea's crime as she experienced the complete destruction of her world. Medea may be foreign, but her attitude and beliefs are Greek. This original question,

whether a Greek woman would ever act like Medea, seems to me to lead to an essential question with which the play confronts its audience. How much longer before Greek women turned into such "barbaric" beings? Are their male 'companions' as unaware of their situation as Jason?

At 1081ff., the chorus of women reach the conclusion that the sorrows and agonies of motherhood are far more than its joys. Given a choice, it seems they would have chosen to remain childless. The emotional risks of motherhood are clearly illustrated at 1090ff.. Medea is as thoroughly aware of them [250f.] as she is of the paramount importance of this role that is assigned to women; motherhood is an essential part of the city's life. She uses her knowledge to full advantage in her revenge. What Jason fails to comprehend is how essential love is in begetting children. What Medea asserts is that abuse of a woman's feelings can have disastrous effects on what constitutes contentment and happiness for a man, namely continuation of his line.

Despite the fact that Medea shares Greek women's attitudes and beliefs about marriage, she still has unique characteristics. Her passionate strength is for Jason only expected from a lioness,[7] Medea's savagery exceeds that of Σκύλλα [1341-3]. This wild animal imagery is used to describe Medea's unusual, difficult, savage nature from the beginning of the play :

Ἰβαρεῖα γὰρ φρήν, οὐδ' ἀνέξεται κακῶς
πάσχουσα· . . . [38f.].
καὶ μὴ πέλαζε μητρὶ δυσθυμουμένῃ·
ἤδη γὰρ εἶδον ὄμμα νιν ταυρουμένην
τοῖσδ', ὥς τι δρασείουσαν· . . . [91-3].
ἄγριον ἦθος στυγεράν τε φύσιν
φρενὸς αὐθαδοῦς· [103f.].
δῆλον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐξαιρόμενον
νέφος οἰμωγῆς ὡς τάχ' ἀνάψει

μείζονι θυμῶι· τί ποτ' ἐργάσεται
μεγαλόσπλαγχνος δυσκατάπαυστος
ψυχὴ δηχθεῖσα κακοῖσοιν; [106ff.].
καίτοι τοκάδος δέργμα λεαίνης
ἀποταυροῦται δμωσίν, ὅταν τις
μῦθον προφέρων πέλας ὁρμηθῆι. [187-9].

It is a unique portrayal; nowhere else in Euripidean, or indeed in any surviving tragedy, do we come across such prolonged and insistent description of the protagonist. The lines are important as they eloquently paint for the audience Medea's very nature : βαρεῖα γὰρ φρήν, ἄγριον ἦθος, στυγερά φύσις, φρὴν αὐθάδης, μεγαλόσπλαγχνος δυσκατάπαυστος ψυχὴ. This moody, temperamental, savage nature, a spirit impossible to check, self-willed and remorseless, with a natural inclination for hatred, cannot but be dreaded as to the way she will react when presented with cruel and unjust betrayal. Medea's nature and spirit are brilliantly summed up in one most extraordinary word, μεγαλόσπλαγχνος, which conveys the meaning of a vast and most varied scale of emotions - an enormous σπλάγχνον (=seat of passions and emotions). Note how the word σπλάγχνον is also used at 220, when Medea is talking about a person's character, their real nature. The combination of such a powerful φύσις with the most dire circumstances has enhanced the savage element in Medea, as the animal imagery shows. We can appreciate how unlikely it is that she will put up with being κακῶς πάσχουσα. Δηχθεῖσα κακοῖσοιν, Medea has turned into a lioness, a bull, in the violent, savage strength of her emotions.

Metaphors from nature are also used to describe in strong terms Medea's unresponsiveness [24ff.] :
κεῖται δ' ἄσιτος, σῶμ' ὑφεῖσ' ἀλγηδόσιν,
τὸν πάντα συντήκουσα δακρύοις χρόνον,
ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ἧισθετ' ἠδικημένη,

οὔτ' ὄμμ' ἐπαίρουσ' οὔτ' ἀπαλάσσουσα γῆς
πρόσωπον· ὡς δὲ πέτρος ἢ θαλάσσιος
κλύδων ἀκούει νοθετουμένη φίλων,

These are recalled at the moment of the children's killing, when the chorus, talking of Medea's unbending will and incredibly harsh, cruel strength to murder her own flesh, use πέτρος ἢ σίδαρος [1279f.].

The description of Medea here is similar to that of Phaidra in *Hippolytos* [131-40]. Phaidra's situation, however, is the reverse of Medea's. As we shall see in the next chapter, she feels guilt and shame, for she knows that in her passion for Hippolytos she is wronging her husband. Her betrayal is, of course, hardly comparable to Jason's, since it is limited only 'in spirit', rather than real acts. Still, she cannot face Theseus, let alone find any of the excuses that Jason produces for his behaviour.

There is here, nevertheless, a more immediate and revealing comparison that can be drawn between Medea and Phaidra. Medea's unresponsiveness to friendly advice and persuasion contrasts sharply with the influence that her Nurse has on Phaidra. This observation helps strengthen the impression that the relationship between Medea and her Nurse is in no way as close as the one between Phaidra and hers. What could be said is that it does not seem to be mutual. It is obvious from the Nurse's prologue, as well as from her conversation with the chorus and the paidagogos, that she loves Medea dearly and cares and worries a lot about her, as well as the children. We, of course, have no possible way of knowing what Medea's attitude and feelings were toward the Nurse before Jason's betrayal. We have heard how, according to the Nurse's view, all her feelings, (even towards her children), have been transformed into hatred. It could well be that the betrayal of her feelings from Jason has rendered her incapable of having any more

loving feelings at all. Nevertheless, we do see her later on in the play, when the children are present, revealing her love and tenderness almost against her will. It seems to me that the fact that Medea does not share a close relationship with the Nurse is yet another instance hinting at her total isolation, remoteness, otherness :
ἦ πολλὰ πολλοῖς εἰμι διάφορος βροτῶν. [579].

Phaidra struggles hard to keep herself away from society because she fears its criticism and condemnation. Medea rejects society altogether, yet it is interesting to see how aware she is of what she shares with this society, and how she is capable of using this knowledge to work her way through society. She has a considerable talent for manipulating. This characteristic of her portrayal renders any discussion about her psychology and emotions more complicated. I have discussed in the Introduction how the reliability of the direct report level can be questioned.[8] Before I go on to discuss the uncertainty surrounding Medea's real emotions and the resulting ambiguity of our response, I want to quickly distinguish between the scenes in which Medea attempts to deceive, (e.g. the scene with Kreon, and her second encounter with Jason [869ff.]), and the scene with the women (as well as with Aigeus) where she is being manipulative. What clearly marks their difference is the fact that Medea herself points out her deception, thus confirming for the audience her hypocritical intentions [cf. 368ff., 774ff.].

This is not the case at 214f., where she addresses the women. Her analysis of her situation is straightforward. After her despairing cries from inside the house, Medea enters in complete control of her emotions, and demonstrates to the full her intellectual abilities, which she exploits to gain most advantage.[9] Her entrance is powerful, not because of lamentations and emotional displays, but, on the contrary, because of the sheer

strength she possesses. She controls her emotions, and this makes the substance of what she says clearer and more effective. She is domineering and persuasive in her attempt to win the women's compliance, but although the context of her speech is genuine it seems manipulatively incomplete.[10] The description of herself conceals the substance behind the facts :

ἐγὼ δ' ἔρημος ἄπολις οὖσ' ὑβρίζομαι
πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἐκ γῆς βαρβάρου λελησμένη,
οὐ μητέρ,' οὐκ ἀδελφόν, οὐχὶ συγγενῆ
μεθορμίσασθαι τῆσδ' ἔχουσα συμφορᾶς. [255-8].

She is aiming at the women's pity, but her exposition, although that of her suffering, is nevertheless one of self-consciousness, which of course explains her self-possessed attitude. Her accusations of Jason are convincing since they are supported by other characters in the play (the chorus, Nurse, and Aigeus [695] with αἴσχιστον), but Medea is here revealing only one aspect of her experience, much distorted by sharpening and hyperbole.

This impression that Medea is being carefully manipulative is further confirmed by the fact that her extremely calculated and reasoned exposition follows immediately after our introduction - direct as well as indirect - to her as passionate and incontrollably emotional. A similar thing happens in *Hippolytos* when Phaidra turns to address the chorus, controlled and with a carefully reasoned speech, after a delirious outburst and a conversation with the Nurse that has revealed her emotionally out of control. The difference is that Medea, unlike Phaidra, is invisible during her outburst. Her presentation as passionate, savage, and incontrollable precedes the audience's own dramatic contact with her character. The Medea we see on stage is fully in control of both herself and her (immediate) audience. On the contrary, Phaidra's outburst on stage exposes her as the more vulnerable character that she is.

Stylization is of course at work[11] in both cases, nevertheless, the presentation here seems to serve yet another function; it introduces an element of doubt, the first ambiguity in Medea's portrayal. As I have already discussed, it seems to me that Euripides is here, too, using his preferred medium of emotional activity to portray genuine emotion. Medea's outbursts, as well as all the symptomatology of her feelings given to us by the Nurse, constitute this activity. Tragic convention, however, requires her speech to be delivered with restraint, marking a contrast with the passion of the preceding lyric text. Euripides exploits the convention to highlight the contradiction between Medea's emotional self-expression and her calculated exposition. On the other hand, the contrast between the Medea as presented to us by the Nurse and the Medea we experience on stage, along with the fact that we first get to see the Nurse in a scene separate from Medea, - which does not happen in *Hippolytos* -, stresses, as has already been mentioned, the notion of her separateness.

We have seen Medea, in the Nurse's description, as a passive victim gathering will for revenge. As she enters the stage, still presenting her self as a victim, Medea has shaken off all passivity. Does her self-control result from an already resolved determination for revenge? Is this the only emotion now governing her? It is never as simple or as straightforward as that with Medea. Her revenge is not portrayed as the result of a passionate decision that has turned cold-blooded after careful deliberation. Unlike the fixity of her will, her mood is never stable. As we shall see throughout the play, the same ambiguity between her reasoning and her feelings emerges. In the scene with Kreon, although Medea is talking intentionally, there is sincerity of experience. In the scene with Aigeus [cf. 689] the physical symptoms of her emotions cannot but be sincere.

But let us return for the moment to her speech to the women. Medea's amazingly modern - in outlook - sociological observations [230ff.] sound more like a feminist's than an average Athenian woman's representation of the situation. A woman, for whom Medea uses the contemptuous φυτόν, has to buy herself a husband, with whom, whether good or bad she is stuck forever, since divorce does not give a woman a good repu tation. Women, she says, arrive at their new house young and unprepared for married life, not knowing how to please their husbands. If they are successful in fulfilling well what is expected of them, so that their husband lives with them μὴ βίᾳ φέρων ζυγόν, then their life is ζηλωτὸς αἰών. While the husbands can go out, ἡμῖν δ' ἀνάγκη πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βλέπειν [247]. Men's perfect excuse is the usual claim of offering protection to the weaker by going to war, while women live sheltered lives at home. But Medea points out how mistaken they are (κακῶς φρονοῦντες [250]). She would much rather expose herself to the dangers of war, than give life going through, not simply the natural dangers of childbirth, but also the psychological risks and implications of motherhood (cf. 1029, and especially 1031: στερρὰς ἐνεγκοῦσ' ἐν τόκοις ἀλγηδόνας).

Having exposed the general circumstances forming the valid reality of women of her society,[12] Medea goes on to point out how the differences in her circumstances aggravate the situation :

ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸς πρὸς σὲ κἄμ' ἥκει λόγος·

[252ff.].

She is in a foreign land, lacking φίλους, without the important support and protection of her family against her husband's ὕβρις. Medea's foreigness here gives emphasis to the standard idea of the wife as an "outsider".[13] Medea's description is revealing of a woman's condition and position within a marriage, and thus explains the violence, because of frustration, of her

reaction at Jason's betrayal. As B. M. W. Knox says : "Euripides is concerned in this play ... (just as in the *Hippolytos* and the *Bacchae*) with the eruption in tragic violence of forces in human nature which have been repressed and scorned, which in their long-delayed breakout exact a monstrous revenge. The *Medea* is not about woman's rights; it is about woman's wrongs, those done to her and by her."[14]

Before Medea's exposition, the chorus' original reaction to her emotions was to advise her to be patient [151-9]. What happened to her, they believe, is nothing unusual, and something she will become accustomed to. After her speech, however, the revenge that Medea was originally advised to leave to Zeus [158f.] they think as right and justified for her to pursue [267f.]. She has succeeded in winning their hearts, sympathy, and complete approval. They now adopt an even stronger attitude of praise towards Medea, who wishes to attain justice and triumph over her enemies. She is seen to be making history. Driven beyond boundaries (διδύμους ὁρίσασα πόντου πέτρας [432f.]), literally and metaphorically, she is now setting new ones to women's fate. Things no longer follow their customary paths; long-established order and faith are no longer valid. Honour is coming to the disreputable female race [410ff.].

But this choral ode, much in the same way as the Nurse's prologue, is expressive of what should have been. This sympathy and praise that Medea has won hardly touches her any more. She has already died as a woman, as a feeling, sensitive person. She herself says so and indicates when and why :

ἐμοὶ δ' ἄελπτον πρᾶγμα προσπεσὸν τὸδε
ψυχὴν διέφθαρκ' . . . . [225f.].

Her husband, who meant **everything** to her, has proved himself unworthy and betrayed her :

ἐν ὧι γὰρ ἦν μοι πάντα, γιγνώσκω καλῶς,
κάκιστος ἀνδρῶν ἐκβέβηχ' οὑμὸς πόσις. [228f.].

The play may not appear, in an orthodox manner, to be a tragedy of love. It is, nevertheless, an ingenious portrayal of its transformation, through Medea's emotional world which is devastated by lack of love. It is this lack of love that Jason's portrayal indicates. In their first encounter this is made manifest. The agon ingeniously contrasts Medea's passionate outrage with Jason's cold rationalism and narrow-minded selfishness. There is here a deviation from the standard practice according to which the rightful, sympathetic case is presented second, in defence (cf. Page ad loc.). Medea speaks first and she is the prosecutor. This seems to reflect the general ambiguity of the play, which is to become even more pronounced towards the end, regarding which character is meant to command our sympathy.

The disharmony of their extreme differences is carried on into the following choral ode. The chorus appropriately pray for an experience of love that is moderate. The key word here is σωφροσύνα [635]. They do not want passion, for passion always brings with it inescapable dangers for one's reputation and honour. They beg the goddess never to throw the irresistible arrows of desire, by which Medea was governed, at them :

ἔρωτες ὑπὲρ μὲν ἄγαν ἐλθόντες οὐκ εὐδοξίαν
οὐδ' ἀρετὰν παρέδωκαν ἀνδράσιν· εἰ δ' ἄλις ἔλθοι
Κύπρις, οὐκ ἄλλα θεὸς εὔχαρις οὕτω.
μήποτ', ὦ δέσποιν', ἐπ' ἐμοὶ χρυσέων τόξων ἀφείης
ἱμέρωι χρίσασ' ἄφυκτον οἰστόν. [627ff.].

The lines constitute a most representative summary of the contemporary views and attitudes to passionate love. The women, having just experienced the emotionally violent exchange between Medea and Jason [446ff.], dread

the insatiable passion for 'another' bed and the strife that ruins a marriage [637-41].

But, equally importantly, the chorus point out that it is criminal to ignore the emotional responsibility entailed in reaching the most intimate paths of somebody's soul :

ἀχάριστος ὅλοιθ', ὅτωι πάρεστιν
μὴ φίλους τιμᾶν καθαρᾶν
ἀνοίξαντα κλῆιδα φρενῶν·
ἐμοὶ μὲν φίλος οὔποτ' ἔσται. [659-62].

Disrespect of this responsibility is Jason's ἁμαρτία. Medea will point out to him, at the final scene [1372], how he was the one who originated the destruction. From the very beginning of the play Medea's invocations to divine justice request punishment for Jason's criminal betrayal :

βοᾶι μὲν ὅρκους, ἀνακαλεῖ δὲ δεξιᾶς
πίστην μεγίστην, καὶ θεοὺς μαρτύρεται
οἵας ἀμοιβῆς ἐξ' Ἰάσονος κυρεῖ. [21-3],
ὦ μεγάλα Θέμι καὶ πότνι' Ἄρτεμι
λεύσσεθ' ἃ πάσχω, μεγάλοις ὅρκοις
ἐνδησαμένα τὸν κατάρατον
πόσιν; . . . [160-3],
θεοκλυτεῖ δ' ἄδικα παθοῦσα
τὰν Ζηνὸς ὁρκίαν Θέμιν, . . . [208f.].

At 492-5 Medea directly confronts Jason with his disrespect of both oaths and gods, while the chorus repeatedly express the belief that Jason deserves divine punishment [cf. 158, 1231f., 1258-60].

Divine intervention in the play is clearly present only at the end, with Medea's escape.[15] However, Jason's punishment is the perfect punishment for oath breaking : no reproduction or continuation of his line.[16] What he gets he more than deserves. He has deserted his family, so all he is left with is an abandoned old age. Is Medea, then, to be seen as Zeus' agent, who, in satisfying her

personal need for revenge, also fulfils a larger scheme of retribution? Zeus most frequently punishes through natural events, while his agents bring about their own ruin. Medea's betrayal of her land and family, which she regrets, and the murder of her brother for which she feels guilty, is reason enough for her punishment :

ὦ πάτερ, ὦ πόλις, ὧν ἀπενάσθην
αἰσχρῶς τὸν ἐμὸν κτείνασα κάσιν. [166f.].

It is almost as if she is aware herself of the fact that she cannot ask for divine justice unless she herself is punished for her old crimes. She knows where she went wrong :

ἡμάρτανον τόθ' ἡνίκ' ἐξελίμπανον
δόμους πατρώιους, ἀνδρὸς Ἕλληνος λόγοις
πεισθεῖσ', ὅς ἡμῖν σὺν θεῶι τείσει δίκην.

[800-2].

Note also Jason's belief [1329-35] and especially :

τὸν σὸν δ' ἀλάστορ' εἰς ἔμ' ἔσκηψαν θεοί·

A question that might arise here is how intentional such a divine interpretation was. In texts of such intensity almost nothing is casual. In a culture where people have the tendency to attribute to gods odd behaviour, compelling motives, or indeed anything out of the ordinary, there are enormous possibilities for irony for the dramatist who actually wants to exploit such speculation. Euripides' drama often deals with how people are liable to believe that gods are behind events.[17] Medea's 625f. sounds like a prophecy, and the equal importance that Medea assigns to θεοὶ κἀγώ [1013f.] is noticeable.[18]

Medea's claim at divine support is to be proven triumphantly true, when the grand-daughter of Helios departs majestically in a chariot, exempt from divine retribution and well above human recriminations. The irony becomes even stronger as Medea, accused of savagery by Jason, is bestowed with all the traditional

powers that divinities show in epilogues, to perpetuate the controversy whether it is an apotheosis or a dehumanization we are experiencing.

To return to the question of retribution, however, whether the gods demand justice or not, Medea's χόλος demands revenge :

. . . οὐδὲ παύσεται
χόλου, σάφ' οἶδα, πρὶν κατασκῆψαί τινι. [93f., cf. 171f.].

Both Nurse and chorus are aware that there is nothing to control Medea's violent anger and sharp, sour bitterness :

εἴ πως βαρύθυμον ὀργὰν
καὶ λῆμα φρενῶν μεθείη, ... [176f.].

This χόλος is what motivates Medea's revenge [cf. 1265f.], and she refuses to let go of it. In fact, she induces more passion in her already inflamed heart, she stirs χόλος up to sustain the pain and bitterness of when the blow was first struck :

. . . . . μήτηρ
κινεῖ κραδίαν, κινεῖ δὲ χόλον. [98f.].

Medea is well aware that her plan for revenge entails her personal destruction, but she still goes ahead with it. Punishment must be whatever will hurt and ruin Jason most (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν μάλιστα δηχθείη πόσις [817]), irrespective of her own feelings. Her acts are fully conscious. She is aware of the eternal suffering that awaits her (κἄπειτα θρήνει [1249]). But she has found Jason's source of contentment to be wealth and dynasty, and realises that to destroy it is not enough to kill his new bride. She must kill her own children in order to deprive Jason from his heirs and his security in old age (cf. 1396 : οὔπω θρηνεῖς· μένε καὶ γῆρας).

In the second scene with Jason, Medea's full intentions are known to us all. She has just fully declared to the chorus her horrific plan for revenge

[774ff.]. Is it here then that a reversal of sympathies will begin to operate? Like the chorus [811ff.], we shiver at her proposed actions. Nevertheless, the scene that unfolds before our eyes manages, once more with its ambivalence, to make us, as well as the chorus, doubt the fact that Medea will find the strength to kill her offspring.

The scenes with the children are perhaps the only instances where Medea's inner-self manages to evade the impressive control she exerts over her emotions. At 898-905 and 922-31, for example, it proves almost impossible for Medea, in the actual presence of the children and at the sight of them with their father, as the family used to be, to keep her maternal feelings under control. The physical act of turning away [922-4] seems to dramatize her effort to turn away from her own self and emotions, in order to get back to the abyss of isolation and alienation she was originally thrown into by Jason's behaviour, and where, by the strength and determination of her own emotions, she chose to sink.

Her emotions begin to surface as she asks the children to get hold of their father's χειρὸς δεξιᾶς [899]. This is the hand that frequently held her own, when Jason was taking all the oaths of love and loyalty, only to betray them afterwards :

φεῦ δεξιὰ χείρ, ἧς σὺ πόλλ' ἐλαμβάνου,
καὶ τῶνδε γονάτων, ὡς μάτην κεχρώ,ισμεθα
κακοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἐλπίδων δ' ἡμάρτομεν
[496-8],

(cf. 21f. δεξιᾶς πίστην μεγίστην). She will address her own δεξιὰ χείρ at the moment she exhorts herself to kill the children [1244ff.]. This very hand, upon which their marriage was sworn, will have to destroy the marriage's confirmation, the result and proof of its existence, in the same way that the marriage has destroyed her.

As the children are dispatched to deliver their mother's murderous presents,[19] the chorus see their death as inevitable [976ff.]. Nevertheless their pity and sympathy for Medea is still strong :

μεταστένομαι δὲ σὸν ἄλγος, ὦ τάλαινα παίδων
μᾶτερ, ἃ φονεύσεις
τέκνα νυμφιδίων ἕνεκεν λεχέων,
ἃ σοι προλιπὼν ἀνόμως
ἄλλᾳ ξυνοικεῖ πόσις συνεύνῳ. [996-1001].

Medea's mind may be resolved on her monstrous revenge, but her emotional self isn't. Her reaction to the news of the paidagogos [1005ff.] betrays this. Her monologue [1021ff.], which begins as a farewell to the children, bears it out even more clearly. At the thought of her solitude and exile after they are dead, after and despite all her labour, care and dreams for them, her hopes for their future care of her, Medea's emotions take over. The sweet sight of her children manages to reach her καρδία [1040-8], her emotional self which she thought and declared dead. It is her καρδία she will address again as she feels it weakening at 1242, for it seems to talk to Medea with and about love. Her determination (φρήν [cf. 1052]), however, is not only resolved; it is also governed by this unrelenting spirit of hers, her unbending will, the passionate nature of Medea, which we have both seen and had described as implacable, uncompromising, incontrollable : Medea's θυμός is imperatively set on revenge. To enforce it she needs to bury for ever her maternal feelings,[20] violate and utterly destroy her emotional world. Medea tries to convince herself of the inevitable necessity of her act [1240-3]. It is Jason killing the children [1273f.], not her. She is suffering [1067f., 1245-50], but emphasizes this to repress the fact that it is she, after all, who will commit the murder .

It is never made entirely clear whether Medea realizes, as she uses one element of herself for another, or against each other in conflict, that they are all within her, part of the same self. The unresolved ambiguity whether or not she is a victim of inner forces, caught in a conflict between emotional motives and imperative instincts, has an important effect on the audience. It seems to be intended to maintain sympathy, as there is still hope that Medea may, in the end, not kill her children. Even in the chorus' last words before the murder there is still such a possibilility, even if remote; they pray that the unholy deed be stopped. It is only as the terrified voices of the children and Medea's total unresponsiveness [1279-81] reach us from inside, that the unquestionable reality of the murder cripples all other emotional response. It does not seem to me that the audience's feelings are immediately, if at all, transformed into revulsion for Medea. The revulsion towards her deed is indeed strong and therefore no longer allows sympathising with, or pitying her. The chorus' response is indeed a good illustration of this state [1282ff.]. They do not turn against Medea; their comments concentrate instead on the horrific crime, as they try to compare it to that of maddened Ino. Still perplexed about our feelings towards Medea, with Jason's arrival the ambiguity is further intensified. His misery and despair should deserve unreserved sympathy. Nevertheless, his negative portrayal in the play works effectively towards robbing him substantially of it. The father's intense suffering requests pity, but Jason the husband more than deserves the punishment his wronged wife has extracted from him.

Throughout the final scene, to the very end of the play, we remain emotionally confused. Euripides, instead of directing us to feel open hostility or revulsion towards Medea, presents her to us like a god.[21] She escapes the consequences of her crime, in total, almost

incomprehensible triumph. This most paradoxical ending must be the result of the moral chaos the chorus have described in their ode [410ff.] and of the disintegration of values, at which Medea had been protesting throughout the play. Medea's transformation into something out of reach seems like a visual metaphor for her escape from the limited boundaries of the world she had to live in. Yet again, however, this brings us back to the question, is it truly an apotheosis? Or is it a concealed metaphor for her un-humanization?

The Medea of this final scene is the result of the gradual emotional disintegration that we have been experiencing throughout the play. She reaches this unhuman state not because of her unholy murder but because of the suffering she had undergone which lead to the destruction of her emotional world. The stages of Medea's unhumanization are never clearly defined. The confusion is further expanded; Medea's collapse as a human being contrasts with her external triumph. How are we supposed to react to this? It seems our emotional response was intended to be ambiguous. Euripides, like his heroine, acts like a self-conscious manipulator. He allows us no 'breathing space' to respond freely, no emotional relief. Medea's permanent presence on stage is even more intense than her characterization. From beginning to end her portrayal is loaded with ambiguity. The correspondences between the Nurse's description at the beginning and that of Jason at the end,[22] as well as the strong influence from the conventional mask with a permanently fixed expression on it, may give the impression that Medea had been all along the same monstrous creature, with her mind set on an already fully planned revenge, that is gloating now from the Sun's chariot. The instability of her mood, however, and the presentation of her suffering contradict this.

Medea might indeed have been resolved to kill the children from the very beginning of the play. The Nurse's comment (στυγεῖ δὲ παῖδας οὐδ' ὁρῶσ' εὐφραίνεται. [36f.]) reveals, not Medea's hatred towards them, but towards what they represent. There is an obvious answer to the Nurse's amazed question at 116-8 : τί δέ σοι παῖδες πατρὸς ἀμπλακίας
μετέχουσι; τί τούσδ' ἔχθεις;
The children are Jason's, and they are to Medea a constant reminder of a now hated relationship, the seal that sanctioned their relationship as a proper marriage. Although the children are in no way responsible for their father's injustice to Medea, her resentment has its source in the fact that they form the one link that seems unbreakable between her and Jason. Everything that has any connections with their relationship arouses hatred and revulsion in Medea, even her own self, whom she wishes dead [96f., 143-7 and 112-4] :
. . . · ὦ κατάρατοι
παῖδες ὄλοισθε στυγερᾶς ματρὸς
σὺν πατρί, καὶ πᾶς δόμος ἔρροι.

At the final scene this wish of Medea has been achieved : the children are dead, both she and Jason are destroyed, and their home, family is in ruins. Jason's hatred and opinion of her [1323ff.] matter little to Medea, for she has achieved what seemed impossible :
τῆς σῆς γὰρ ὡς χρῆν καρδίας ἀνθηψάμην. [1360].
She found a way to touch his heart; something that neither her love nor all her previous recriminations had managed to do. What gives her ultimate satisfaction now are his feelings of despair and his suffering. She gave him back what he deserved, all the suffering with which he killed her heart. She has her share in his present suffering, but it is soothed by her successful revenge :
. . . λύει δ' ἄλγος, ἤν σὺ μὴ 'γγελᾶις. [1362].

I have talked at the beginning of the common theme of what constitutes φιλία and real happiness in *Alkestis* and *Medea*. Alkestis and Admetos lived in unison; Jason's and Medea's motivation and outlook is revealed in the play to have been, and remains, completely different. This, of course, means that their feelings could not be mutual. At the end of the play Jason's hatred for Medea is expressed powerfully :

ὦ μῖσος, ὦ μέγιστον ἐχθίστη γύναι
θεοῖς τε κἀμοὶ παντί τ' ἀνθρώπων γένει, [1323f.].

She, for her own part, hates him bitterly :

στύγει· πικρὰν δὲ βάξιν ἐχθαίρω σέθεν. [1374].

The only mutual feeling they share is hatred, of equal strength and the same nature. This is about as close as they ever get to each other.

Their differences in mentality are essential in understanding this tragedy. The happiness which concerns Medea most is an internal lasting happiness based on φιλία. It is **emotional** rather than material. For her happiness Medea needs to satisfy her emotional needs : a family, home, marriage as a loving, mutual relationship (cf. 228 ἐν ὧι γὰρ ἦν μοι πάντα). Otherwise wealth and prosperity are unwelcome :

μή μοι γένοιτο λυπρὸς εὐδαίμων βίος
μηδ' ὄλβος ὅστις τὴν ἐμὴν κνίζοι φρένα. [598f.].

Jason uses κνίζειν for Medea's feelings of jealousy, but Medea uses it to express and describe her internal pain (note the presence of φρήν). Such an original difference in mentality between Alkestis and Admetos is what leads to Alkestis' death. But her death serves as a catalyst for Admetos to realise how wrong his previously unreflective attitude had been. On the contrary, Jason will never understand Medea's mentality and finds women's attitudes in general inferior and unacceptable.

There is another interesting comparison between the two plays, regarding the double function assigned to the heroines in their role as women : wives and mothers. Both reach their ultimate decisions driven by their feelings as wives. Alkestis believes that, all things considered, her death would be a lesser evil for her children than the death of their father. Still, she cannot help but be worried for them. Her feelings towards them make it extremely difficult to go through with her commitment. Nevertheless, they do not equal the strength of the feelings that drove her to self-sacrifice, and thus have no power to alter her decision. The same is true of Medea. Her betrayed feelings as Jason's wife are more powerful than those for her children, thus she does not change her decision to kill them.

Although it may, on a superficial level, seem that both women are acting on their own initiative, entirely at their own will, it eventually emerges that in the requirements and consequences of their role as wives they are manipulated by the males in question. This is nowhere better realised than by the fact that the women are forced to assign their paramount role as mothers far less prominence and importance, and have to suppress - or indeed kill off in the case of Medea - their naturally strong maternal emotions. Euripides criticises neither woman's attitude, (eventhough Alkestis' has everybody's full approval in the play, and Medea's nobody's). What he does, is to allow his first heroine to remain, in her ζηλωτός αἰών, unaware of this manipulation (or at least its implications), while he makes Medea thoroughly aware of it. Her bitterness and resentment are the results of this awareness. The provocation of this manipulation and her revolt against its implications, constitute a leading motive behind her crime. The wound Medea receives in the most vulnerable part of her self makes her aware; shatters the illusions that are never shattered, for example, for Alkestis, but at the same

time causes her irreparable damage. It kills off her feminine nature, which refuses to be any longer the disposable good wife and unappreciated caring mother, and turns her into a savage creature full of negative emotions directed at those who imposed limitations on her being and their own definitions of her feminine role.

Medea seems to be Euripides' only heroine to be portrayed as so consciously and actively aware.[23] She is portrayed as foreign not, I think, to contrast with a Greek woman,[24] but to emphasize this characteristic of hers. She is "barbaric" because she has the audacity and courage to kill her own flesh and blood, but still she is a woman since her suffering at her deed is extreme. Her powerful emotional capability and her tremendous perception strengthen her isolation. Her extraordinary strength in resisting herself and her emotions, and her composed ability to manipulate people make her unique amongst women. Because of this, we tend to forget that her revenge is precisely due to the fact that she is a woman. She is compared to Aias and the heroes of the old tradition, she is described in men's terms.[25] But in surpassing even the limits of the Homeric heroes she becomes foreign, estranges her audience that has not learnt to expect anything like this, especially from a woman.[26]

8. Ἔρως as Νόσος

The *Hippolytos* is an excellent illustration of what I have mentioned in *Medea* as ironical speculation about attribution of unusual human behaviour to gods. The contrast present in the play between divine cause and human motivation seems to me to imply that attribution of behaviour to gods is the result of either lack of awareness, perception or knowledge about one's emotional world, or unwillingness to confront it. As we shall shortly see, in what is perhaps the most straightforward example in the play, the Nurse's misinterpretation of Phaidra's emotional state as madness results from her lack of knowledge about the emotions motivating her.

There are, indeed, many other examples throughout the play. In the prologue, Aphrodite forecasts the events that will occur as inevitable, stemming from her divine will. As the play progresses, however, we will see her function taken over gradually by the emotions she represents. The Nurse says :

. . . . Κύπρις οὐκ ἄρ' ἦν θεός,
ἀλλ' εἴ τι μεῖζον ἄλλο γίγνεται θεοῦ,
ἥ τήνδε κἀμὲ καὶ δόμους ἀπώλεσεν. [359-61].

In Phaidra's words we shall see how Aphrodite becomes mingled with her feelings, as within a short succession of lines she names Κύπρις as ἔρως [392] as well as νόσος [394; cf. 725-7], and then again :

τρίτον δ', ἐπειδὴ τοισίδ' οὐκ ἐξήνυτον
Κύπριν κρατῆσαι, ... [400f.].

Phaidra's confused attempts to understand her emotions result into an explanation for her behaviour that we have come to recognise as traditional. Hippolytos' asceticism will also be revealed in the play

to be the result not of his fanatic εὐσέβεια to Artemis, but of bitter resentment of his bastard origin, which brings about fear of sex and hatred of women. The list of contradictions and inconsistencies is a long one. Nevertheless, the epilogue, which superficially seems to reassert the action's source as divine θυμός, confirms, in fact, with tremendous irony, what has been exposed by the entire play : the inability and/or reluctance of human beings to realise that the driving force behind their actions is not divine motivation, but the compelling strength of their own emotions. Artemis' words are a personal recrimination to Theseus, too harsh and cruel for a blame that would really belong to Aphrodite. Her mention of the rival goddess is indeed as futile as the help she offers her devotee. Let us, then, look more closely at the presentation of these motivating emotions.

Aphrodite's information in the prologue is indeed valuable to us since Phaidra's passion is something about which everybody else in the play is totally ignorant. Through her wish, she tells us, Phaidra has fallen in love with Hippolytos :

. . . καρδίαν κατέσχετο
ἔρωτι δεινῶι τοῖς ἐμοῖς βουλεύμασιν, [27f.,
cf. 32].

She is described[1] as silently dying of love, while no one knows the cause of her suffering :

. . . δὴ στένουσα κἀκπεπληγμένη
κέντροις ἔρωτος ἡ τάλαιν' ἀπόλλυται
σιγῆι, ξύνοιδε δ' οὔτις οἰκετῶν νόσον. [38-40].

The chorus describe Phaidra in the following terms :

τειρομέναν νοσερᾶι κοίται δέμας ἐντὸς ἔχειν
οἴκων, λεπτὰ δὲ φά-
ρη ξανθὰν κεφαλὰν σκιάζειν·
τριτάταν δέ νιν κλύω
τάνδ' ἀμβρωσίαι
στόματος ἀμέραν
Δάματρος ἀκτᾶς δέμας ἁγνὸν ἴσχειν,

κρυπτῷ, πάθει θανάτου θέλουσαν
κέλσαι ποτὶ τέρμα δύστανον. [131-40].

Her love is unknown to them, the reason for her suffering is kept secret. Phaidra keeps herself inside, her face covered and her body unfed, melting away by some kind of illness that provokes in her a desire to die.

In their ignorance the chorus cannot but resort to speculation as to the causes of the queen's obvious distress. Such possibilities are Phaidra's possession by a god (ἔνθεος) [141-4],[2] an offence to Artemis [145-7], a possible misconduct on Theseus' behalf, or perhaps bad news from Phaidra's fatherland [151-60]. What, however, seems most likely, is that her discomfort must be related to what a woman's nature entails :

φιλεῖ δὲ τᾶι δυστρόπωι γυναικῶν
ἁρμονία . . . . [161ff.].

It is a δύστανος ἀμηχανία which results in pain and madness (ὠδίνων τε καὶ ἀφροσύνας).[3]

The Nurse enters the stage in an agitated state of emotional concern about Phaidra [176-f., 186-8], who is carried in by her attendants. The stress in this scene is on Phaidra's restlessness. From the Nurse's words it is made clear that Phaidra has decided to come out of the house, but this is a decision that she will soon want to change [177-82]. Nothing seems to please her anymore [183]; the Nurse ironically comments :

οὐδέ σ' ἀρέσκει τὸ παρόν, τὸ δ' ἀπὸν
φίλτερον ἡγῆι. [184f.].

Phaidra's own words and behaviour confirm her constant desire for change [198ff.]. She wants her hair loosened and set free [201f.], while her body moves about restlessly : . . . μὴ χαλεπῶς
μετάβαλλε δέμας. [203f., cf. 198-200].

The restlessness is accompanied by the wish to be outdoors, in the bright light and clear air :

τόδε σοι φέγγος λαμπρόν, ὅδ' αἰθήρ· [178].
Her own words betray an almost compulsive desire to experience the freshness and purity of the country [208-11].

Being outside, however, in the light of the sun,[4] does not seem to help Phaidra's clarity and peace of mind. She becomes more agitated and reaches a delirious state, in which she wishes to be sent to the mountains, hunting [215-22], and to Artemis' precinct (πώλους Ἐνετὰς δαμαλιζομένα [228-31]).

To the Nurse, Phaidra's words make no sense; she suspects her first utterance as μανίας ἔποχον [214, 223-7]. As Phaidra gets more and more delirious, the Nurse becomes increasingly alarmed that she has gone mad : τί τόδ' αὖ παράφρων ἔρριψας ἔπος; [232], and : τάδε μαντείας ἄξια πολλῆς,
ὅστις σε θεῶν ἀνασειράζει
καὶ παρακόπτει φρένας, ὦ παῖ. [236-8].
Phaidra herself, her delirium over, attributes her words to a god-sent madness : ἐμάνην, ἔπεσον δαίμονος ἄτηι. [241]. Things, however, seem to us, the audience, different. We know Phaidra is not mad, because we know what causes her delirious behaviour. We have been informed of her feelings, so we know that it is not madness, but an emotional outburst for which we know the reason. Our interpretation of her words, and actions,[5] is completely different from the Nurse's (or indeed the chorus'). We can see in them her desire to be with, and share, Hippolytos' world. Her πόθος, which for the Nurse is an enigma [234], is for us qualified as a πόθος for Hippolytos. The sexual imagery in her words, especially 230f., is evident, and stressed by such verbs as ἔραμαι [219, cf. 234f.].

Nevertheless, it remains true that Phaidra's behaviour is suggestive of madness, and I shall turn for a moment

to investigate the basis of the Nurse's assumption that her mistress has gone mad. Phaidra, like Orestes, lies in the bed of illness, wasted by disease, abstaining from food, and covering herself [*Hipp.* 131-40/*Or.* 39-45]. The restlessness is another common characteristic of their νόσος [*Or.* 282, 231/*Hipp.* 183-5, 198-206]. Everything and anything seems to annoy them; their hair, body [*Or.* 223f./*Hipp.* 201f. (Phaidra's ἐπίκρανον)/*Or.* 227f./*Hipp.* 198f.]. The chorus in *Orestes* talk of how Orestes is prey to the Erinyes and driven mad [835f.] in the same way the Nurse does about gods driving Phaidra mad [*Hipp.* 235-7].[6] Phaidra, like Orestes after his madness attack, will feel lost and confused after her delirium [*Or.* 278/*Hipp.* 239f]. Orestes cries when the seizure of madness abandons him [*Or.* 42-4], and in the same way we hear Phaidra speak of her tears of shame after her delirious talk [*Hipp.* 243-6]. *Orestes* 44f. : . . . ποτὲ δὲ δεμνίων ἄπο πῆδα, δρομαῖος, πῶλος ὡς ὑπὸ ζυγοῦ., seem like a summary of the scene that takes place on stage during Phaidra's delirium [*Hipp.* 208-38].

As can be seen, there are many and noticeable similarities between the portrayal of Orestes' madness and Phaidra's delirium. We have seen how the Nurse and chorus interpret them. Phaidra, however, is not mad, (i.e. paranoid). How are we, then, the audience to understand Phaidra's delirium? What does it reveal to us?

The contrast between country and house and her wish to escape to the country is highly suggestive in terms of the freedom and purity the country symbolises, and the restrictive and, - as Phaidra herself will verify [383-6] -, often corruptive environment of a household. In nature Phaidra seems to believe that she can achieve the longed-for freedom [219-22, 228-31] from inhibitions that she herself as well as her environment (society) impose. It is not a wish as such to be freed from her

passion. This would be unlikely in view of the subconscious need that her inner-self expresses during her delirium to be nearer to Hippolytos, not only physically, but also in spirit. The vocabulary she uses makes this manifest; δέσποιν' [228, cf. Hippolytos' 74, 82], her wish to be at Artemis' . . . Λίμνας
καὶ γυμνασίων τῶν ἱπποκρότων, [228-31].
αἰαῖ·
πῶς ἄν δροσερᾶς ἀπὸ κρηνῖδος
καθαρῶν ὑδάτων πῶμ' ἀρυσαίμαν,
ὑπὸ τ' αἰγείροις ἔν τε κομήτηι
λειμῶνι κλιθεῖσ' ἀναπαυσαίμαν; [208-11].

That the desire expressed here is in spirit similar to Hippolytos' desires is emphasized by the similarity in the use of their vocabulary :

σοὶ τόνδε πλεκτὸν στέφανον ἐξ ἀκηράτου
λειμῶνος, ὦ δέσποινα, κοσμήσας φέρω,
ἔνθ' οὔτε ποιμὴν ἀξιοῖ φέρβειν βοτὰ
οὔτ' ἦλθέ πω σίδαρος, ἀλλ' ἀκήρατον
μέλισσα λειμῶν' ἠρινὴ διέρχεται,
Αἰδὼς δὲ ποταμίαισι κηπεύει δρόσοις· [73-8].

Her own ἐμάνην, ἔπεσον δαίμονος ἄτηι [241] is not a belief. It is expressed in conformity with the habit encountered elsewhere[7] of attributing to gods any powerful emotions or unusual behaviour that seem inexplicable.[8] It seems to me, however, that it reveals nothing more than an awareness of her inability to explain,[9] even to herself, her passion and subsequent loss of control.[10] The vocabulary is ambiguous;

δύστηνος ἐγώ, τί ποτ' εἰργασάμην [239],

implies personal responsibility, while παρεπλάγχθην is passive; her ἀγαθὴ γνώμη has been led astray. Again, it is interesting to note that she uses the verb in past tense (ἐμάνην), which reveals the brevity and singleness of the occurrence. δαίμονος ἄτηι suggests another ambiguity. Even if secondary,[11] the notion that ἄτη is a punishment for guilt is there, and Phaidra may

well believe that she is being punished for her indecent and unlawful passion. She is indeed ashamed of her behaviour [243-6], for which she goes on, as a consequence of her awareness, to express personal responsibility, in clear terms :[12]

τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γνώμην ὀδυνᾷ·
τὸ δὲ μαινόμενον κακόν· ἀλλὰ κρατεῖ
μὴ γιγνώσκοντ' ἀπολέσθαι. [247-9].

More significantly, her covering reveals more than her shame. It is a translation into action of her efforts to hide and keep secret the passion that causes such shame. It has been painful for her while struggling to stay in her right mind, and she is now horrified at the dangers of losing control. Phaidra knows, just like the audience, that it is only her delirious speech that verges on madness. She is experiencing a discordant blend of emotions. Her passion for Hippolytos is at the same time attractive and repulsive. Her shame and guilt contrast with her feelings of desire; this simultaneous attraction and repulsion is the main cause of her restlessness and her need to escape to the purity of the country. She finds it impossible to come to terms with the secret she carries inside her while she is inside the house. This is very significant, if we look at Phaidra as a married woman, a housewife.

The house stands for the established social demands on women[13]; ἀρετή, αἰδώς, σωφροσύνη, εὐκλεία are amongst the most important. Phaidra is an excellent illustration of the influence and effects that Athenian society had on women in Euripides' age. She is admirable because she tries to live, not just by conforming to such demands, but by making the effort to transform them into ideas in which she can believe. Her one conscious and determined wish is to maintain her good reputation. It is in this interest that she keeps her passionate desire secret, and does not try to justify or reason with her

feelings. Phaidra does not for a single moment, anywhere in the play, consider gratifying her feelings.[14]

So, in contrast with Medea, whose emotional cries reach us from indoors but her control on stage is remarkable, Phaidra gives way to her emotions only once she is outside. Her secret emerges from inside her as she emerges from the house. It can no longer be confined within her, and this is brilliantly conveyed by the portrayal of her discomfort with her own body. Phaidra's efforts could be described as superhuman. She tries to keep her passion secret by refusing contact with all routine activities essential in life, like eating[15] and communicative interchange. But once she is out of the house she begins to talk again. Clearly, her passion needs to be distanced and disassociated with anything related to the house, the function of which is similar to that of her cloak; in it she hides herself.

Phaidra is an internaliser.[16] The externalising of her emotions can occur only in the form of activity. The realism of Phaidra's emotional portrayal is yet another illustration of Euripides' preference to portray emotions through their resulting activity. She opts for silence [271, 273, 284] and is stubbornly[17] resolved to keep it, despite the Nurse's emotional exhortations [297, 300]. She has to resort to supplication before Phaidra reveals her secret. During the stichomythia, under the extreme pressure of the Nurse, Phaidra will consciously yield no information. Nevertheless, the Nurse follows in her questioning a process similar to that of a psychologist. She starts off with what she knows is of paramount importance to Phaidra - her children [304ff.]-, and to which she will undoubtedly react. Her strong reaction (θιγγάνει σέθεν τόδε; [310]), will then provide the following clue to throw back at her. What is interesting here, however, is that the process proves indeed successful, despite the fact that the Nurse is completely

ignorant of what the problem is. The success is due to Phaidra's constant subconscious revelations. She does not stop at admitting that she loves her children; she reveals that her problem lies elsewhere [315]. Her hands are pure, she says, but invites more questions with her φρὴν δ' ἔχει μίασμά τι [317]. Finally, perhaps the most important relevation comes at 315 (ἔα μ' ἁμαρτεῖν·), although no one has accused her of ἁμαρτία. It becomes by now clear to the Nurse that she has got the upper hand. Despite Phaidra's determination not to talk, her unwillingness is substantially undermined by the growing need inside her to actually do so. All that the Nurse has to do is to provide her with the excuse that she has no choice but to talk [333, 335], and that she bears no responsibility for her revelation : πῶς ἄν σύ μοι λέξειας ἁμὲ χρὴ λέγειν; [345, cf. 352].

Phaidra's need to talk about her feelings eventually overpowers her fear of dishonouring herself [cf. 329, 331]. Having revealed her ἔρως for Hippolytos [347, 350], Phaidra regains some of her calm. Her refusal to accept her feelings resulted in an intense emotional pressure evident in both her verbal as well as physical behaviour. Her struggle to resist the pressure is what rendered her so unresponsive. She refused any ties of emotional dependence to make it easier on herself by remoteness, aloneness, and silence. But only until the nurse gets physically hold of her (ἐξαρτωμένη [325]). What happens here is what Hippolytos dreads might happen at 606. He finds the idea of being touched by the nurse intolerable, as if he fears a tresspassing of his self's boundaries may result in a form of "contamination" and influence his ideas and attitude.[18] Phaidra becomes "contaminated" by the Nurse's influence, her boundaries have been invaded, and she gives in.

Ἔρως is dangerous to Phaidra because it is threatening her honour. For Hippolytos, on the other hand, eros is dangerous, because as a relationship it threatens the boundaries of his remote and independent self. Eros is associated with the most deep human needs of dependence and reciprocity, which he seems to dread.[19] For different reasons they both fight this feeling with extreme force and this results in intense emotional pressure, betrayed by their physical activity. Hippolytos cannot bear to be touched [606], Phaidra is physically exhausted from her internal fight, but still restless, in constant movement.

Hippolytos, just like Phaidra, is an internaliser. Turning their emotions inwards, their silence reveals their attempts to repress emotion for reason.[20] Nevertheless, Phaidra is drawn in completely different colours to Hippolytos. A prominent element in her portrayal is the possession of an intense and responsive emotional world. Hippolytos' portrayal, on the contrary, is drawn in such a way as to point to a severe lack of emotionality. This lack, however, is to be revealed as superficial, rendering his tragedy felt and real. His feelings exist, but repression does not allow them to emerge and find expression. This, with all its horrific consequences, will be ingeniously illustrated in the symbolism of his death, a death as tragic as his life has been [cf. 1201ff.].

The symbolism of this passage can only be compared to that of Pentheus' death, and even then, the explicitness here has a more direct, shuddering effect. The bull, traditional symbol of animality, sexuality and emotionalism, arises from the depths of the sea to cause his death :

αὐτῷι δὲ σὺν κλύδωνι καὶ τρικυμίαι
κῦμ' ἐξέθηκε ταῦρον, ἄγριον τέρας· [1213f.].

What seems to be highly suggestive here, is that Hippolytos' destruction is brought about through his own horses [cf. 1218ff.]. Bred by himself, as emphasized at 1355-7 (ὦ στυγνόν ὄχημ' ἵππειον, ἐμῆς/βόσκημα χερός,/διά μ' ἔφθειρας, κατὰ δ' ἔκτεινας. [cf. 1240f.]), the horses are a symbol of his blind obsessions. His death is described in a manner suggestive of his divided self :

αὐτὸς δ' ὁ τλήμων ἡνίαισιν ἐμπλακεὶς
δεσμὸν δυσεξέλικτον ἕλκεται δεθείς,
σποδούμενος μὲν πρὸς πέτραις φίλον κάρα
θραύων τε σάρκας, . . . [1236-9].

The tearing of his flesh, the pain and physical suffering that results brings us back to the preoccupation with the body (δέμας). Prominent in the first part of the play, in Phaidra's desperate attempts to control its demands [131, 175, 198, 204, 274], the body is what Hippolytos denied in his obsessed spiritualism. Artemis states this clearly :

. . . οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ γῆς ὑπὸ ζόφον
θεᾶς ἄτιμοι Κύπριδος ἐκ προθυμίας
ὀργαί κατασκήψουσιν ἐς τὸ σὸν δέμας
σῆς εὐσεβείας κἀγαθῆς φρενὸς χάριν. [1416-9].

The result is magnificently described in the quoted verses of the messenger's speech, as well as in the chorus' : σάρκας νεαρὰς ξανθόν τε κάρα
διαλυμανθείς. . . . [1343f.].

In fact, the dichotomy of body and mind is also obvious in Hippolytos' own words, as he experiences physical pain to his κεφαλή and ἐγκέφαλος [1352f.]. It is his body now that needs release from suffering and longs for rest [1353, 1391f., 1445].

The lack of interaction between Phaidra and Hippolytos in this play, although traditionally they did meet,[21] seems equally symbolic. It suggests how extreme opposites they are, with no meeting point. Their

inability to understand each other's emotions leads to terrible misinterpretations of each other's motives.[22] Both make strong claims to σωφροσύνη,[23] but Hippolytos' inexperience and imbalance robs him of any rights to it (cf. Phaidra's last words :

. . .· ἵν' εἰδῇι μὴ' πὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς
ὑψηλὸς εἶναι· τῆς νόσου δὲ τῆσδέ μοι
κοινῆι μετασχὼν σωφρονεῖν μαθήσεται.).

This uncontrolled, imbalanced temper of Hippolytos is due to immature and uncompromising youth. This is pointed out early on in the play by the servant [114-9]. Theseus, too, talks of Hippolytos' youth, even if he misreads the signs for Hippolytos' case [966-70]. I have mentioned Aristotle's description of the characteristics of youth[24] as we have seen them present in Pentheus' character. There are many interesting similarities between Hippolytos and Pentheus. From the beginning Hippolytos' obsessive fanaticism is immediately noticeable. As the play progresses, it is revealed how life-long repression has turned his emotions into obsessions. He is remote and superior, and this is essentially what causes Phaidra and his father to doubt him so much. Eventhough his innocence is established from the very first lines, the sympathy Hippolytos commands from the audience is minimal. His pronounced fanaticism, superiority and absolutism are comparable to Pentheus'. Hippolytos' attitude towards Aphrodite is similar to that of Pentheus' towards the new god. This is most obvious during the exchange with the servant [*Hipp.* 88ff., esp. 99f., 106, 113], even if Hippolytos cannot be openly hostile and polemical, since Aphrodite is an established goddess.

Both Pentheus and Hippolytos are haughty, cruel, unwise, uncontrolled, contemptuous and ironical, as well as irreverent to gods. There is, however, one difference. In his first speech to Artemis [73-87], which is our

introduction to Hippolytos, the image we see of him is in contrast to the scene with the servant that will follow. With his emotional expression of loving feelings towards Artemis, another, different side of Hippolytos is portrayed for us. The significance of this seems to me to be the revelation that his emotional repression is conscious, intentional and clearly a matter of choice. He is capable of love and feeling, as his prayer to Artemis show. In fact, because his emotions do have an outlet, we do not see Hippolytos in the extreme states of emotional agitation - but once [601ff.] -, constant anger and aggressiveness, as is the case with Pentheus. Hippolytos is more aware than Pentheus as to what emotions are threatening to him, and the measures against them are taken almost consciously.[25] In other words, he knows what he is doing, unlike Pentheus, who does not know what it is he is fighting.

Hippolytos' emotional world is revealed to us in glimpses. The traumatic cause that forms the root of his repression is heard only once, in an uncontrolled outburst, under the emotional strain of the terrible accusation : ὦ δυστάλαινα μῆτερ, ὦ πικραὶ γοναί·
μηδείς ποτ' εἴη τῶν ἐμῶν φίλων νόθος.
[1082f.].

The cry is brief, but full of impact. A whole life's bitterness is expressed in few words.[26] In the same context, his outrage and fury towards the entire womankind [616ff.], are also important. He expresses feelings similar to Jason's [*Med.* 574ff.]. Although both despise women, the difference lies in the fact that Hippolytos' extensive attack reveals a horror, which is even more significant in view of his unfamiliarity and inexperience with women. His reaction has a deeper cause than the "offense" the Nurse has done him :
ὄλοισθε, μισῶν δ' οὔποτ' ἐμπλησθήσομαι
γυναῖκας, οὐδ' εἴ φησί τίς μ' ἀεὶ λέγειν·
ἀεὶ γὰρ οὗν πώς εἰσι κἀκεῖναι κακαί.

ἤ νύν τις αὐτὰς σωφρονεῖν διδαξάτω,
ἤ κἄμ' ἐάτω ταῖσδ' <u>ἐπεμβαίνειν</u> ἀεί. [664-8].

The strength of the feeling is remarkable. This is neither traditional misogyny nor resentment at what is deemed a woman's damaging or mischievous deed, (as is, for example Jason's tirade [*Med.* 569-75]). Similar words we hear out of Orestes' mouth [*Or.* 1590]. Hippolytos' psychology in this respect is not any healthier. The resentment and aggressiveness implies a rather obvious fear of women. This, along with his despisal of Aphrodite and his refusal to worship her, and his wish to remain pure and virginal, reveal a fear of sex and erotic relationships.

I now want to go back and discuss Phaidra's speech to the women. No longer revealing her inner feelings, composed, she assesses her circumstances and discusses her decisions. What she says here is of great importance, and also bears interesting comparisons with *Orestes* .[27] The similarity of their symptoms has already been discussed. There also seems to be a similarity of circumstances; they are seen for both to be externally caused - divinely provoked. In *Hippolytos,* the goddess herself presents us with the situation. The external cause of the tragedy is her desire for personal revenge from Hippolytos; she is using Phaidra to achieve it. As the play progresses, however, we come to realize that Aphrodite's wish is supplemented and reinforced by internal factors. Phaidra is made to fall in love, but how she handles it is her own responsibility. The same is true of Orestes.

Phaidra is aware of that, even if not of the cause of her love [380-3] :

<u>τὰ χρήστ' ἐπιστάμεσθα καὶ γιγνώσκομεν,</u>
<u>οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ'</u>, οἵ μὲν ἀργίας ὕπο,
οἵ δ' ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἄλλην τιν'. . . .

Because of this knowledge she becomes capable of reasoning with herself : ταῦτ' οὖν ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνω φρονοῦσ' ἐγώ [388]. She decides on a certain path and resists anything that may influence her judgement [392ff.]. To push aside this ἔρως and get rid of her νόσος, she is willing to resort to extremes. Her statements at 395-7 reveal how perceptive she is. When she realizes that her σωφροσύνη is powerless against ἄνοια, she opts for the ultimate extreme :

. . . ἐπειδὴ τοισίδ' οὐκ ἐξήνυτον
Κύπριν κρατῆσαι, <u>κατθανεῖν ἔδοξέ μοι,</u>
<u>κράτιστον</u> - οὐδεὶς ἀντερεῖ - βουλευμάτων.
[400-2].

Death is not something Phaidra shies away from. On the contrary, as we have seen, Orestes' every effort is directed at σωτηρία, escaping death. Guilt seems to be the disease that is eating both Phaidra and Orestes alive, and manifests itself in similar symptoms. Phaidra's delirium is parallel to Orestes hallucination in its incoherent thought and confusion. Her excessive elation during the delirium is, like Orestes' paranoia, accompanied by a flight of ideas and a disappearance of inhibitions. Nevertheless, madness is not a permanent feature of Phaidra's portrayal. After the tremendous release of the emotional pressure of her secret, she regains her full sanity. Her critical ability remains capable of healthy evaluation of her situation. She opts for reasonable, even if extreme solutions.

It is Phaidra's wish to die,[28] that seems to me to prove best this major difference between her and Orestes. It is significant that this wish becomes even stronger after the Nurse's betrayal, since her shame and guilt are thoroughly exposed.[29] Unlike her, Orestes is, throughout the play, obsessed with his σωτηρία. Phaidra dedicates her efforts to :

ἐκ τῶν γὰρ αἰσχῶν ἐσθλά μηχανώνεθα. [331],

while Orestes remains stubbornly blind to the shamefulness of his evil acts in pursuit of σωτηρία. They start off with the same kind of νόσος. The rising of conflicting emotions, the feeling of guilt and shame create in them a psychological disturbance. While Phaidra accepts her responsibility and faces up to her guilt, Orestes never does so openly and consciously.[30] What saves Phaidra from insanity is what drives her to her death. Orestes manages to preserve his life, but his sanity is irrevocably lost.

Another interesting similarity between these two plays is the strong presence of the divine element, and the ambivalence that this introduces. The Erinyes are presented in *Orestes* as the agents of his madness, while Aphrodite causes Phaidra's shameful passion. If we detach the divine sphere, events can still take their course and reach the same completion, unfolding strictly on the human plane. How are we then to understand the Erinyes or Aphrodite? Could it be likely that Euripides intended such divinely caused states as a metaphorical projection of human defence mechanisms?

Let me turn for a minute to *Bacchai,* for which the same inference seems to be valid. Pentheus, I have said in the discussion of that play,[31] presents hysterical symptoms, and hysteria is considered as the condition par excellence of repression. As we have seen here, Phaidra's symptoms also reveal hysteria. To psychologists it is a fact that women who live a sheltered life are liable to hysteria; conflicts like Phaidra's between duty and desire are usually the most common cause of hysterical symptoms.[32] The states Orestes, Phaidra and Pentheus are in, are the results of repression, this universal mechanism of defence which puts in motion sets of operations to shut out things too uncomfortable or painful to know. Orestes' repressed guilt, and Phaidra's, or indeed Pentheus', repressed

emotions, cause in them what otherwise the gods may be seen to have provoked. This provides adequate evidence to answer the above question positively.

Although the presentation, as well as, to an important degree, the theme of Phaidra's speech to the women is similar to that of Medea's,[33] the context is remarkably different. Phaidra accepts her society's loathing of women as the standard [406f.], and there is a hint that she even finds it understandable together with the implication that women themselves often invite it [407-12]. There is no revolt or indignation here; Phaidra expresses her convictions[34] [409-14], on account of which she is suffering :

ἡμᾶς γὰρ <u>αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀποκτείνει</u>, φίλαι, [419].

Phaidra, unlike Medea, feels she is the guilty one [cf. 321, 419f.]. She does not wish to wrong her husband; that she feels ashamed and embarrassed about her secret thoughts and desires is clearly suggested by the horror and disapproval expressed at the contemplating of 415-8.

She is aware of the consequences that any shameful act of hers will have on her children, and of her enormous responsibility, both emotional and social, towards them [420ff.]. Phaidra does not share Medea's insularity, and consequently not her single-mindedness either. She is considerate and sensitive to other people's feelings and this inevitably influences both her decisions and behaviour. It is because she is aware of the dangers of this that she tried so hard to isolate and cut herself off, but in the end, under the tremendous pressure of her own personal feelings, she proves incapable of resisting her nature.

It is precisely this difference of hers from Medea that will be her ruin. Phaidra does not possess Medea's horrifying, but none the less admirable ability to control her emotions and direct them to serve her purpose.

Phaidra's innermost emotions render her vulnerable to the Nurse's strong pressure :

. . . · ὡς <u>ὑπείργασμαι</u> μὲν εὖ
<u>ψυχὴν ἔρωτι</u>, τἀισχρὰ δ' ἦν λέγηις καλῶς,
ἐς τοῦθ' ὅ φεύγω νῦν <u>ἀναλωθήσομαι</u>. [504-6].

Weakened by her almost superhuman original attempts to completely disregard her emotions, under the Nurse's persuasive influence [433ff.], she totally loses control. Her repressed emotions surface, strong enough to drawn all her convictions and flatten all her inhibitions. Phaidra's objections lack her previous tenacity and conviction [486-9]. The Nurse's comment on what Phaidra has to say reveals to what extent it has now become a meagre shadow of her struggle :

τὶ σεμνομυθεῖς; οὐ λόγων εὐσχημόνων
δεῖ σ', ἀλλὰ τἀνδρός. - [490f.].

In the Nurse's words when she comes back to change Phaidra's mind, the attitude is the exact opposite of her mistress'. Beliefs and values that Phaidra has as principles are pushed aside in a way that Phaidra has just explained how she despises. Her comment at 459 (σὺ δ' οὐκ ἀνέξηι;) sounds ironical. She herself has declared, not so long ago that :

γυναῖκες, οὐκ ἀνασχέτ', οὐκ ἀνέξομαι
ζῶσ'. . . . [354f.].

The Nurse's advice seems to be total and unconditional surrender to ἔρως. The strength of this emotion is, according to her, irresistible to men and gods alike [447ff.]. Phaidra reacts to this suggestion [486-9, 498f.]. But the Nurse understands what inhibits Phaidra and takes over from her the burden of responsibility and consequences for her honour [521]. Under the perfect excuse, (. . . . νῦν δ' ἀγὼν μέγας
σῶσαι βίον σόν, κοὐκ ἐπίφθονον τόδε. [496f.]),
Phaidra surrenders control to the Nurse
(249 : . . .. ἀλλὰ κρατεῖ
<u>μὴ γιγνώσκοντ'</u> ἀπολέσθαι.).

Nevertheless, the dismay at the revelation of her secret to Hippolytos and the Nurse's betrayal [565ff.] shocks Phaidra out of the passive torpor into which she has sunk, prey to her own emotions and the Nurse's influence. Once more in control of her own decisions, she withdraws back into herself and her decision to die [599f.]. The disgrace she fought so hard to avoid is now inevitable, and her shame renders her emotional once more [669-79]. This time, however, Phaidra will manage to stay in control and direct her emotions towards achieving her own original aim, death, as well as satisfying the demands of a new emotion, born in her out of Hippolytos' scorn, rejection and haughtiness [cf. 728-31].

Phaidra clearly regards this πικρός ἔρως by which she has been subdued and disgraced [727] as a νόσος. She is aware that her feelings towards Hippolytos are not healthy. We have seen how her state is regarded by both chorus and the Nurse as diseased. Phaidra wonders : τί τοῦθ' ὅ δὴ λέγουσιν ἀνθρώπους ἐρᾶν; [347]. The nurse's answer takes us into the territory of the lyric poets, who view ἔρως as γλυκύπικρος[36] :
ἥδιστον, ὦ παῖ, ταὐτὸν ἀλγεινόν θ' ἅμα [348].
The idea is the same, but the dichotomy is expressed in stronger terms. Phaidra, however, feels that her experience consists thoroughly of painful feelings [349]; her ἔρως is defined only as πικρός. She cannot find a φάρμακον for her νόσος [388-94]. Although it is traditional to regard love as madness or disease, the portrayal of Phaidra's feelings also suggests, I think, something more. Her own words and behaviour unmistakably reveal her feelings to be not those of love, but of a passionate obsession, an infatuation. As, for example, the predominant occurrence of the word νόσος indicates, this is more than just a typical negative depiction of love.

Phaidra's ψυχή is described as εὐναία δέδεται [160]; there is no strength or will in her to live. She herself says :

λέλυμαι μελέων σύνδεσμα φίλων [199].

Ἔρως, as seen in *Notions of Love,* is traditionally λυσιμελής. But Phaidra's ἔρως is described more like a terminal disease, and it is interesting to note that death is also λυσιμελής. In fact, the only remedy Phaidra will find to set herself free from her νόσος, which is described as ἀνόσιος ἔρως, is her death :

ἄπο νυμφιδίων κρεμαστὸν
ἄψεται ἀμφὶ βρόχον λευκᾶι καθαρμόζουσα
δειρᾶι,
δαίμονα στυγνὸν καταιδεσθεῖσα, τὰν τ' εὔ-
δοξον ἀνθαιρουμένα φήμαν <u>ἀπαλλάσ-
σουσά τ' ἀλγεινὸν φρενῶν ἔρωτα.</u> [769-75; cf. 763ff.]

There are also other kinds of indications that Phaidra's feelings for Hippolytos are better not referred to as love. Indeed, ἔρως and νόσος are the only words used for her passion. Apart from [319], where φίλος has the conventional rather than a particularly significant meaning, φιλία is not experienced by Phaidra towards Hippolytos. Obviously her "love" entails no familiarity or shared experiences with Hippolytos, but neither does it show any caring feelings, respect or consideration for him. Any 'romantic' notion is also absent from it, as Hippolytos holds by no means a particularly precious place in Phaidra's heart. Her children, her husband and her honour come before him.[37]

The description of Phaidra's feelings does not bear any similarity to either Alkestis' self-sacrificing love, or, more relevantly, Medea's eros. We can easily understand and explain the former, on the grounds that Phaidra's and Hippolytos' relationship is clearly not the one shared by Alkestis and Admetos. On the other hand, Phaidra's

feelings are described in terms similar to those used in Medea to portray her feelings **after** the betrayal of her eros. Both are abstaining from food, melting away in tears, keeping to themselves, and unresponsive. There are, nevertheless, important differences; Medea's cries, protestations and hatred for everything [16, 21-3, 36] as well as the externalising of her emotions before coming on stage [96ff., 111, 145, 160]. There is no shame or secrecy for her; she is the one who has been wronged. She does not feel, like Phaidra, that she is wronging. Although they both deliver their speeches composed, there is a remarkable difference in mentality and context. Phaidra accepts and consents, Medea revolts and protests. Phaidra laments womankind [699f.], Medea asserts what women are able and capable of. Medea can manipulate, Phaidra is manipulated. Medea is herself a brilliant illustration of her speech. Aware not only of her situation as a woman, but of the injustice entailed in the expectations of her social role too, Medea demonstrates with her revenge her active reaction to it :

ὅταν δ' ἐς εὐνὴν ἠδικημένη κυρῇ,
οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη φρὴν μιαιφονωτέρα. [264f.].

In the same way that Medea transforms her words to action, Phaidra's final and fatal act constitutes the best illustration of her conformity. Phaidra is well aware of her position as a woman and the way it is viewed by society [cf. 406f.]. Nevertheless, her reaction is not rebellious; on the contrary, she accepts, although not with Andromache's passivity, for example, who is merely a mouthpiece. Phaidra transforms society's demands and criticism into her guiding rule for living and acting [cf. 409ff.]. She still follows, however, a morality that Medea has understood and exposed as immoral. She remains within the set boundaries, while Medea sculpts her own fate and finds ways to escape where there are no alternatives.

Let us return, however, to the discussion of the portrayal of eros. There are, in the two plays, parallel choral odes to eros; *Medea* 627ff. and *Hippolytos* :

Ἔρως Ἔρως, ὅ κατ' ὀμμάτων
στάζεις πόθον, εἰσάγων γλυκεῖαν
ψυχᾷ χάριν οὓς <u>ἐπιστρατεύσῃ</u>,
μή μοί ποτε σὺν κακῷ φανείης
μηδ' ἄρρυθμος ἔλθοις. [525-9].

The popular belief that love attacks from the eyes[38], brings us back to the domain of lyric poetry, with which this ode presents interesting similarities. The underlined verb is reminiscent of the imagery of warfare, prominent in Archilochos [193, 196], who used it to express the characteristic subduing attack of eros. Ibykos, as has been seen,[39] dreads the onset of eros (ἐπερχόμενον), which invades him through dark eyelids. Nevertheless, as I have already said, there is none of its γλυκεία χάρις portrayed in lyric descriptions for Phaidra. Her eros is of a kind that the chorus dreads. Their apotropaic fear is here expressed in the same terms as in *Medea* . But the emphasis here lies not on how strife and discordance or ἔρως ὑπὲρ ἄγαν can ruin a loving relationship, (the lines come after Medea's and Jason's bitter fight), but rather on the horrific aspects of ἔρως itself [541-3], who must be worshipped and appeased like a terrible god. The images they draw are full of blood, smoke, destruction and death; these are both eros' manifestations and results. The cruelty of Aphrodite is here more than implied [546ff.]. And all this occurs only at the point where Phaidra has just given in to the Nurse to become the prey of eros, even before any consequences occur. This is the **manifestation** of eros - the result will be death. Phaidra's eros is undesirable and unwanted from its very beginning, its suffering constantly increasing to excruciating anguish. The power of this eros no man, animal, or living creature can mistake, as the chorus reaffirm [1273ff.].

9. Family Bonds

Family relationships are more frequently and extensively portrayed in tragedy than the relationship between man and woman. A thorough analysis of the portrayal of emotions within such relationships would provide enough material for a separate investigation. Nevertheless, my discussion of the presentation of love would remain incomplete without some examination of Euripides' portrayal of the emotional dynamics of family bonds. Therefore, confining the scale of the material by a high degree of selectiveness, I shall be looking at a number of scenes related to the strongest of these bonds, that between parent and child. In order to accommodate the diversity of the depicted material, however, the selected scenes will be further divided into groups that share similarities in either theme or presentation.

As has been seen is the case in both the madness and love plays of Euripides, it is almost as a rule that the clearest portrayal of emotions usually occurs in adverse situations, either under the strain of an imminent threat of destruction to a relationship, or indeed immediately after such destruction. The scenes I intend to discuss in the first group are perhaps the best illustration of this :

1. "Separation Scenes" :

In *Hekabe* Polyxena accepts the decision regarding her death with almost stoic resignation. Her horror at the unbelievable announcement [191-3] gives way almost immediately to feelings of pity towards her mother. Her lament is not for herself, since death is better under the circumstances [213-15, cf. 349ff.], but for her mother's suffering [211f.]. She knows that Hekabe will have to

lead the hard life of slavery with no one to lean on for support, or at least consolation, in her old age [202-4].

Polyxena is for her mother the only remaining consolation and sole opportunity for soothing forgetfulness. Her guiding light, caring, nursing, closest and dearest to her heart; her home, security and companion [cf.278-81]. Hekabe's desperate need of, and total dependence on her daughter are portrayed in a paradoxical manner. After Polyxena's helplessness has been presented with the moving parallel of a cub torn away from the security of its secluded, protected home, violently hunted from the mother's embrace to be brutally slaughtered [205-10], the roles become reversed. The daughter assumes that of the mother-figure, while the actual mother completely resigns herself to her daughter, like a lost and helpless child.

Polyxena tries hard in her love and pity to protect her mother from any needless pain, any further humiliation [402-8]. Their parting scene is recapitulating all their loss and painful misfortunes in a climax of tears, bitterness and suffering [409-443]. They will from now on be separated [418], so their emotions render it imperative that they take leave from each other not only with words, but also with bodily contact. The cheeks, on which so often kisses were exchanged, the hand, that so often gave a gentle caress, Hekabe's breasts, a symbol of motherhood, where a child's head so often leans :

ἀλλ', ὦ φίλη μοι μῆτερ, ἡδίστην χέρα
δὸς καὶ παρειὰν προσβαλεῖν παρηίδι· [409f.];
ὦ στέρνα μαστοί θ', οἵ μ' ἐθρέψαθ' ἡδέως. [424].

Polyxena's last thought even as she walks to her death is for her mother [433f.]. Hekabe feels a weakness conquering the members of her body [438-40]. She begs for a last touch of her daughter's hand, but she is gone, and the woman who mothered fifty children [cf. 421] is left childless.

The technique of role reversal is used in this scene to accentuate its emotive quality. In Andromache's separation from Astyanax [*Tr.* 735ff.] a different technique is used to sharpen emotional response. The child is young, defenseless, and unable to understand what is happening to him. His response of instinctive fear, however, reveals the security, comfort, and tenderness that the mother's embrace means to him :

ὦ παῖ, δακρύεις; αἰσθάνηι κακῶν σέθεν;
τί μου δέδραξαι χερσὶ κἀντέχηι πέπλων,
νεοσσὸς ὡσεὶ πτέρυγας ἐσπίτνων ἐμάς;

[749-51].

The scene follows conventions already seen in *Hekabe*. The description of emotional activity is used to increase the immediacy, directness and impact of the portrayal. The mothers' experience is expressed physically in vivid terms : ὦ νέον ὑπαγκάλισμα μητρὶ φίλτατον,
ὦ χρωτὸς ἡδὺ πνεῦμα· διὰ κενῆς ἄρα
ἐν σπαργάνοις σε μαστὸς ἐξέθρεψ' ὅδε,
μάτην δ' ἐμόχθουν καὶ κατεξάνθην πόνοις.
νῦν, οὔποτ' αὖθις, μητέρ' ἀσπάζου σέθεν,
πρόσπιτνε τὴν τεκοῦσαν, ἀμφὶ δ' ὠλένας
ἕλισσ' ἐμοῖς νώτοισι καὶ στόμ' ἄρμοσον.

[757-63].

The same pattern is used to build the separation scene in *Medea*. The same emotional activity is present [1069-75; cf. *Tr.* 757-63/*Her.* 485-9], as well as the following motifs :

(i) Lamentations of how children and mother will be deprived of each other before she sees them happily married [1025-7; cf. *Tr.* 484-6, 1167-70/*Hek.* 416] with the same ring of disillusionment and frustration that Megara expresses in *Herakles* [476-84, esp. 480-2] :

καὶ ταῦτα φροῦδα· μεταβαλοῦσα δ' ἡ τύχη
νύμφας μὲν ὑμῖν Κῆρας ἀντέδωκ' ἔχειν,
ἐμοὶ δὲ δάκρυα λουτρὰ δυστήνωι φέρειν.

(ii) The pains and sufferings the mother went through, in vain, to bring the children up are recollected at 1029-31 [cf. *Tr.* 758-60, 1187f., where the vocabulary is almost identical/*Her.* 458f.]. Regret is expressed that she will not be looked after in her old age, and given proper burial by her children [1032-8; cf. *Tr.* 1180-6].[1]

One difference from the scene in *Hekabe* is that in *Medea*, as well as in *Herakles*, the children do not actively participate in the scene. The emotional activity is provided by the mother; their response is not dealt with. On the other hand, in *Troiades*, although Hekabe's farewell to her monstrously killed grandchild is again one sided, its emotional impact is increased tremendously by the pile of broken bones (ὀστέων ῥαγέντων φόνον [1177]), that Hekabe has in front of her.[2] Her lament over it [1158ff.] recalls his childhood as well as the emotions this child provoked in her when alive, and portrays all the loving and tender feelings between them. The vocabulary and emotional activity remain those of all other separation scenes :

ὦ χεῖρες, ὡς εἰκοὺς μὲν <u>ἡδείας</u> πατρὸς
κέκτησθ', ἐν ἄρθροις δ' ἔκλυτοι πρόκεισθέ μοι.
ὦ πολλὰ κόμπους ἐκβαλών, <u>φίλον στόμα</u>,
ὄλωλας, ἐψεύσω μ', . . . [1178-81];
οἴμοι, <u>τὰ πόλλ' ἀσπάσμαθ' αἵ τ' ἐμαὶ τροφαὶ
ὕπνοι τ' ἐκεῖνοι φροῦδά μοι</u>. . . . [1187f.].

The examples discussed so far do not only share the same theme. They also reveal a remarkable similarity of vocabulary and point to a highly stylized presentation of emotional activity. There is, however, one rather unusual separation scene in *Troiades*. Kassandra's parting from her mother [308ff.] breaks free from the conformity seen so far. She is as much aware of her mother's suffering as Polyxena is in *Hekabe*, but she behaves in a singularly different manner. The emotions described here are thoroughly unconventional. It is

Kassandra's pain and bitterness at the god's betrayal that seem to determine and colour most of her other feelings. Her prophetic knowledge enables her to replace the laments with frenetic celebration. What she knows about the future transports her to a different world from that of her mother. Her personal feelings find an outlet at the knowledge that the suffering will take its revenge on their enemies. Thus she can feel joy and satisfaction, as well as pride for the glory that will accompany the name of her city.

Her departure, although it will give her mother as much pain as Polyxena's, and again cause her collapse to the ground, is not preceded by a moving separation scene between them. Kassandra's portrayal is that of an experienced and independent person, more sophisticated than that of her youngest sister in *Hekabe*. She remains remote from, somehow aloof, not only to the catastrophe and enemies surrounding her, but more importantly, despite them, from her own mother. Hekabe is of course dear to her, she bids her farewell, as well as to her beloved country [458-60], but there seem to exist for her things emotionally closer. She is moved to breaking point only as she parts from the god and the duties she performed for him [451-4] :

ὦ στέφη τοῦ φιλτάτου μοι θεῶν, ἀγάλματ' εὔια
χαίρετ'· ἐκλέλοιφ' ἑορτάς, αἷς πάροιθ' ἠγαλλόμην.
ἴτ' ἀπ' ἐμοῦ χρωτὸς σπαραγμοῖς, ὡς ἔτ' οὖσ' ἁγνὴ χροᾶ
δῶ θοαῖς αὔραις φέρεσθαι σοὶ τάδ', ὦ μαντεῖ' ἄναξ.

The separation here is not of daughter from mother. Kassandra sees herself first and foremost as τὴν Ἀπόλλωνος λάτριν [450]. That she is bitter and disillusioned with the god is obvious not only in these lines but also at 308ff. [cf. esp. 428-30].[3]

Such a portrayal of Kassandra is not entirely surprising. It follows in the lines of her portrayal in Aischylos' *Agamemnon,* and seems to form part of a typicalisation of her character. She is the mad prophetess, characterized by her close relationship with the god and the superiority of her knowledge. The portrayal, however, is not merely in accordance with a generic theme. The remarkable deviation has its function. It provides Euripides with a significant advantage in his 'emotional response' strategy. Kassandra's emotional attitude sharpens our response. It is the counterpoint against which the suffering is weighted, her joy underlining the immensity of the surrounding misery.

I have said at the beginning that the scenes I would be looking at portray the relationship between parent and child. So far, the scenes examined were between mother and child. Similar scenes, built on the pattern traced above and expressive of affectionate feelings between father and child are indeed rare. Separation between father and child is portrayed in distinctly dissimilar fashion and from a particularly different angle. As I intend to go on to discuss, this may be intended to reflect the lack of any close relationship between father and child, a characteristic prominent in Euripides' portrayal of family relationships. In order to make this evident I shall first discuss (a) what typically emerges from the portrayal of scenes of motherhood, and then look at (b) what is typical in father-child scenes.

(a) Motherhood :

The scenes of separation so far considered are within war plays. The presentation in them of the relationship between mother and child reveals a strong emotional bond of love, care, commitment and mutual expectations. Nevertheless, what also emerges is a strong feeling of

disillusion and worry, suffering and strain, which leads to an eventual exclamation on the pointlessness of motherhood : ἰὼ τέκνον, δυστυχῆ
σ' ἔτρεφον ἔφερον ὑφ' ἥπατος
πόνους ἐνεγκοῦσ' ἐν ὠδῖσι· καὶ
νῦν τὸν ἐμὸν 'Αίδας
ἔχει μόχθον ἀθλίας,
ἐγὼ δὲ γηροβοσκὸν οὐκ ἔχω, τεκοῦσ'
ἁ τάλαινα παῖδα. [*Suppl.* 918-24;
cf. *Tr.* 753-5/*Hek.* 419-21].

Before I go on to discuss this feeling of disillusion and pointlessness, I want to draw attention briefly to the last comment of the chorus in the above quoted lines. Γηροβοσκία [cf. *Med.* 1032-5/*Alk.* 662-4/*Aias* 570] is what parents in the whole of Greek tragedy expect from their children. As has been noted already, it is one of the strongest motifs constantly emphasized in all separation scenes. A reflection, perhaps, of the respect and gratefulness of the children towards the parents' worries (emotional as well as material) over them, during the years of their need and vulnerability, the need to rely on this expectation emphasizes the high degree of interdependence in human nature. Within the modern Greek world, in fact, where this custom is still paramount in the culture, people regard the looking after in old age as one of, if not the one, most important reason for having children.[4]

It is therefore only reasonable to argue that such topical expressions of disillusionment as above are only to be expected in plays dealing with war, permeated with the feeling that human efforts, hopes, life in general is all in vain [cf. *Hek.* 160-5/*Tr.* 676-8], when the paramount hope of a mother lies dead in front of her. Nevertheless, a closer look at the rest of Euripides' plays where motherhood is portrayed reveals the same feeling present almost unfailingly throughout.

Menelaos' threats in *Andromache* [314-8] expose motherhood's extreme vulnerability. Andromache is prepared to die in order to save the life of her child [413f.]. Nevertheless, she knows that her motherhood has only added to her life's troubles and misery [395f.]. Her speech revealing the strength of her maternal emotions [406ff.] results in the paradoxical comment of 418-20 :

. . . . πᾶσι δ' ἀνθρώποις ἄρ' ἦν
ψυχὴ τέκν' · ὅστις δ' αὔτ' ἄπειρος ὢν ψέγει,
ἧσσον μὲν ἀλγεῖ, δυστυχῶν δ' εὐδαιμονεῖ.

Parallel comments, by the chorus, are found in *Medea* 1090ff., immediately after her emotional separation from her children. Medea's conventionalised monologue [1018ff.] is repeatedly broken by the expression of other, interfering emotions. After all, the separation is self-imposed and her constant changes of mind are there to highlight that. Nevertheless, Medea does not hold herself responsible for the children's death. Her experience is the same as that of all mothers in similar scenes, in the sense that her relationship with her children is violated. The difference is that, while she appears to be the violator, the actual destruction of the relationship is the result of the previous violation of herself as a woman, both wife and mother. The damage of this violation is additionally pronounced because of the emotional proximity of the violator and the responsibilities he betrayed.[5]

Medea's perverted act constitutes, as pointed out in the play [1282-5, 1339-43], a striking deviation, which is even more emphasized by this constant use of convention. The chorus' 1261-4 is clearly more than a topos. Medea's maternal feelings are emphasized before they are pushed aside. The reason for this seems to me to be the same that leads Euripides to a recurrent topical expression of the suffering and pointlessness of motherhood; his critical portrayal questions the

traditional value system. *Medea* is perhaps the one play where this becomes most clear.

As I have already discussed,[6] Medea's characteristics include strong awareness and a keen perception. When she talks about motherhood it is its risks, physical as well as emotional, that she points out [250f., 1030f.]. Having a child is a painful experience, not only at birth but continuously. The vocabulary at 1104 and 1261 [cf. *Her.* 281] strongly denotes this. Giving birth is regarded as a combat by Medea, and N. Loraux writes[7] : "Ce faisant, elle n' innove que dans l' excès, car, au regard de toute la tradition grecque, l' accouchement est un combat, ou du moins une épreuve, digne de recevoir le nom de *ponos* . Et de fait, *ponos* est bien l' un des mots qui désignent la douleur de l' accouchement, dans la poésie comme dans la prose, et tout spécialement dans le corpus hippocratique qui n' en farde pas les dangers."

Loraux also points to the association between madness and childbirth.[8] The word ὠδίς, which in its plural form is traditionally used for the pains of childbirth, becomes a synonym for child.[9] Its strong association with πόνος [cf. *Ph.* 30] provides the link with νόσος [cf. *El.* 656], and this is only one step behind overpowering ἀνάγκη [cf. *Ba.* 88f.] or δύστανος ἀμηχανία [*Hipp.* 163]. The words betray the danger and suffering entailed in this vulnerable state of women, motherhood, and at the same time portray them as an inseparable part of their nature. This is clearly expressed in *Hippolytos* at 163 with δυστρόπωι ἁρμονίαι, and it is at this same point that the link with madness is pointed out : ὠδίνων τε καὶ ἀφροσύνας [164].

On the other hand, the suffering of childnessness is portrayed in Euripides with equally strong terms. In Andromache's words [*Andr.* 419f.] δυστυχῶν brings to

mind Hermione's situation, which is more emphasized, even if indirectly, by Peleus' attitude:

. . . ., ἥν ὅ γ' ἐξ ἡμῶν γεγὼς
ἐλᾷ, δι' οἴκων τήνδ' ἐπισπάσας κόμης·
ἥ στερρὸς οὖσα μόσχος οὐκ ἀνέξεται
τίκτοντας ἄλλους, οὐκ ἔχουσ' αὐτὴ τέκνα.
ἀλλ', εἰ τὸ κείνης δυστυχεῖ παίδων πέρι,
ἄπαιδας ἡμᾶς δεῖ καταστῆναι τέκνων; [709-14].

The insensitivity towards both Hermione and her feelings is here perhaps shaded because of Hermione's ambiguous, but overall negative and unsympathetic portrayal. The unsympathetic presentation essentially relies on her attitude to Andromache, with whom the audience's sympathy mainly lies because of her presentation as a mother. Nevertheless, Hermione's antipathy to Andromache is her emotional reaction to the fact that Andromache is a mother, while she herself is unable to have children. Ambiguously and contradictiously enough, as one might say is typical of Euripides, the emotional consequences (as well as those to her status) of this inability are the reasons, stressed in the presentation, for which Hermione should command at least some of the audience's sympathy.

Kreousa's situation in *Ion* provides perhaps a less complicated illustration. The ode of 452ff. speaks of the hated life without children and their importance in achieving real happiness, fulfilment and immortality. At 676-80 and 761-9 the emotional pain of childnessness, which is portrayed as Kreousa's personal suffering, is both contemplated and expressed. Ion's sympathy for the ageing and childless Kreousa becomes even stronger at the thought of her status :

. . . · οὐ γὰρ ἀξία
πατέρων ἀπ' ἐσθλῶν οὖσ' ἀπαιδία, <u>νοσεῖν</u>.

[618-20].

More importantly, however, what emerges from his words is that, childlessness, the suffering of which is a

life-long companion, is also seen as νόσος, much in the same way as giving birth is.[10] This ambivalence is what is emphasized in Euripides by the paradox expressed in Andromache's words [*Andr.* 418-20], as well as in *Medea* [1090ff.].

The unique terms of Medea's portrayal,[11] are indeed necessary, in order to render credible her presentation as a mother who, burying her maternal instincts and emotions, can destroy her own children. Medea's act can be seen as a reaction to the realization not only that motherhood did not in any way prevent her emotional disillusionment, but also that it proved powerless in terms of her personal security. It failed both emotionally and socially to function as the solid and valid confirmation of her marriage.

The destruction of her relationship with her children was the only way Medea had to take revenge for the destroyed relationship not only between herself and her husband, but also that of her children with their father. Her bitter accusations about his responsibility in their death [1363-5] echo the criticism of Jason as a father in the entire play.[12] The father's indifferent attitude towards emotional responsibilities is also presented and criticised in *Ion*. Kreousa's brief but emotionally expressive criticism of the god at 252-4, is expanded at 859ff., to reveal both Apollo's inconsideration towards her and his irresponsibility as a father [cf. 876-80, 902-6, 912-8, especially : οὓς ἀποδείξω/<u>λέκτρων προδότας ἀχαρίστους</u>, and, <u>κακὸς εὐνάτωρ</u>].

These last observations make the consideration of the depiction of the relationship between father and child now almost imperative.

(b) Fatherhood :

In *Hippolytos*, father and son are portrayed with contrasting characteristics. Hippolytos' asceticism and internalising are in total disagreement with Theseus' nature. This becomes most obvious when they clash in the agon, where Theseus cruel and contemptuous comments on his son's preferences and lifestyle reveal a general dislike and disapproval [952-7, 1064 : οἴμοι τὸ σεμνὸν ὡς μ' ἀποκτενεῖ τὸ σόν]. Hippolytos' attitude itself demonstrates the grounds for Theseus' resentment. He has little appreciation for what is most important to his father [1009-20]. Nevertheless, even if tentatively, he does express loving and caring feelings towards Theseus. His fruitless attempts to establish contact and remind his father of their relationship [902-15, cf. 1070f., and his last attempt where he tests his father's feelings at 1086f.] meet with no response from Theseus. His attitude towards his son remains unrelenting to the bitter end of the scene [cf. 1089], and seems extreme, even given the emotional stress he is under :

πέραν γε πόντου καὶ τόπων 'Ατλαντικῶν,
εἴ πως δυναίμην, ὡς σὸν ἐχθαίρω κάρα. [1053f.].

The intensive portrayal of Hippolytos in the play suggests that Theseus should have known his son better. Although he is well aware of his habits, which he so resents, he refuses stubbornly to see that they would never have allowed him to do what he stands accused of. Theseus chooses to ignore [1051f., 1055f., 1058f.] Hippolytos' oaths and protestations [1025-31, 993ff.], and prefers to assume that his son would behave like all other youth [967-70].

There is, nevertheless, another aspect to his behaviour. Theseus' portrayal relies much on characteristic features of tyrant-figures in tragedy. A

very appropriate comparison would be with Kreon in *Antigone*. Both men act on impulses [*Ant.* 707-11/*Hipp.* 1320-4] that they regard right on almost the sole justification that they are kings and rulers. Deeds are what matter to them most, they dislike words [cf. Kreon's attitude to Antigone 441-6, 485f. / Theseus' 957, 960f., 971]. Their expectations of their sons [cf. Kreon's 641-8 / Theseus' contempt of Hippolytos' lifestyle, betraying resentment]. B. M. W. Knox[13] sees Theseus as a "man who is always conscious of his audience". When Theseus curses his son "he calls on the city to hear (884), making it an official act."[14] He speaks of, and shows no previous, and now offended, loving feelings; rather he seems antagonised [cf. 976-80].

Theseus' entire attitude implies a lack of any real relationship ever existing between him and his son.[15] His words of resentment [948-57] betray a feeling that might have been with him all along. In fact, G. J. Fitzgerald[16] attributes Theseus' rage against his son to guilt related to the circumstances of his birth. He sees the additional punishment of exile as the result of his wish to break his relationship with, forget about Hippolytos altogether. Hippolytos' lines [1041-4] can indeed be seen as a bitterly ironical questioning of deeper causes to his father's reaction.[17]

Hippolytos is in fact the only instance we find in scenes of this kind, where the son's attitude towards his father is impeccable. If we look at the scene between Admetos and Pheres in *Alkestis* , the harsh attitude of Pheres is matched by that of his son. Even if Admetos may seem to be right in his recriminations, Hippolytos' exceptional character stands out, for he, too, was totally innocent. Pheres has had no complaint with his son [658-61]. With his selfish attitude [cf. 712], however, he isolates himself and denies the all important continuation of his line. In order to save his own

expiring life, he loses what parents look forward to in the whole of Greek tragedy; being looked after in old age (cf. γηροβοσκία), and a proper burial and mourning by his child [662-8]. The punishing revenge Medea exacts from Jason, namely deprivation of joy in old age and continuity of his line, Pheres prefers to sacrificing his life for his son [734-8].

His claims ring hollow :

ἐγώ δέ σ' οἴκων δεσπότην ἐγεινάμην
κἄθρεψ', ὀφείλω δ' οὐχ ὑπερθνήισκειν σέθεν·
<u>οὐ γὰρ πατρῶιον τόνδ' ἐδεξάμην νόμον,</u>
<u>παίδων προθνήισκειν πατέρας, οὐδ' Ἑλληνικόν,</u>
σαυτῶι γὰρ εἴτε δυστυχὴς εἴτ' εὐτυχὴς
ἔφυς· ἃ δ' ἡμῶν χρῆν σε τυγχάνειν ἔχεις.
πολλῶν μὲν ἄρχεις, πολυπλέθρους δέ σοι γύας
λείψω· <u>πατρὸς γὰρ ταὔτ' ἐδεξάμην πάρα.</u>
τί δῆτά σ' ἠδίκηκα; τοῦ σ' ἀποστερῶ; [681-9].

Although it may be true that it is both parents that refuse to give their lives for Admetos, the emphasis here is on Pheres' attitude [cf. πατέρας 684]. The lines reveal, in much stronger terms than indeed is the case with Jason, that a father's obligation is seen not to extend beyond material comfort.[18] What has traditionally been passed down to Pheres is void of any emotional liabilities, answerable to no emotional obligations.

These two scenes share certain noticeable characteristics : hostile, antagonistic feelings between father and son, resentment and bitterness at false expectations from both sides. Similar patterns emerge in scenes where in the absence of father the grandfather takes his place in the agon, (cf. Orestes - Tyndareos in *Orestes,* Pentheus - Kadmos in *Bacchai,* although there the abusive attitude is rather one-sided).[19] An interesting exception appears to be that of *Herakles.* The responsibilities of a father are portrayed in this play as

extending beyond physical protection and material wealth to love, care, and tenderness towards his children. There are three different relationship patterns in the play, emphasizing, in an interlinked comparison, a healthy and correct attitude to fatherhood.

The relationship between Amphitryon and Herakles is portrayed as caring and understanding.
ὦ τέκνον· εἶ γὰρ καὶ κακῶς πράσσων ἐμός.
[1113].
Amphitryon' words express unconditional love and support. His sensitive and careful attitude brings Herakles out of the confused state following his madness,[20] with no resentment or recriminations for his behaviour during it. His concern for the emotional state of his son is obvious throughout and especially at 1204-13. The special emphasis he places[21] on his relationship with Herakles highlight the contrast with Zeus' attitude of indifference and neglect towards his son. Amphitryon constantly and emphatically criticizes this [170f., 212, 339-47; also at 498-501, and more importantly at 1127].

The criticism of this absence of Zeus throughout the entire play reaches its critical point with Herakles' final choice of father :
πατέρα γὰρ ἀντὶ Ζηνὸς ἡγοῦμαι σὲ ἐγώ· [1265].
From his own experience - (he has been an absent father, too) -, Herakles has come to realise that fatherhood is not limited to conception, as Amphitryon explicitly illustrates at 339-47. It also entails responsibilities [574-82], obligations [1360-6, 1419f.], and emotional support [622ff., especially 631-36].

Herakles then is not so much an exception as it appears to be. It is in fact the contrast in the two paternal attitudes portrayed that shapes the play. The ambivalence of fathers as a determinant of his nature is a major cause of Herakles' madness.[22] The relationship

with the father as such, however, also presented in its ambivalence, seems to be of equal importance for Herakles' sanity. The actual physical absence of the father in this play points to the absence of real contact, communication, and close relationship with him.

Nevertheless, the portrayal of the relationship between father - daughter seems to be governed by an emotional tone distinctly different from that between father - son. This is prominent in the portrayal of Agamemnon's relationship with his daughter, in *Iphigeneia in Aulis*. Iphigeneia's strong feelings for her father are made obvious the minute she enters the stage, rushing into her father's arms [632]. She openly declares how much she has missed him [640], and putting aside formalities expresses how overpowering her desire is to see him [637].

Agamemnon himself claims that the feelings are mutual [641]. Theirs is a special relationship. Iphigeneia's loving feelings for her father render her more sensitive towards his reactions, so she realises straightaway that he is not comfortable with his feelings of joy at seeing her [644]. Her caring concern for him and her keen perception of his unhappiness bring tears to Agamemnon's eyes [645ff.]. The colours of sincerity, honesty, sensitivity and perceptiveness that Euripides uses to portray Iphigeneia are meant, in a way, to clash with her father's characterization (cf. 1214f. which contrasts with Agamemnon's σοφίσματα 444).

Both Agamemnon and Iphigeneia reveal their feelings in words, as well as with touch. Agamemnon, who earlier had longed for the δυσγένεια that allows people to cry [445-53], cannot now help shedding tears [650]. Their emotional closeness is highlighted in their eagerness for physical proximity [632, 679-84]. Agamemnon has, of course, his own reasons which add to

and strengthen his emotion to the point of losing control over his feelings. This is a rare instance of a separation scene between father and daughter sharing the nature of the separation scenes discussed between mother and child. His words echo those used in such scenes [cf. *Hek.* 409f./*Tr.* 757f.] :

ὦ στέρνα καὶ παρῆιδες, ὦ ξανθαὶ κόμαι, [681].

Under the circumstances, the sight of his daughter, let alone her touch, is enough to reduce him to tears [683f.]. Agamemnon is using the moment when he has the opportunity under the pretext of welcoming his daughter, to take his parting from his beloved child.

Once she finds out what actually awaits her, Iphigeneia will try and change her father's decision by reminding him of their special bond and all his dreams for her. Here again the activity and motifs are those of a separation scene :

πρώτη σ' ἐκάλεσα πατέρα καὶ σύ παῖδ' ἐμέ·
πρώτη δὲ γόνασι σοῖσι σῶμα δοῦσ' ἐμὸν
φίλας χάριτας ἔδωκα κἀντεδεξάμην.
λόγος δ' ὁ μὲν σὸς ἦν ὅδ'· Ἆρά σ', ὦ τέκνον,
εὐδαίμον' ἀνδρὸς ἐν δόμοισιν ὄψομαι,
ζῶσάν τε καὶ θάλλουσαν ἀξίως ἐμοῦ; [1220-5].
οὐμὸς δ' ὅδ' ἦν αὖ περὶ σὸν ἐξαρτωμένης
γένειον, οὗ νῦν ἀντιλάζυμαι χερί·
Τί δ' ἆρ' ἐγὼ σέ; πρέσβυν ἆρ' ἐσδέξομαι
ἐμῶν φίλαισιν ὑποδοχαῖς δόμων, πάτερ,
πόνων τιθηνοὺς ἀποδιδοῦσά σοι τροφάς;
[1226-30].

The play is in fact unique in its extensive portrayal of the father - daughter relationship. The expression of affection on behalf of a father towards his daughter is also found in Iphis' words in *Suppliants* [1080ff.], after Evadne jumps into the pyre. Although his suffering is the result of the fact that both his children are dead,[23] it should be noted that the feelings expressed principally

concern his relationship with his daughter. Iphis himself remarks it is perhaps old age that has rendered him aware of the special female qualities that are more appreciated and needed by old people :

. . .. οὐδὲν ἥδιον πατρὶ
γέροντι θυγατρός· ἀρσένων δὲ μείζονες
ψυχαί, γλυκεῖαι δ' ἦσσον ἐς θωπεύματα.
[1101-3].[24]

The daughter who had, so far, been the light of his eyes is now dead. The picture he draws is full of the sweetness and tenderness that his daughter's existence filled his own life with [1098-1101]. Any comparison with his present situation is unbearable. Iphis can now only long for darkness and death [1105f.].

If the portrayal of the father - daughter relationship presents differences from that of father - son, could it be that similar, or any differences at all, apply between mother - daughter and mother - son relationship portrayals? In the scenes discussed at the beginning (with the exception of the scene between Hekabe and Polyxena),[25] the child is very young and its non-active participation in the relationship portrayal renders the question of its sex unimportant. In the rest of the plays, however, and especially those not related with war, direct portrayal of either the mother - daughter or the mother - son relationship is by no means extensive.[26]

The only extensive, and eventually direct presentation of a mother - son relationship in Euripides is perhaps in *Bacchai*. Interestingly, many of the elements in the presentation are strongly linked with the consequences of an absent father.

(c) Father's absence and its consequences :

Pentheus was brought up by his grandfather in the total absence of a father. There is, in fact, in the entire play, a notable " . . . emptiness of the male. Sexual activity is everywhere implicit in the play, not just in the prurient fantasies of Pentheus, but as counterpart to the images of luxuriance and fertility, whereas sexually active males are strikingly absent. There are no adult males, no fathers, only the old and inadequate, and the young and inexperienced." [27]

The play "presents infantile theories of sexuality and childbirth".[28] How children are born and the father's role at birth are two prominent questions that Pentheus' fascination with the rites of the new god seems to seek to answer : Are they private? Do they occur at nightime? Can anyone participate? [469-4]. Pentheus' repulsion towards sexual activity is in fact a cover for his desire and fascination, associated with his fear of femininity and women.[29] W. Sale[30] finds Agave responsible for this fear and Pentheus' aggression and contempt towards the women. With no direct evidence, it is of course difficult to prove this. Nevertheless, there are strong suggestions in the play to support it.

Agave is portrayed as the only prominent figure in Pentheus' life, with Kadmos an ineffectual old man, with no influence on his grandson [250-4, 263-5, cf. 1256f.]. Her behaviour is governed by the need for approval and praise [cf. 1193, 1194f.]. In particular, she is after her father's and her son's praise [1211f.], for managing, a woman herself, to equal men's exploits, and for that matter unhelped by their devices [1206-1210]. She is extremely proud of her deed. She herself, first of all, (πρῶτον ἐμὸν τὸ γέρας) [1179], with naked hands [1173f.], hunted down this beast the god had sent [1189-

91]. Her striving for identification with the male is manifest :

πάτερ, μέγιστον κομπάσαι πάρεστί σοι,
πάντων ἀρίστας θυγατέρας σπεῖραι μακρῷι
θνητῶν· ἁπάσας εἶπον, ἐξόχως δ' ἐμέ,
ἥ τὰς παρ' ἱστοῖς ἐκλιποῦσα κερκίδας
ἐς μείζον' ἥκω, θῆρας ἀγρεύειν χεροῖν. [1233-7].

. . . . εἴθε παῖς ἐμὸς
εὔθηρος εἴη, μητρὸς εἰκασθεὶς τρόποις,
ὅτ' ἐν νεανίαισιν Θηβαίοις ἅμα
θηρῶν ὀριγνῶιτ'· ἀλλὰ θεομαχεῖν μόνον
οἷός τ' ἐκεῖνος. νουθετέος, πάτερ,
σοὐστίν. . . . [1252-7].

Her words are indicative of her resentment of Pentheus' failure to be like her, adopt her ways and manners - her nature? -, themselves clearly shaped by the need to please her father (cf.1238-43, especially :

μακάριος γὰρ εἶ,
μακάριος, ἡμῶν τοιάδ' ἐξειργασμένων.).

The fascination she exerts on her son is ingeniously portrayed at 955ff.. His need for the mother's embrace, tenderness, and acceptance [966-70], is in fact also present in his last cry to her, filled with the horror and awe of a lost, rejected and fearful child:

. . . , καὶ λέγει, παρηίδος
ψαύων· Ἐγώ τοι, μῆτερ, εἰμί, παῖς σέθεν
Πενθεύς, ὃν ἔτεκες ἐν δόμοις Ἐχίονος·
οἴκτιρε δ' ὦ μῆτέρ με, μηδὲ ταῖς ἐμαῖς
ἁμαρτίαισι παῖδα σὸν κατακτάνηις. [1117-1121].

Pentheus, as has been noticed,[31] shares several behavioural characteristics with Orestes in the homonymous play, where nevertheless, there is no interaction whatsoever between Orestes and his mother. In fact, none of the emotional intensity of the relationship portrayed in *Bacchai* is evident, at least on

a concrete level, in any Euripidean plays of the Orestes saga. The relationship could be described as virtually non-existent. On the other hand, however, *Orestes* is an ingenious illustration of the problematic effects of the absence of the father. "Orestes' dilemma is that of the other desperate young men in Euripidean drama, including his counterpart in the *Electra,* namely, how to be a man in a world in which there are no men, in a society without fathers."[32] In her discussion of this, F. Zeitlin refers to A. Mitscherlich's modern socio-psychological study *Society Without the Father,* the clinical descriptions of which contain close parallels to Orestes' portrayal.[33] Mitscherlich sees three stages in the development of personality. First, imitation and unquestioning experience of things, then identification with role models, and finally the internalizing and incorporating of these models to form an independent, critically conscious personality. If this succession of the stages does not progress, the person is *governed by ... external stimuli* lacking the ability to transform these models into a *sense of consciousness, a self.* Characteristics of such a person are : *a basic mistrust,* aggression, the tendency to live *by the feeling of the moment* and to scape-goating. The lack of an incorporated system of values leads to a *manipulated conformity,* a *role behaviour that picks up slogans to live by.* Failure to complete the development results in *compulsive role-playing in the service of an unconscious superego, coexisting with compulsive drives that are practically unhampered by consideration for others, abrupt transitions from one type of reaction to the other.*

Orestes' anti-social and unstable behaviour of guilt and contempt would be, according to Mitscherlich's theory, the result of the absence of his father, his search for a model on which to rely[34] in order to incorporate his experiences into identity feelings. His *killing with a good conscience* (note *Or.* 1605-7, and also 1587f.), is an

attempt "to make the world safe again for patriarchy" by killing "mothers or mother surrogates and wives who are adulterous"[35] [*Or.* 1590, cf. 1607].

This last comment is significant as it brings us back to the relationship between mother and son, as it reveals another effect of the father absence, on the relationship between mother and child. Orestes' οὐκ ἄν κάμοιμι τὰς κακὰς κτείνων ἀεί. [1590] is suggestive of his emotions towards his mother. Nevertheless, in the lack of direct evidence on their relationship, the best alternative is to look at his relationship with other women in his family, with whom there might be more extensive interaction. An obvious case here is of course his sister Elektra. Before I examine the portrayal of their relationship as such, it is informative to look briefly at the effects of her father's absence on Elektra herself.

The love for her absent father that is close to becoming a fixation is one of the main themes in *Elektra* . It undoubtedly reaches the boundaries of obsession. Dressed in old, ragged clothes, her hair in an uncared-for condition [185f., 239, 241], she provides a powerful contrast not only with the rest of the carefree girls of her age, but, more importantly, with her mother. Klytemnestra may well remark upon what she believes to be her daughter's degradation [1107f.], but she seems to miss the point. It is not Elektra's external circumstances that account for her appearance. It is something deeper and purely emotional, and it is precisely the one thing that marks their indissoluble difference : her strong love and unshaken dedication to her father.

In plays of intense grief physical terms are predominantly used to portray suffering. Abuse and humiliation of the body become essential means of

expressing mourning [cf. *Hek.* 495f., 655f./*Tr.* 278-80, 793-5, 1235f./*Supp.* 76-9, 826-31].[36] Grief, however, is not only formalised into a ritual to express the suffering at a present or recent situation, when one might argue it is felt most deeply. The depth of the feeling can be sustained over a long period of time, and ritual can actually become a means of maintaining its strength. This is exactly Elektra's method for maintaining her passionate grief. From her own words, as she implores the stranger to pass on her message to her brother, it becomes obvious that her shaven head is both the symbol that expresses her mourning and, at the same time, an element that has helped keep its strength alive :

ἀλλ', ὦ ξέν', ἱκετεύω σ', ἀπάγγειλον τάδε.
πολλοὶ δ' ἐπιστέλλουσιν, ἑρμηνεὺς δ' ἐγώ,
αἱ χεῖρες ἡ γλῶσσ' ἡ ταλαίπωρός τε φρήν
κάρα τ' ἐμόν ξυρῆκες ὅ τ' ἐκεῖνον τεκών. [332ff.].

Moreover, what she has also been keeping alive is her equally passionate hatred for her mother, which in fact constitutes her real motivation. As Klytemnestra states, she has always been a father's child [1102]. Nevertheless, comparison with Iphigeneia, Agamemnon's truly loving child [cf. *I. A.* 638f.], in *Iphigeneia in Aulis,* where the purity, tenderness and beauty of the father - daughter relationship contrasts with Elektra's obsessive passion, makes more evident the fact that it is not necessarily love for Agamemnon but hatred for Klytemnestra that motivated Elektra.

Orestes' relationship with his sister Elektra receives careful and extensive treatment in this play as well as in *Orestes.* I have mentioned elsewhere[37] that Elektra's intense and emotional care in *Orestes* brings her brother's fear of women to the surface, and that his seeing Elektra as an Erinys is an illustration of his ambivalent relationship with women in his family. This ambivalent picture that Orestes seems to possess of women is in fact reflected through their portrayal and

relationships in all Euripidean plays of the Oresteian story.

In *Elektra* relationships are portrayed in a manner revealing the emotional confusion experienced in the various and often contrasting roles of being a wife, mother, daughter, and at the same time a woman. There might be intense hatred in the relationship between Elektra and her mother, which stems from their corresponding roles of (a father's) daughter and wife, but there is, however, extreme similarity in their relations with men, which is part of their portrayal as women as well as mother and daughter. Elektra drives her brother to murder [1182/1224] in the same way her mother drove Aigisthos to murder [930ff.]. The scene where Elektra leads her mother into the house to be killed is highly reminiscent of Klytemnestra's own triumphant and venomous remarks in *Agamemnon* , where she herself is leading the king to his murder.[38] So when Orestes sees Elektra as Klytemnestra in *Orestes* [1204-6], it is not without good cause.

As said already, in *Elektra* her own emotions are the driving forces motivating her revenge; her personal humiliation, hatred and bitter resentment. Her miserable state is largely due to her own choice [cf. *El.* 166ff.] and her suffering to a great degree something she cultivates [57f., 112ff.]. Her selfish preoccupation is present even in the message she sends to Orestes which mainly revolves around her [304-18]. It is through her, and because of the emotional/influential relationship that exists between them, that Orestes acquires his motivation. The chorus [1203-5] also confirm that Elektra was the one who persuaded Orestes (οὐ θέλοντα) to do the murder. Orestes is reluctant to kill his mother and this is largely due to his own feelings [964, 971, 973, 975, 981, 1195-7]. The impulse to avoid matricide grows stronger and stronger [274, 278,

967ff.], however he is not strong enough to oppose his sister. Nowhere is the difference in their emotions, and the strength of their motivating reasons more obvious than at 967ff., where Orestes, hesitant and reluctant, is faced with the overpowering will of his sister, exorting him to be brave. Orestes cannot hold his ground for very long, and when he leaves the stage there is an immense emotional gap between him and his sister. In this powerful influence that she exerts over her brother we not only see, yet again, Elektra's similarity with her mother, but also her being, in a way, portrayed like a mother to Orestes. In guiding Orestes to avenge his father's death, she is in fact taking over a mother's role. In Sophokles' *Elektra* she is actually the one who protected, cared, and provided for Orestes in childhood [S. *El* . 1144-48]. This care and protection is also extensively portrayed in *Orestes* .

The relationship between brother and sister in this play is portrayed with great complexity. Both scenes between them [211-315, 1018-50] suggest the influence Elektra exerts on her brother because of the strong feelings they have for each other. The first scene portrays their close, tender and loving bond, Elektra's care, Orestes' weakness and need for physical as well as mental relief, their interdependence. As Orestes remarks [294ff.] they only have each other and must be strong for each other's sake. He does not want his sister to die out of extreme care for him, as he would then be ἔρημος, and it is equally so for Elektra. In fact, she claims, being a woman, if she were to become ἀνάδελφος in addition to ἀπάτωρ and ἄφιλος, she would perish.

Elektra stresses here that there is no way she would fail her brother. Life and death bear equal weight without him. Nevertheless, the inequality of the relationship is made increasingly obvious. Her dominance is established

visually from the beginning of the play. In their second scene Orestes originally reacts aggressively to Elektra's intense emotionality. At 1037f., Elektra expresses the desire to be killed by her own brother, and at his refusal her wish changes to common death and burial [1052f.]. She seems perpetually to look for an act that will unite them in an unseparable way. In *Elektra* this bond had been the blood they shed of their mother :

διὰ γὰρ ξευγνῦσ' ἡμᾶς πατρίων
μελάθρων μητρὸς φόνιοι κατάραι. [*El*. 1323f.].

Orestes is trying to hide his feelings, since he regards tears and emotional displays a sign of weakness [1031f.]. Elektra's ability to 'unman' her brother is most evident :

μὴ πρὸς θεῶν μοι περιβάλῃς ἀνανδρίαν.

The scene is parallel with the one at the beginning of the play, where Elektra's protective attitude resulted in Orestes' confusing her with an Erinys. In this context, Elektra's ability to unman Orestes brings to mind *Eumenides* [185-90, 137-9, 183f., 264-8, 365f.], where the Erinyes are seen as the horrible goddesses who have the power to destroy manhood.[39]

The fact that under her persistent emotional pressure Orestes eventually yields [cf. 1027 : σὺ μή μ' ἀπόκτειν'·] reveals that Elektra's feelings have a tremendous influence on him. His weakness is not entirely due to his illness and physical exhaustion; he simply cannot hold his own. Elektra does not succumb to her brother's imploring requests. It is her wishes that are always to be granted, it seems, by Orestes. It is made manifest that she is the stronger, the leader of the two. Tyndareos points out with bitterness [615-21], how Elektra's hatred was an overmastering influence on Orestes. Orestes praises her ἄρσενας φρένας [1204], forgetting that this was his mother's major characteristic.

Since Elektra is repeatedly and predominantly portrayed throughout both *Elektra* and *Orestes* as a true daughter of her mother, to conclude that her relationship with Orestes is suggestive, or could be seen as a substitute of his relationship with his mother, would not perhaps be an unwise assumption.

I have said at the beginning that Euripides' emotional portrayal is more frequent and intense at situations surrounding or resulting from relationship destruction. The choice of atypical situations points to the potential for perversion of the relationship. By tightening up the traditional family relationships, the effects of the pressure entailed in the social demands and emotional obligations of the bond become evident. The portrayal concentrates on the strength of the feeling, highlighting both the motivational influence as well as the frustration and suffocation of the emotional bond.

It seems that if indeed Euripides' portrayal of motherhood is aiming at a re-evaluation, his portrayals of emotional perversions constitute an even more detectable attempt at re-evaluating tragedy's entire traditional value system. The portrayal of Klytemnestra or Medea, who negate or reverse the sacrificing and loving attitude of mothers; the absence of the father, or the emotional relationship with him, and its consequences; the sister's overpowering love for her brother and its strong associations with an obsessed love for her absent father and an intense hatred for her mother;[40] the parents' love for their children struggling under the conflict of emotional and social demands. The emphasis is permanently on how the asphyxiating intensity of the feeling under pressure often leads to a betrayal of the emotional obligations of the bond.

2. Betrayal and its consequences :

This is an especially strong theme in *Orestes,* a play deeply concerned with family relationships, - none of them healthy or correct.[41] It is in fact betrayal in the family loyalties, both by Klytemnestra and Menelaos, that Orestes and Elektra resent. There are frequent references to that, all using the verb προδιδόναι [575, 722, 1057, 1165, 1463, 1588]. It is interesting to note, in the same context, that both Pylades and Elektra use the same verb [1087, 1236] in pronouncing their loyalty, one to Orestes, the other to her father. In all the characters' demands to be rendered what is due to them [ἀποδιδόναι 643, 652, 1075, 1585], it becomes even more obvious that this principle of family loyalty is in operation.[42]

Iphigeneia's bitter criticism in *Iphigeneia in Aulis* [1312-8, note προδοὺς], along with Klytemnestra's speech [1146ff.], deal with this same theme of betrayal. Its effects on the emotions of the characters who have suffered it provides significant connections amongst Euripides' tragedies dealing with the family of the Atreidai. As W. D. Smith points out,[43] Klytemnestra's exposition of her past experiences brilliantly illustrates the traumatic process by which, through violence and betrayal, she lost her innocence. She, and more directly her daughter, provide for us the "archetypal image of the betrayal of the girl by the father, her devastation followed by some kind of recovery to adulthood."

From *Iphigeneia in Aulis* the theme travels through the ambiguities and complexities of *Elektra* and *Orestes,* while it seems cured in *Iphigeneia in Tauris,* where Euripides has given Iphigeneia a role reverse from the one she had in Aulis, a role which reminds us of her mother (i.e. killing men). Iphigeneia will, like an Erinys in *Orestes*, be assigned the role of persecuting him, in

contrast with her brother's role of persecuting females. But the action of the play will prove her better than all of her relatives.

Indications of her noble and loving nature are spread throughout *Iphigeneia in Aulis* [cf. 1238-40], nonetheless where she asks her mother to forgive, not hate : πατέρα τὸν ἀμὸν μὴ στύγει, πόσιν γε σόν. [1454]. They are again the focus of portrayal in *Iphigeneia in Tauris* where she reveals a kind, sensitive nature [344-7, esp. 372ff.], and a strong love for her family [42ff., 515, 547, 582-90]. The thought, however, after her dream, that her brother may be dead, has a very strong impact on Iphigeneia. She laments for his death [149f.], for to her it actually means the death of her whole oikos, as well as of her hopes for salvation [153].

It is not only through her lament that we can see Iphigeneia's reaction to the death of her brother. As she says herself it is not only grief and mourning. The total despair that now surrounds her brings about a change in her. What seems of particular importance is her use of the verb ἠγριώμεθα [348] to describe this novel state of feeling in her heart. She specifically addresses her heart [344], as the place where the previous emotions (φιλοικτίρμων, γαληνὸς, [345]) were experienced, and from which this sudden change originated in her. Sudden it may well be, but it certainly is not left unexplained. Iphigeneia explains to the chorus that the reason she will prove of hostile spirit to the hostages is her belief that her brother no longer is alive. The actual cause of this new emotional state is, however, deeper :

[οἱ δυστυχεῖς γὰρ τοῖσιν εὐτυχεστέροις
αὐτοὶ κακῶς πράξαντες οὐ φρονοῦσιν εὖ.] [352f.].

In her case, as B. Vickers suggests[44] of Hekabe and "so many characters in Euripides", "suffering neither purifies, nor ennobles, but degrades, brutalises, ..." .

Iphigeneia feels the need to turn from victim to victimizer, for, as she herself so expressedly reveals at 354-60, she has not, so far, had the opportunity to be released from resentment. She may well have survived the actual sacrifice, but she is having difficulty in coping with its consequences [cf. 855-66]. We have here a very sensitive portrayal of the psychological effects on Iphigeneia of all the years spent practically in exile, accompanied by the disturbing memories of her father, whom she loved dearly, subjecting her to such an inhuman ordeal. She cannot forget [361], and her resentment becomes all the stronger, since, through her own experience from practising human sacrifice [380-91], she is now fully aware of her victimization and she is capable of interpreting its actual causes.

What she considers as a new misfortune, then, seems to add the final touch to her previous bitterness and resentment, and succeeds in bringing about what will soon prove a momentary - and this is of some importance - perversion of her nature. This brings us back to ἠγριώμεθα. This verb that Iphigeneia uses here is also used in :

i) *Orestes* [615f.], when Tyndareos says to Orestes of Elektra : μᾶλλον δ' ἐκείνη σοῦ θανεῖν ἐστ' ἀξία,
ἥ τῆι τεκούσηι σ' ἠγρίωσ', . . .,

ii) *Elektra* [1030f.], where Klytemnestra explains the reasons that led her to kill her husband :
ἐπὶ τοῖσδε τοίνυν καίπερ ἠδικημένη
οὐκ ἠγριώμην οὐδ' ἄν ἔκτανον πόσιν·

The same verb is used for Orestes' hair that has gone wild, due to illness and neglect [*Or.* 226, 387]. The picture that Orestes presents there is a visual metaphor for the way he feels. *Orestes* 388 emphasises and draws attention to this : οὐχ ἡ πρόσοψίς μ', ἀλλ' τἄργ' αἰκίζεται. The disease he suffers from is, significantly, also described as ἀγρία [34], and not only

because of its strength, but more because of its effects. It has driven him to a wild state, that of a beast. Ἄγριος is also used of Aigisthos' feelings towards Elektra in *Elektra* [1116].[45]

The verb occurs in instances where the speaker is talking about a change of feelings that has, or, as is the case in *Iphigeneia in Tauris,* looks as if it will lead to wrong, perverted acts. The original feelings always being positive, loving, turn into passionate hatred or wildness. And the cause of this change is always emotional [cf. *Or.* 615-21/*El.* 1018-48, esp. 1032-4/*I. T.* 348ff.].

I have said, however, that Iphigeneia's change of nature is momentary. When the hostages are brought on stage none of the heartlessness she said they would be met with is obvious. On the contrary, she is full of compassion (cf. her own words [472ff.], and Orestes' remark [482-6]), even before she finds out that they are her compatriots. Iphigeneia maintains her innocence and nobility throughout, uninfluenced by betrayal and hatred.

There must indeed be a reason why Euripides chose to present this change of feelings that Iphigeneia experiences but does not allow to take over. It is probably related with the fact that Iphigeneia's fate in this play is a 'happy' one; - remarkably different from the one that befalls either her mother or her brother, for neither Klytemnestra, in *Elektra* , nor Orestes, in the play that was called after him, are endowed with noble nature. On the contrary, Euripides does his best to cast doubts regarding their nobility of soul. They never openly admit their guilt, or let go of their hatred. They allow it to turn them into savages, drive them to behave like wild beasts. Iphigeneia, on the other hand, is released from resentment [990-3], through the grief she will experience at her parents' death, and particularly

through pity at her father's cruel death and joy at the suffering of those responsible for her sacrifice [530ff.]. Even the near act of murdering her brother will work differently for her [868ff.]. She comes to terms with past sufferings. However, the same element is present here, on which Euripides seems to be insistent. The threat of yet another murder within the family betrays once more this ever-present compulsion, like an obsessive, unavoidable and unconscious, unrealised need "of the potential repetition of violence of members of the family towards each other." [46]

Iphigeneia, however, does not commit her crime. One step short, recognition puts a halt to it :
ὦ συγκασιγνήτη τε κἀκ ταὐτοῦ πατρὸς
Ἀγαμέμνονος γεγῶσα, . . ., [800f.].
Orestes' words at the recognition scene stress the family bond, the blood connection, while Iphigeneia places the emphasis on the strength of the bond's feeling:
ὦ φίλτατ', οὐδὲν ἄλλο, φίλτατος γὰρ εἶ, [827];
and, [832f.] :
κατὰ δὲ δάκρυ, κατὰ δὲ γόος ἅμα χαρᾷ
τὸ σὸν νοτίζει βλέφαρον, ὡσαύτως δ' ἐμόν.
It is her loving feelings that reconcile her with the past resentment. This reconciliation is the great absentee from *Orestes* . There, there exists no purification of the original feelings that provoked the first crime, thus he is prepared to reenact it - which he does with Helen - time and again [cf. 1590].

Iphigeneia in Tauris provides not only Iphigeneia, but also her brother, with the opportunity for relief; the former from her resentment, the latter from his guilt. By saving his sister he frees himself from pollution, and what is notable here is that, as a consequence, the desperate and paramount consideration for personal salvation which permeates *Orestes* is also reversed. Orestes will save his sister even if it means his death.

This somehow signifies an end in this repetition of violence in the family :

οὐκ ἄν γενοίμην σοῦ τε καὶ μητρὸς φονεύς·
ἄλις τὸ κείνης αἷμα· . . . [1007f.].

This is highly reminiscent of *Orestes* 1039f. :

ἄλις τὸ μητρὸς αἷμ' ἔχω· σὲ δ' οὐ κτενῶ
ἀλλ' αὐτόχειρι θνῇισχ' ὅτωι βούληι τρόπωι.

In *Iphigeneia in Tauris* the lines are meant and are a sincere statement of his feelings towards his sister. The dreadful experiences resulting from the shedding of his mother's blood have managed to reduce, in this play, Orestes' desire to live. This is in no respect the same in *Orestes*. Although the lines are similarly spoken at a time of close danger for both brother and sister, Orestes is upset with his sister's emotional attitude, preoccupied as he is with the idea of his own imminent but unwanted death. More generally, by the end of the play, with his answer to Menelaos [cf. 1589f.], Orestes will negate his own ἄλις τὸ μητρὸς αἷμ' ἔχω.

The third and final group of scenes I shall discuss deals with a distinctly Euripidean method of portraying complete emotional devastation :

3. Total Collapse :

The separation between mother and daughter in *Hekabe* concludes with the mother's physical collapse to the ground. As Polyxena, shrouded, begins her journey to the shadows of the underworld [209f.] with a farewell to the light of day [435-7], Hekabe feels the flow of life abandoning her :

οἵ 'γώ, προλείπω, λύεται δέ μου μέλη.
ὦ θύγατερ, ἅψαι μητρός, ἔκτεινον χέρα,
δός, μὴ λίπηις μ' ἄπαιδ'. ἀπωλόμην, φίλαι.
[438-40].

Her own words of supplication to Odysseus reveal the reasons of the abysmal depth of her exasperation :

. . .· τῶν τεθνηκότων ἅλις.
ταύτῃ γέγηθα κἀπιλήθομαι κακῶν·
ἥδ' ἀντὶ πολλῶν ἐστί μοι παραψυχή.
πόλις. τιθήνη. βάκτρον. ἡγεμὼν ὁδοῦ. [278-81].

Her βάκτρον has been snatched away. What gave her strength, aid, and support, and, most importantly, was her last remaining hope and consolation, is forever gone. She has offered her own life in exchange, she has pleaded in vain to be killed along with her child [383-93]. She now feels the need to die, in the same way that ivy inevitably dies when the tree it grows on is chopped down [396, 398]. She will remain prostrate, shrouded and unresponding, covering her all-white head in dust [486ff.], until her excited and eager response to the thought (note : φίλα [506]) that Talthybios may have come to carry her away to death [505-7].

In *Troiades* Hekabe is again significantly presented prostrate for a substantial part of the play [98f., 462ff.], her physical collapse a symbolic and appropriate response to the loss of her family and the destruction of her city. Portrayed in the play [475-78] as the image of motherhood, the queen becomes the personification of suffering as she relates her misfortunes. One after the other her children were killed [479], taken away from her into slavery [484-8], raped [500f.]. She can do absolutely nothing but mourn for them [480], she can hope for nothing from them [503f.]. Despite all her love and labours for these children she is left, through their suffering, a corpse, rotting away in tears :

ἐᾶτέ μ' (οὗτοι φίλα τὰ μὴ φίλ', ὦ κόραι)
κεῖσθαι πεσοῦσαν· πτωμάτων γὰρ ἄξια
πάσχω τε καὶ πέπονθα κἄτι πείσομαι. [466-8]

Collapsing to the ground or remaining prostrate [cf. also *Tr.* 505, 508], seems to be a conventionalised reaction of a totally broken human being. The group of similar instances listed in the Introduction[47] has

revealed this method of portrayal as essentially Euripidean.[48] As I have remarked several times already, translating emotions into activity seems to be Euripides' preferred means of emotional portrayal. Nevertheless, in *Troiades* , for example, as Astyanax is taken away to his horrendous death (cf. Andromache's visualisation 755f.), the mother resigns [777f.] with bitter hatred [764ff.], but she does not collapse in the same way that we have seen Hekabe do. Not only because, as Hekabe suggests at 632f., there is hope in life, but more importantly because, in contrast with Hekabe, she is still young. Total collapse and abandon seems to be a response reserved by Euripides for older people, whose last hope in and connection with life expires.

A good illustration of this association between physical collapse and the weakness and vulnerability of old age[49] is Peleus' case in *Andromache.* The old man collapses to the ground at the news of his grandson's death : ἆ ἆ, τί δράσεις, ὦ γηραιέ; μὴ πέσῃς·

ἔπαιρε σαυτόν.

οὐδέν εἰμ'· ἀπωλόμην.

φρούδη μὲν αὐδή,[50] φροῦδα δ' ἄρθρα μου κάτω.

[1076-8].

From the moment of his appearance on stage, however, up to the point that he finds out the death of his grandson, Peleus himself hardly accepts any of the characteristics of old age.[51] Peleus praises himself on his long-lost ἀνηβητηρίαν ῥώμην [552f.] that now fills him again as he rushes to the scene, full of concern for the security of his family. For as long as he believes in this security and prosperity Peleus demonstrates this kind of 'false' youthfulness (cf. especially 588 and Menelaos' reaction to Peleus at 744-6), similar to the one Iolaos' experiences in *Herakleidai* [680ff.], when he regains hope for securing his family's fate. Iolaos' rejuvenation [726ff., especially 740-4] comes in fact after the scene that has struck him what seems the final blow of

misfortune, when Makaria departs to be sacrificed. Like Hekabe at the departure of Polyxena, he collapses [602-7] and remains covered and prostrate [cf. 618, 633, 635] until the messenger delivers the rejuvenating news to him.[52]

Peleus' reverse experience is an interesting portrayal of the emotional activity of collapse as a process. His collapse emphatically exposes the meaning of this Euripidean ritual, in a way that Hekabe's, or indeed Iolaos' experience does not, as it occurs to people in the midst of suffering, already crashed by several blows. In Peleus' case the whole process that brings the old but youthful Peleus to the ground takes place there and then, in front of the audience's eyes, thus revealing the reasons for the collapse : Not only the combination of the unbearable blow of terrible news with the physical weakness of old age, [1201 γέρων, 1207; cf. *Herkl.* 636] but also, and most importantly, the vulnerability and loneliness of a childless, unprotected old age [cf. 1177-83, 1204ff.].

It is interesting to note that this physical method used to express emotional collapse becomes strikingly stylized solely by the fact that Euripides reserves it, apparently, only for the old. It is quite true that people often collapse, literally, at unexpected or too harsh blows of misfortune. This renders Euripides' presentation, from one aspect, both realistic and naturalistic. On the other hand, however, the fact that the same activity is not used for younger people in similar situations, gives the action the character of a stylized repertoire action, specifically reserved for use with old people. Nevertheless, ironically enough, this highly non-realistic use of the activity addresses a deeper kind of realism, emphasizing a profound reality of life : It is only old people that would totally, and often irreparably, collapse.

10. Review

ἐγὼ πέφυκα γραμμάτων μὲν οὐκ ἴδρις,
μορφὰς δὲ λέξω καὶ σαφῆ τεκμήρια.
Euripides *Theseus* [N. fr. 382].

The preceding analysis of the presentation of madness and love has verified the two original assumptions from which I had set off to examine the presentation of emotions in Euripides. For establishing an emotion the portrayal relies on the presentation of its physiological indicators. This primary factor, supported by the concurrence of Euripides' method and modern psychological principles, tends to confirm the dramatist's source of information as close observation of real life.

Euripides' choice of method, however, does not seem to have been determined only by its suitability to his medium, or indeed his awareness that the audience were likely to respond better to what is a way of expressing and understanding emotions most familiar to human beings. Opting to portray emotion through its physiology and activity also allowed him to communicate the inexpressibility of feeling and highlight the human inability to verbalise emotional expression. Moreover, one might argue, this gave him an excellent opportunity to explore the relation between feeling, action, drama and myth.

Although his representation of emotional activity is regulated by literal and theatrical convention and not naturalistic behaviour, Euripides often manages to make conventions coincide successfully with the psychological reasons for a particular situation, thereby maintaining a high degree of psychological realism. I have already discussed the question of what is meant by realism in the emotional representation in tragedy[1], but I feel I

ought to, perhaps, qualify my use of the terms "real life" and "reality" in this thesis. The difficulty in such definitions is clearly beyond any doubt.[2] The question is fundamentally a philosophical one, and an attempt to solve it here is not likely to provide either a significant contribution, or indeed a decisive answer to a multilateral problem. Nevertheless, I must still endeavour to clarify what my use of the terms is intended to mean, and that is, basically and essentially, every-day, day-to-day events and behaviour. And it is for the patterns of this behaviour that clinical psychology not only acted as my most valuable safeguard in treacherous ground, but also provided me with the security that stems from having a solid, objective basis amongst shifting meanings and terminology.

Euripides' 'realistic' presentation does not simply rely on a straightforward imitation of naturalistic behaviour, but more importantly on a representation of lived and felt experiences. He observes and assimilates his mythical material to the patterns of behaviour manifest in human nature. His portrayal of women [cf. Aristophanes *Thesm.* 148-52], or indeed old age,[3] are strongly indicative of this. His exploration of human conditions is intended to show *how they feel.* Since, however, for numerous reasons, and not least the one discussed above, the emotional 'reality' of any condition can hardly be called 'objective', a main question that arises is how the playwright portrays this subjectivity. In every-day life subjectivity can only be recognised through physiology; language in itself is not a sufficient medium to communicate it. This is one of the reasons for the paramount importance of physiological indicators in the psychology of emotions, and this, more relevantly to my discussion, highlights in turn the significance of the role they play in Euripides' emotional representation.

His characters' struggle for emotional expression[4] powerfully dramatizes the sense of a gap, experienced by all human beings, between the felt emotion and its final expression. A striking illustration of this is in *Troiades* [577ff.], in the scene between Hekabe and Andromache. The women's lament is a harmonious symphony of the highest level of conception. Although the emotion is fully communicated between them, the co-ordination of its expression is not achieved through verbal description of the feeling. Significantly, it is brought about because of exquisite tuning into the responses of each other's emotion. Their sharing of feeling vibrates through the playwright's brilliant choice in method of presentation which enables the audience's understanding of the emotion, and effects their own emotional response.

From this perspective, the culmination of this scene may be seen to be in Hekabe's comments at [686-96]. There is a striking attempt here actually to express and communicate *verbally* this sense of gap between what one feels, and how, and to what extent it can be expressed at all.[5]

ναύταις γὰρ ἥν μὲν μέτριος ἦι χειμὼν φέρειν,
προθυμίαν ἔχουσι σωθῆναι πόνων,
ὁ μὲν παρ' οἴαχ', ὁ δ' ἐπὶ λαίφεσιν βεβώς,
ὁ δ' ἄντλον εἴργων ναὸς· ἥν δ' ὑπερβάληι
πολὺς ταραχθεὶς πόντος, ἐνδόντες τύχηι
παρεῖσαν αὑτοὺς κυμάτων δραμήμασιν.
οὕτω δὲ κἀγὼ πόλλ' ἔχουσα πήματα
ἄφθογγός εἰμι καὶ παρεῖσ' ἔχω στόμα·
νικᾶι γὰρ οὐκ θεῶν με δύστηνος κλύδων.

The choice of parallel, and its drawing no less, is perfect. Hekabe's strength of feeling, which (cor)responds to (that of) her misfortune, renders her speechless; with no verbal, indeed no sound (ἄφθογγος) resources at all to express it. In the same way the sailors resign to the overpowering reality of the ultimate disaster, language gives up the effort to

express the human being, overcome by feeling; feeling, which in less forceful intensity, seeks and may find expression in physical activity. This, again, is represented here by the sailors' earnest attempts, under less daunting prospects, to rescue themselves.

This is remarkable use of language to describe the impossibility of expressing strong emotion. Euripides, however, exploits other resources to register emotion that language cannot express. His use of objects and their handling as a means of communicating emotion is notable. In the servant's speech in *Alkestis* [152ff.], the prolonged and intense piling up of household objects, which follow one another in an emotionally climaxing sequence, re-creates for the audience the compact picture of Alkestis' emotional world, portrays the feelings and emotions she will never express on stage herself. The striking contrast between her suppression of emotion at line 173 (ἄκλαυτος ἀστένακτος), and the release of it at 176 (᾽δάκρυσε), as they are remarked upon by the servant, is strongly associated with her approaching the one object that for her has utmost emotional value.

In *Troiades*, Hekabe's lament over Hektor's shield [1156ff.], which shelters the pile of broken bones that used to be her grandson's body, is another instance. Again, the choice of object here brings symbolism into operation, a factor also present in the choice of household objects for the case of Alkestis.[6] The item itself, an emblem of war, now holds a dead body, a symbol of war's horrendous consequences. The same object that once protected and identified Hektor the defender, now acts as a coffin, protecting the dead body of his own child, who lies murdered in front of his grandmother, who has lost both - (indeed all) - people dear to her through war. The significance of this symbolism in the portrayal of Hekabe's intense state

through her emotional relationship with the object is highlighted in her own conflicting and ambivalent addresses to it; at 1156f. (λυπρὸν θέαμα κοὐ φίλον λεύσσειν ἐμοί), 1192-9 (ὡς ἡδὺς ἐν πόρπακι σῶι κεῖται . . .) and at 1221-23 :

σύ τ', ὦ ποτ' οὖσα καλλίνικε μυρίων
μῆτερ τροπαίων, Ἕκτορος φίλον σάκος,
στεφανοῦ· θανῆι γὰρ οὐ θανοῦσα σὺν νεκρῶι·

Another distinctive feature in Euripides is the portrayal of the strong sense of conflict with the self. As I have discussed in the Introduction,[7] emotion is, both for Euripides' contemporaries, as well as for us today, motivating, although the intellect is seen as separated from the emotional self. Understanding an emotion is seen as a function independent from the actual experience of the feling. The conflict in Euripides, however, is of which part of the self to allow to emerge, to voice, to hand control over to.[8] His portrayal suggests that the inability to understand and the inability to express emotion are linked, and that the refusal to allow ourselves to be/accept our emotional part is the primary factor hindering our understanding.

The causal relationship that Euripides highlights between emotion > motivation > action has undertones of the discussed Homeric 'unity' of the self. There is, however, one most significant difference. The unity is enriched by the realisation that the self is none other than the emotional self. One is what one feels, and the recognition of this effects the acceptance of responsibility for both the feeling and its control. The playwright uses the presence of the gods to exploit the ambiguity entailed in this.[9] Do the gods stand for the reluctance to accept emotional responsibility, or do they illustrate the lack of awareness of it? More ambiguously still, is the role of the gods suggestive not of the human evasion of responsibility but rather of the inability to

deal with it? The answer is left, like everything else in Euripides, open.

There is in Euripides an inextricable relationship between words and action. What remains linguistically unexpressed action expresses, and this action is patterned on, and expressive of, human feeling. And as I have discussed,[10] in order to achieve psychological realism in his representation of feeling, Euripides makes remarkable use of myth. In the chapters examining the portrayal of madness, close relation between insanity and conflict within the individual was revealed. The pronounced ambivalence in all the relevant plays reflects Euripides' attempt to expose the notion of divine causation as a subconscious cover for internal conflicts. It has also been seen how closely related these conflicts are to emotional problems in human relationships, particularly those within a family. Myth reflects this conflict, this ambivalence within the family, which itself is but a microcosm of society and ultimately the entire world of life, not only in so far as the experience of the characters in a play is concerned, but also that of the audience's. Myth is the dramatist's common ground of 'reality' between his characters and his audience and it is as such that Euripides uses it to invest his presentation with depth of realism.

I have suggested[11] that, in the lack of symptomatology for establishing a particular emotion, a confusing uncertainty is introduced regarding the presence and/or nature of the feeling in question. In other words, if the subjectivity of the feeling is not represented, there is ambiguity. This ambiguity of feeling Euripides almost always accentuates by seemingly creating a further kind of ambiguity, one of response, which he achieves by calculated use of situational and constitutional information about a character. His emotional portrayal does not limit itself to presentation of the subjectivity

of a character's emotions or the ambiguity of their feelings. By putting before his audience the concrete image of the character's conditions, the relation between 'subjective' reality and 'objective' motivating circumstances is revealed, effecting the audience's ambiguity of feeling. The ambiguity that governs his audience's response is in fact not a new creation of the dramatist but an element cleverly drawn from his primary material, myth. As a formulation of feeling, myth is governed by the ambiguity entailed in the very nature of feeling, and in both the characters' emotions and the audience's response this same kind of ambiguity is in question.

Euripides uses drama as a means of expressing, effecting, and eventually understanding the ambiguity of feeling. Exploring not only his characters' verbally expressed feelings but also those that remain unexpressed but manifest themselves in action, he shows how feeling, whether recognised or not, expressed or not, is the motivation behind the action. The presentation of action as emotional response is highlighted further by the fact that this same action is also stipulated by the myth, itself a formulation of feeling as well as a paradigm of human behaviour. Drama is another form of myth, its transformation into action, an acting out of what myth expresses. As such drama is used by Euripides as a way of giving a substance other than subjective to emotional reality, so that it can be formulated, expressed and communicated.

As has already been suggested,[12] there clearly seems to exist a distinctive attempt, traceable throughout Euripides' work, at re-evaluation. It is evidently at work from the bottom steps of the ladder to the highest, from a smaller to a larger scale. I have noted the re-evaluation of Kassandra's traditional madness, which seems to be part of an attempt to re-evaluate madness

entirely, presenting it as emotional response. The same re-evaluation process was found to be present in his portrayal of attitude to emotions,[13] as well as of emotional relationships and family bonds,[14] most notably motherhood. Euripides' attempt at re-evaluation reaches, on its ultimate level, the entire world of feeling - and therefore accordingly of its representation[15] -, and affects tragedy's traditional value systems.

Euripides' presentation of emotions does not only express their conflict and ambivalence but goes on to explore the possibilities of new kinds of emotional relationships, be it within the family or between the sexes. Despite the extensive degree of emotional portrayal, there is very little relationship description as such. Relationships in Euripides are never described as coming into being, developing or even deteriorating. Their existence is interesting only in the sense that it has passed, the detailed and extensive portrayal is of the effects of this collapse on human experience. What shapes the tragedy is the relation between the emotional potential entailed in the relationship and its traditional evaluation. Euripides seems to attempt to provoke thought through feeling - emotional reaction. For instance, how love is thought about traditionally may be the theme of a play, but how love ought to be thought of as emerges as its issue.

The total re-evaluation of negativism regarding emotions is evident throughout his work. Emotional concern and support is the one thing that characterizes humanity's superiority over petty, capricious divinity. Acceptance of emotions brings relief, while acceptance of their responsibility and control is, perhaps, the sole guarantee of sanity. Mutual, responsible and loving relationships are what keep couples, families and society together and prosperous. The tragic quality that emerges from the presentation of conflict as inevitable

in the lack of this realisation, and from the impossibility of resolution without personal experience of suffering, (i.e. without 'emotional understanding'), seems to be intended to act as the catalyst effecting such realisation and understanding.

Euripides' presentation conveys information about the feeling; of madness, love, or any particular emotion in question, with his use of "the objective correlative". But it also *imparts feeling*. In the same way that his presentation contains the sum of representations in it but does not consist solely of this sum, this feeling is not the total of the particular emotions represented. It is the experience of response to the presentation. Its ambiguity is perhaps the only way that enables a kind of immersion into all aspects of emotion. Euripides' presentation is highly suggestive of what and which the tragic emotions should be : *those through which the strength, the depth, and the effect of feeling can be imparted.*

In Euripides, "tragic knowledge" is an understanding of what it is to be human : recognition and acceptance of the emotional self, achieved through suffering, - or, more correctly, πάθος, the undergoing of the experience. This affords not only new depths to the Aischylean τὸ πάθει μάθος, but also new interpretations to the misunderstood notion of κάθαρσις : A merging of ἔλεος (compassion through knowledge, understanding) and φόβος (of emotions, their control and responsibility) to an eventual acceptance, reconciliation, and atonement with feeling.

Notes to Chapter 10, p. 256-264 :

1. See p. 128.
2. See, for instance, Easterling's discussion in Pelling, especially p. 84ff., and references on p. 88.

3. See, generally, Falkner (1985).
4. See, for instance, the discussion on p. 169.
5. See Gredley's review (1990) of de Romilly's book *La modernite d' Euripide*, Paris 1986, in JHS 110 (p. 222ff.), especially on p. 159ff. of the book, where de Romilly discusses the tendency of Euripidean characters to use rationalised arguments instead of outbursts to express themselves in moments of intense emotionality or pressure.
6. There are many other examples of the same technique being used by Euripides. See, for example, Herakles' relationship with his weapons [cf. especially 1376-85], Kassandra's emotional but bitter parting with the beloved objects that linked her with Apollo [451-4], and, probably, if we accept that Orestes' bow is actually real stage property and not imaginary, his dependence on it for freeing himself of most horrifying emotions.
7. See Introduction p. 22ff..
8. The best, perhaps, illustration of this is Medea's monologue [*Med.* 1019-1080].
9. In *Medea*, several layers of motivation produce different nuances for both Jason's and Medea's actions. In *Bacchai*, the downfall of Pentheus is either through his own ἁμαρτίαι or through the will of Dionysos. Despite Orestes' claims in the homonymous play that he killed his mother because he was instructed by the god, there is a strong suggestion in the play that he killed because he was emotionally motivated.
10. See p. 128ff..
11. See p. 105-7 and 127.
12. See the discussion of motherhood, p. 225ff.
13. This is obvious, for instance, in *Herakles*, in the hero's acceptance of emotion as an essential part of his nature and its portrayal as a kind of therapy for his madness. See the discussion on p. 87-8. Also, the presentation of Alkestis' emotional motivation and admirable composure strips away any negativism against emotion as uncontrollable and disastrous.
14. Not only his presentation of love (φιλία) as a mutual, rewarding and constructive feeling, but also his portrayal of perversions of emotional relationships (see p. 246) are detectable instances of re-evaluation.
15. *Bacchai* is a good illustration of this. See discussion on p. 125ff..

NOTES

Notes to the Introduction, p. 6-48 :

1. See Taplin (1978) p. 161.
2. The limited definition of "tragic emotions" is further discussed at p. 44ff.
3. Frijda p. 241.
4. The reasons for the emphasis here are given at p. 44ff..
5. See Buck p. 314ff., especially 350-1.
6. Weinrich p. 124ff..
7. A principle similar to Weinrich's is followed by Aristotle in his advice to rhetoricians (cf. especially the beginning of book II of *Rhetoric*). The same method is also behind what is perhaps the most popular prescription in modern aesthetic theories of art of how to express emotion. T. S. Eliot's method of "the objective correlative", used for constructing a particular emotion presented in a finished artistic product is as follows : "Find a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked." Quoted by Langer (1967) vo. 1 p. 115.
8. Where this will prove not to be the case the implications are examined and discussed. See p. 80, 107, 127ff..
9. The conditions/reasons that can render verbal reports unreliable in real life are listed by Plutchik p. 5-6.
10. See, for instance, Medea's statement to the chorus regarding her deception of Kreon [*Med.* 368-75].
11. *Dictionary of Psychology* ed. Warren H.C. Houghton-Mifflin 1934. Third definition p. 91.
12. Young p. 43.
13. Izard p. 4.
14. To this psychologists offer the tentative explanation that perhaps "our perceptual-cognitive apparatus, through which we first receive the external stimuli that produce emotions, may be more discriminating than the language we use to label the emotions that the perceptions and cognitions lead us to experience". Kemper p. 85.

15. Gibson J. J., *The senses considered as Perceptual Systems* . Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1966. p.91.
16. For examples see Kemper p. 85ff..
17. Dodds (1951) comments on Aristotle's psychological insight p. 238ff.. See also Fortenbaugh.
18. See Buck p. 321ff..
19. Snell (1953) p. 21.
20. Snell (1953) p. 47ff..
21. As called by Onians p. 44.
22. For further discussion see Onians p. 23ff..
23. D. Laertios, in Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 12th ed. Weidmann. Dublin-Zurich 1966. Vol. 1 p. 450 l.15/20.
24. To this day neurological experiments confirm that there is no specific part of the human organism that stimulated will produce a belief or decision.
25. This further explains the attribution of such activity, that cannot otherwise be understood, to external powers. For example, in a sentence such as "I do not know what made me ...", since knowledge of the act is not possible, the implication would be that it has been forced on to the person from outside himself.
26. "I am conscious of the presence and criticism of a part of me which, as it were, is not a part of me, but a spectator, sharing no experience but taking note of it, and that is no more I than it is you." Thoreau H. D., *Walden* . London 1910. p. 119
27. The vocabulary of lyric poetry and its imagery of eros are also discussed at p. 137-41. Lyric poems and fragments are cited from M. L. West *Iambi et Elegi Graeci,* Oxford 1971/2 and E. Diehl *Anth. Lyrica Graeca,* Leipzig 1952.
28. Most p. 127. He sees αὐτάρκεια as a "widespread and rather perplexing feature of Greek culture" p. 126.
29. This fear is perhaps best illustrated by the negative attitude to love. For a discussion of the fear of eros and its reflection in misogyny see p. 137ff..
30. Euripides' emotional portrayal in *Orestes* and *Hippolytos* seems to me to provide an excellent illustration of this reluctance/incapability. See the discussion on p. 92-3, 196-7 and 103. Also p. 198-9, 211-3.
31. The liver has always been another important seat of emotions for the Greeks. Its importance in relation with deep emotions is still evident today in everyday

expressions in Greece. The tragedians describe it as affected by painful and powerful emotions [*Ag.* 432/*Aias* 938/*Hipp.* 1070], and in many instances in the plays when suicide is acted out or intended the liver is the primary target. In Homer [cf. *Il.* xxiv 212], it seems to have been the source of χόλος, which was believed to affect all emotional organs. In the *Hippokratic Writings,* as well as in later medical literature, unspecified fears, depressed moods or wishes for death are treated as the results of melancholic diseases, i.e. caused by χολή, which develops into one of the four humours.

32. Dodds (1951) p. 186.

33. This may not be so evident in parts of the world where emotional expression has become inhibited and consequently less powerfully experienced. Nevertheless, in many countries where emotion is still strongly felt, the discrepancy between the freedom with which it is expressed and the contempt for emotionality is striking.

34. Oatley K., "The importance of being emotional", in *New Scientist,* no. 1678, 19th August 1989. p. 33-6. The article discusses how the "properties of emotions are a biological and cognitive solution to the problems of managing goals and plans" and aiming to show their importance "in the everyday management of action."

35. See Rowe's discussion of Plato's position in *Phaidros,* especially p. 241ff..

36. Dodds (1951) p. 236ff..

37. Wiles p. 150, quoting a private communication from Taplin.

38. Langer (1953) p. 314. I am indebted to Langer whose work proved very influential to my approach.

39. Gregori F., *Die Vorbildung des Schauspielers.* Quoted in Langer (1953) p. 316.

40. Taplin (1977) p. 31-9.

41. Heath p. 144.

42. For further discussion of the kind of realism that operates in myth see p. 127-9.

43. See Easterling (1973) and (1977).

44. Heath, p. 98ff., seems to take a similar attitude to the function of unity, which he supports with a discussion of Aristotle.

45. The name is used by Bullough in his influential essay, where Distance is regarded an essential condition for the appreciation of any form of art.

46. Bullough p. 353 (as repr. 1979).

47. Taplin (1986) p. 164.

48. See Lloyd p. 90ff. and 384 ff., and Hall p. 1ff..
49. For Sifakis the continuous interplay between actors and audience is a requirement of comedy. See especially p.11ff..
50. For a more extensive *synkrisis* see Taplin (1986).
51. I found Reckford's (1987) analysis of Aristophanes' plays very helpful, and his attempt at recapturing the original spirit of comedy compelling. More specifically, for points discussed here, see p. 3ff., 25ff., and 239ff..
52. For a more extended discussion of tragedy's methods of emotional portrayal see Shisler (1942) and (1945).
53. For further discussion of this Euripidean feature see p. 252-5.
54. The stronger terms that tragedy adopts (οἰμωγή, στόνος, ὁλοφυρμός etc.) are also found in large numbers in Thoukydides towards the end of book vii.
55. Shisler (1945). "In general, indications of action for expressing emotion are almost twice as frequent in Euripides as in the other dramatists, . . ." p. 396.
56. See p. 13.
57. Heath p. 16.
58. Stanford (1983) was the first in recent times to rightly point to the neglect of the subject of emotions in the criticism of Greek tragedy, and his contribution definitely deserves great appreciation.
59. Heath p. 16.
60. Stanford (1983) p. 21.
61. Stanford (1983) p. 47.
62. Taplin (1986) suggests that the chorus of tragedy provides a model for the audience's response. p. 173.
63. Stanford (1983) p. 23ff..
64. See also Vickers p. 58.
65. Taplin (1978) p. 168.
66. Heath p. 15.

Notes to Chapter 1, p. 50-65 :

1. The potential psychological richness of the poets' original material, and its explorative analysis of human motivation, is suggested by the extensive use of the

Greek myths by psychoanalysts, especially of the Freudian school.

2. Representative examples of such views are :
(a) Szasz T., *Myth of Mental illness* , and Laing R.G., *The Divided Self*, both disputing the notion of madness as an illness. Their suggestion is that rather than a medical disorder, madness is evidence of special social needs, essentially a human response to environmental stimuli, with particular reference to familial ones.
The madman is seen as a victim suffering from a circle of conflicting needs and influences, and the circle encompasses not only the immediate family, but also the family's family, enlarging itself to eventually cover the entire society.
(b) Lemert E. M., *Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control* , whose theory links social labelling with the development of peculiar or asocial behaviour into mental disorder.
For further discussion and criticism of the above theories see Simon p. 37-9.

3. See Hippokrates *Sacred Disease* iv 36-42; more generally on Κῆρες Hesiod *Works and Days* 90-2, Plato *Laws* 937d. For a more detailed discussion see Rosen p. 74-8.

4. Words like δαιμονεῖν, or κακοδαιμονία, although they gradually lost their strict original meaning of possession by a demon, were used, more often than not, to imply madness, or at least some form of mental disturbance [cf. Xen., *Mem.* I i 9, II i 5/ Aristoph. *Ploutos* 501]. Offerings to placate Zeus, at a certain time of the year, connected with insanity, indicate a belief that the disease could be send by the god as a form of punishment. (This, in fact, may account for the meaning of εὐδαιμονεῖν, as being in good terms with the god.) For further discussion and examples see Vaughn p. 19-20.

5. For discussion of the notion as much older than Plato, see Delatte A., *Les Conceptions de l' énthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques* , Paris, "Les Belles Lettres", 1934. See also here p. 18ff..

6. To mention briefly very few examples :
In Herodotos' discussion of the madness of the Persian king Kambyses [book iii], and that of Kleomenes I [books v, vi], - both believed largely to have been caused by the gods as punishment for impiety -, other suggestions (i.e. natural causes) are offered as possible provocative agents. Other passages, for instance Demosthenes

[*Against Olympiodoros* 56], or Plato [*Ph.* 268a-d], not only reflect the melange of medical and popular beliefs, but also reveal how "being mad" becomes a topos, part of the daily speech.

7. In the scattered references to madness in comedy, - which presents an equally inconsistent mixture of medical and traditional beliefs, as characters talk indiscriminately of demons, bile, μελαγχολία, or hellebore [*Wasps* 1474-89/*Ploutos* 364-373/*Peace* 65-7/*Birds* 13f.] - , accusations of madness are hardly ever meant literally. With perhaps one exception, the case of Philokleon in *Wasps*, "mad" characters are often proven in the end to be as sane as, if not more than, their accusers. Madness is there, in as much as it serves comic exaggeration, in the same way we apply it today with rhetorical exaggeration to strange or unreasonable behaviour.

8. The theme of the *Iliad,* the wrath of Achilleus, from the moment of its birth to its resolution, is perhaps the best example of conflict in Homer. For the kind of conflict present in epic see here p. 26.

9. Simon p. 72-7 offers an excellent discussion of the action in Book xxiv as an illustration of the methods of relief for distress portrayed in Iliad. "Action alone does not suffice; discharge of emotions is not enough. The acceptance of a common humanity and a common mortality begins to achieve some therapeutic effect. At first it only allows Priam and Achilles to mourn at the same time, separately, each for his own sorrows. But the realization that each can empathize with the other brings them closer and allows for something more than pity to surface. Finally, both the disease called the "wrath of Achilles" and the implacable grief of Priam are brought to some resolution by a profound realization not only that each can be in the other's place but that each has within him parts of all others : man and woman, mother and father, parent and child, sister and brother, friend and foe, beast and human." (p. 76).

10. The incident in *Iliad* vi 150ff., is a good illustration of this ambiguity. Bellerephon is a hero who was definitely considered mad in post-Homeric days. (In Aristotle, *Problemata* 30, he is mentioned as a melancholic). In Homer, however, his state of mind is left ambiguous, but is, nevertheless, referred back to the gods. Again, it is left ambiguous whether it was a punishment, or simply the result of their hatred.

What is interesting to note is the emphasis given to his wandering [200-2], which in later days is definitely a typical characteristic of madmen. See, for example, the scholiasts on *Ploutos* 903, where the wandering of the madman has the specific purpose of avoiding men. Aretaeus [*De Caus. et Sig. Morb. Diut.* I. 6] later describes this as one of the effects of μελαγχολία, specifying its aim with φυγανθρωπεύουσι. See also below, note 14.

11. See p. 23.

12. In passages like the one quoted from the *Odyssey*, Penelope uses words like ἄφρων, βλάπτω (τάς φρένας), μάργος, to describe Eurykleia's state of mind. Μανία and λύσσα qualify the heroes in battle [cf. *Il.* xv 605ff.], and the common symptom of violence and raving provides the link as they become important terms for madness in tragedy.

13. The tension of the heroes, created by the pressure of striking a balance between excelling in prowess, without resorting to ὕβρις, and failing the demands placed on them, and the implicit links of this tension with madness are obvious in the incident mentioned in note 10 above [*Il.* vi 150ff.], where Lykourgos and Bellerephon, both punished by the gods in Homer are found in later tradition as mad. The implications become perhaps more obvious when Glaukos' failure to follow to the letter his father's demand [208-10] is attributed to divine interference stealing away his mind. Aias' story as presented in Sophokles is a stronger version and interpretation of this same kind of incident, and illustrates the "internalising" of conflict as discussed on p. 26.

14. Orestes' wandering is mentioned by Aischylos in *Choephoroi* at 1042. In *Eumenides* 75-7 Apollo describes Orestes' wandering journey as he is being pursued by the Erinyes, while Orestes himself attributes his wandering to the fact that he is driven (ἐλαύνομαι [*Ch.* 1062]) by them. (See also *Prom. Bound*, where wandering, mentioned with frequency in the scene with Io, has the same notion of "being driven" [cf. especially 576 and 900].)

Aischylos' use of what has been noted as a characteristic of madmen (see above, note 10) is clearly different from its use in later tradition, where the wandering is the result of the madman's desire to avoid men.

15. There is indeed a possibility that it was Aischylos who developed the Erinyes into the very goddesses of madness. See O' Brien-Moore p. 75-82.

16. This will become more evident in the discussion of the relevant plays.

17. See p. 82.

18. For further discussion of this see p. 223-5.

19. See p. 67.

20. A possible reason for this is suggested at p. 106.

21. Symptoms prominent in *Hippokratic Writings* ; see p. 52-4 and also the discussion of the symptoms p. 71-3.

22. Note the continuation of the Homeric χόλος, and the use of χολή in the medical corpus p. 53.

23. As said above, in note 13, Sophokles deals here with Aias' inner conflict as the result of his failure to the heroic demands on him.

24. Euripides does the same in his portrayal of Herakles' madness.

25. See relevant discussion at p. 88ff..

26. See p. 70.

27. The vocabulary here is interesting to note for comparison with its use in *Medea* . See p. 63 and Chapter 7 notes 4, 18, and 25.
Note also how closely the description of Aias at 317-25 can be paralleled to that of Medea, both as described by the Nurse and as heard from the audience before her appearance on stage.

28. This is in contrast with what happens in the conclusion of *Herakles*. There is a noticeable difference in the attitude of the two heroes to their family and friends, which brings about different results. For further discussion see p. 89-90.

29. See p. 93-5.

30. See p. 93.

31. See p. 89-90.

32. Knox (1961) p. 5.

33. The limited number of surviving plays, and especially the fact that the two tragedians worked at close quarters and clearly had an influence on each other, as well as problems with dating Sophokles' plays, are all a hindrance in deciding which playwright was the first to introduce a new idea.

Notes to Chapter 2, p. 66-85 :

1. The unexpectedness and rarity of the scene for the audience lies in the fact that gods' appearances are usually reserved for prologues or epilogues. Notice the chorus' gasping ἔα, an unmistakable indication of surprise in Euripides [cf. 514, 525, 1089/*Ba*. 644, 1280/*Med.* 1004/*Andr.* 896].

2. Πίτυλος is a word that occurs frequently in Euripides, and he often associates the repeated rhythmical movement or noise that it denotes with repetitive behaviour patterns in madness or strong emotion [cf. 1187, qualified by μαινομένωι/*I. T.* 307 μανίας πίτυλον/*Tr.* 1235f. /*Hipp.* 1464].

3. The importance of this notion lies in the fact that it illustrates that divinities do not go mad. Insanity is a purely human characteristic.

4. See p. 21.

5. The text seems to present problems here (cf. Bond). To me, however, it makes perfect sense as it stands, with οἶστρος linked with κεραυνοῦ and retaining not the limited and specific meaning of "gadfly", but of striking, sting, in which case it would not have to be repetitive. I fail to see why it would only make sense "if it is bare of all its implications of madness".

6. Silence also precedes madness at *I. T.* 282ff., and there is also, apart from "Cassandra's stubborn silence before her passionate outbursts at A. *Ag.* 1050ff., 1072ff.." (Bond), that indescribable moment in *Bacchai* 1084f., where the whole nature becomes still with a supernatural silence before 'hell breaks loose'.

7. Although Euripides relies on the general notion behind the belief that Κῆρες or Erinyes brought about madness as punishment for a murderer [870], he does not here employ them as the agents. Instead, he uses ἐβάκχευσεν.

8. A goddess who uses the popular measure of stoning madmen. See Rosen p. 87.

9. Cf. *Or.* 227, and here p. 21.

10. This is one of the noticeable differences with Aias. Herakles may sound ironical here (cf. Bond, ad loc.), but Aias is wild and almost violent in his demand to find out from Tekmessa the details of what had happened. Moreover, Aias seems to know that what surrounds him

was his own deed, while Herakles is completely ignorant of what has taken place.

11. Similarly with Aias : see p. 63.

12. For the scene that ensues see p. 88ff..

13. See p. 53-4.

14. For instance : Blaicklock or Devereux (1970).

15. For definitions and discussion of epilepsy see : Fish p. 37-9, 100, 155-9; Storey p. 95ff.; Mayer-Gross, Slater and Roth p. 445ff.; and Temkin.

16. Gregory p. 42 of Chapter 2 on *Orestes* .

17. Smith (1967) p. 293.

18. The Erinyes are the goddesses "par excellence" of madness. Their proper name is avoided here by Elektra. She uses the cult-name given to them, Εὐμενίδες, which, however, does not seem to have been the one by which they were traditionally referred to. In tragedy, the only other instance is *O. K.* 42, 486, where they are the σεμναί θεαί of the cult [cf. *Or.* 410]. In *I. T.* they are constantly called Erinyes. It would be tempting to say that Elektra is using this name to avoid bad omen, but there does not seem to be any evidence that Eumenides became a euphemistic name for the goddesses. "The widespread name Eumenides for the Furies in later literature . . . is likely to be a consequence of the enduring popularity and influence of our play." (Willink).

19. See Willink (ad loc.), who argues that φόβωι should be replaced by φόβον, giving the line the meaning that the Erinyes are giving Orestes "an ἀγών of terror". I do not think, however, that this influences the subsequent meaning that Orestes' state, i.e. madness, is the result of this ἀγών.

20. The detailed depiction of the affectionate relationship between brother and sister will be discussed more thoroughly at p. 242ff..

21. The word ταραχή is frequently associated with φρένας [cf. Pi. *Od.* 7. 30/*Ch* . 1056].

22. Willink, with whom I am inclined to agree, suggests : "257-9 would be better in the sequence 258-9-7 : 255-6 have left it open whether Or. is 'seeing' or merely 'fearing to see' the Furies; El. attempts to calm him by denying his visions, and Or. counters with 'Yes (I do see them) for (. . .) here they come galloping near me . . .'." The suggestion that lines "260-7 would be better in the sequence 260-1-4-5-2-3-6-7" is also plausible.

23. The way that Orestes' behaviour fits the modern definition of paranoia is discussed at p. 99-100.
24. Definition and description from Willis p. 4, 34-5.
25. See p. 53.
26. Simon p. 113.
27. The beast-like qualities of Pentheus have already been exposed in the description of 616ff., and I shall discuss at p. 126, 128-9 the bestial nature of the god which Pentheus' animality shares.
28. Discussed at p. 242ff..
29. Devereux (1970) p. 40.
30. The scene is discussed from a different perspective at p. 238-9.
31. Devereux (1970) p. 41.

Notes to Chapter 3, p. 86-104 :

1. For discussion of the causation of mental illness see Fish p. 2-4; Willis p. 24ff.; and Kleinmuntz p. 97ff., especially 122-3 and 125ff., especially 151.
2. See p. 8-11.
3. Everything up to the point of Herakles' arrival on stage seems to have been written with this purpose in mind. His family's past happiness is stressed [1-12, 60-8], as well as their present need and dependence at his absence [35ff., 74-6]. They are helpless suppliants, under the threat of Lykos, with nobody but Herakles to look up to for help or salvation (ἀπορίᾳ σωτηρίας) [54ff., 84f.]. It is important to note how Megara prays to him [490-96], rather than Zeus, to whom Amphitryon seems to pray in vain [339-47/498-59]. Lykos' ironical attack [40ff.] also serves as yet another excuse to glorify Herakles. The scorn he pours over Herakles [151-164] will be answered by Amphitryon at 174ff.. The chorus' ode celebrating his labours [348-435] is the climax of Herakles' eulogy (στεφάνωμα μόχθων δι' εὐλογίας). Another of Herakles' extraordinary qualities pointed out in the play is the fact that violence is his natural way of expression. This emphasizes that such exploits as the killing of Lykos are all in a day's work for him.
4. See p. 66.

5. See Gregory chapter 1 on *Herakles*, and Simon p. 134-6.

6. Note the acceptance of his tears [1353-7] :

. . . οὔτ' ἀπ' ὀμμάτων
ἔσταξα πηγάς, οὐδ' ἄν ὠ¸όμην ποτὲ
ἐς τοῦθ' ἱκέσθαι, δάκρυ' ἀπ' ὀμμάτων βαλεῖν.

7. See p. 62-4. Briefly, both are violent and stubborn, both decide to kill themselves because of disgraceful acts committed during god-sent madness, the madness of both is examined in its aftermath.

8. Barlow (1981) comments : "... one senses in Euripides in the outrage at the workings of a callous universe, in the raw violence of a terrible madness and in the hard-won decision to live on in a life that allows no conforting faiths in divine aid that one has somehow been brought to the very edges of experience. It is not just a matter of pride that motivates Herakles...., it is a matter of his facing a violation of love - the love he has for his children and which he, in his madness perverts. .... In the *Herakles* the resolve of the hero is changed through love." p. 125-6.

9. See Knox (1964) p. 28ff..

10. Orestes' relationship with women in his family, his fear of women and other related issues are discussed at p. 239ff..

11. See also Elektra's ability to unman her brother [cf. 1031], and further discussion at p. 242ff..

12. Or indeed his grandfather, who mentions pollution at 479- 481 and more clearly at 513f.. 449-69 is the only point where Orestes shows shame related to his deed. Nevertheless, it is made very clear that this αἰδώς is not because of the deed itself, but because his ἀμοιβή **to Tyndareos** was not καλή. Anyhow, 467-9, which echo Herakles' 1159, 1216, clearly are spoken out of shame and not out of concern for pollution.

13. See also p. 96.

14. For Orestes' defense at this point see p. 96.

15. There, the repressed feelings will be set free when Dionysos drives Pentheus out of his φρονεῖν [853] (ἔκστησον φρενῶν [850]). As he is at 851, (φρονῶν εὖ), Pentheus will never accept his repressed emotions and admit his repressed fantasies. Once in ἐλαφράν λύσσαν he loses the defensive control. See also p. 118-20.

16. Fuqua (1978) p. 9.

17. "A good medical term for the emotional upset that can bring on disease." Smith (1967) p. 297.

18. Rodgers : "It is, I think, this internal awareness expressed in the word synesis, rather than the strange use of the word itself, which puzzles Men. Or.'s affliction has been attributed earlier in the play both by others and by himself to the θεός, 37-8 . . . . But in reply to Men.'s question he refers not primarily to these externalised agents of madness, but to synesis, an inner consciousness. This concept Men. fails to grasp since, as his question to Or. implies, he understands his plight in terms of something external destroying him. That is why he is much happier when Or. talks of λύπη ..., since this can be understood as a form of nosos which, because it is caused from without, can be cured .... " p. 254.

19. Rodgers also seems to agree that Orestes experiences no conscious feeling of guilt. "Orestes is in obvious distress, and describes his condition as λύπη. But can one, even so, talk justifiably, in Orestes' case, of a guilty conscience in any sense? The adjective he uses to describe his deed is δεινός, a word which appears to bear no moral connotations at all, being used of things which are extraordinary or monstrous. *What he is conscious of is the full horror of the deed, a feeling which need have nothing to do with awareness of culpability or with moral guilt* ." p. 250, italics mine.

20. Smith (1967) believes that what is meant by σύνεσις is "the conscious knowledge of evil action, which may destroy moral sensibility rather than bring healing remorse." He also points out that σύνεσις - νόσος is an oxymoron. "The terms are opposed in medical writings as in common speech, and synesis is what delirium destroys." p. 297.

21. See p. 56ff..

22. Orestes' paranoia is present by the end of the play in both Pylades and Elektra. It is clear throughout the play that Elektra is in a similar physical condition with her brother [301ff.]. The strong visual hint of her covering her head like her brother [280], as well as her words [195-207], where she calls herself and her brother ἰσονέκυες [cf. 385], suggest that the similarity of their condition may extent to other aspects that Orestes' νόσος covers. As Orestes will point out [296-300], they both need care and restraint to handle their feelings of fear. Since they have, in fact, shared the deed, they

consequently have to share the illness, even if in Elektra's case it is in a lesser degree, since her participation in the action did not equal that of her brother [32]. It is also hinted elsewhere in the play [791-5], that not only Elektra, but Pylades, too, may have caught his friend's disease. This is reinforced by all the imagery of Bacchic frenzy, which is used not only of Orestes or the Erinyes [319, 338, 835], but also of Orestes and Pylades [1492].

23. For a further discussion of this theme see p. 247ff..

24. See p. 87ff..

25. See also p. 212-4 where Orestes' desire to live is compared with Phaidra's wish for death.

26. See Zeitlin (1980), especially p. 51ff. and 70ff.

27. Italics are phrases forming the modern definition of paranoid psychopath, taken from Willis p. 6, 47; and Fish p. 69, 71, 138-9.

28. Simon p. 124.

29. Simon p. 119.

30. Discussed at p. 242ff..

31. Orestes and Elektra pity themselves [1033, 1023], but there is also [566-70], Orestes' contempt of women trying to evoke pity.

32. There are numerous echoes from *Oresteia* : The imagery of δράκοντες and snakes [*Or.* 479, 1406, 1424/*Ch.* 1049f., Klytemnestra's dream 527-50, cf. also 249]; Tyndareos' words [*Or.* 526-8, also chorus 839-43] with Klytemnestra's [*Ch.* 896-8]. Parallels between the two plays suggest that the preparation for Helen's murder is a mirror-image of both Klytemnestra's killings and her own death. Apollo asks for the shedding of blood in *Choephoroi,* Pylades in *Orestes.* His speech here is a negative mirror-image of his speech in *Ch.* 900-2.

33. This is an excellent illustration (of the results of) what I have described at p. 25-6 as reluctance/ incapability to face up to responsibility for one's own emotions and emotional motivation.

34. "The silence of a mute actor, is worth drawing attention to if the dramatic reason for it overshadows the technical one. But unless something previously unnoticed is happening at *Or.* 1591-2, the opposite situation obtains : there is only a technical reason for Pylades' silence, all the more reason, one would think, for letting it pass unnoticed." Nisetich p. 49 note 14.

Notes to Chapter 4, p. 105-129 :

1. The same word was used by the chorus for Orestes (1505 : ἐπτοημένωι ποδί), as he rushes out of the palace in pursuit of the slave, after Helen's "murder". Kadmos will use the same word [1268 : τὸ δὲ πτοηθὲν τόδ' ἔτι σῆι ψυχῆι πάρα;), when he tries to find out from Agave whether her previous insane excitement is still with her.

2. In fact Teiresias explains that it is only natural (ἐν τῆι φύσει) that women should honour Aphrodite [cf. 314-8].

3. Significantly contrasted throughout with the Stranger's calmness [cf. 436-40, 622, 636, 790]. God's restraint as a model of human conduct at 641.

4. There is in Aristotle [*Rhet.* II xii] a brilliant description of the characteristics of youth, which Euripides' portrayal closely represents :

4 : εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ταχέως δὲ παύονται.

5 : καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῆι ὁρμῆι, καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἀγανακτοῦσιν, ἄν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι μὲν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις.

14 : καὶ ἅπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἁμαρτάνουσι παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον· πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσί τε γὰρ ἄγαν καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὁμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι ἅπαντα οἴονται καὶ διισχυρίζονται· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν. καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν, οὐ κακουργίαν.

5. Dodds quotes *Theognes* 1053 : Τῶν γὰρ μαινομένων πέτεται θυμός τε νόος τε.

6. The same loathing is shown by Hermione for Andromache's effort to talk some sense into her [237]. Moreover, the extreme agitation both Pentheus and Hippolytos show at the idea that they are going to be

touched betrays a fear of invasion of their own private world. It suggests their incapability to come into terms with the outside, real world, where physical, as well as emotional, proximity is possible without fear, and essential for communication. That is perhaps a reason that they both find it so hard to communicate with other people, however close they may be to them.

7. Winnington-Ingram (1948) p. 19.
8. Winnington-Ingram (1948) p. 75.
9. Winnington-Ingram (1948) p. 80.
10. See the references at p. 53 and also *Her.* 869.
11. We see the same thing happening in *Hippolytos*, especially behind the nurse's comments about Phaidra's stubbornness to yield to the natural passion of love [439-472], which culminate in :

ἀλλ' ὦ φίλη παῖ, λῆγε μὲν κακῶν φρενῶν,
λῆξον δ' ὑβρίζουσ'· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο πλὴν ὕβρις
τάδ' ἐστί, κρείσσω δαιμόνων εἶναι θέλειν·

[473-5].

The chorus in this play also talk about it at 890-6. Moreover, equally significantly, it is Hippolytos himself who, in his extreme asceticism, opposes nature and his punishment is precisely for that. His death is caused by a bull emerging from the sea. For further discussion of this see p. 207-11.

12. As Sale argues, see below, note 21.
13. For a discussion see p. 238-40.
14. Winnington-Ingram (1948) p. 105.
15. For examples and discussion of this see Gould (1987) p. 36.
16. The god embodies and expresses all three scales of the human condition : Delicate and refined [233-6, 453-60, 493], temperate, with self-restraint [cf. note 3], and finally bestial and savage.
17. Evidence from : Fish p. 64ff., and Dodds citing Binswanger, *Die Hysterie*, 626.
18. Simon p. 115.
19. The vocabulary again stresses Pentheus' association with the god : ἁβρότης and τρυφή are words belonging to the original portrayal of the Stranger. Hall, p. 128, who discusses the above characteristics with regard to the presentation of barbarians in Greek tragedy, gives examples from Plato, where excessive refinement and luxury are paired with μαλθακία, in *Rep.* 9. 590b, and with ἀκολασία, in *Gorg.* 492c. [cf. Ar. *Eth.*

Nic. 7. 114a 35-6]. It is interesting in this light to remark that this "soft" and "effeminate" portrayal contrasts with σωφροσύνη in the same way that the savagery and bestiality of both Pentheus and the god do.

20. The strain of the human weakness to accept responsibility of their emotions can be seen as the force that kills Pentheus, a force he recognises at the moment of his death as constituting his ἁμαρτία.

21. Sale (1972) p. 81.

22. Sale (1972) p. 74. See also here p. 238.

23. Sale (1972) p. 72.

24. The phenomenon must have been well known in Euripides' time; evidence for this is provided by Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* .
Sale (1972) compares evidence from the play with a psychiatric case presented in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis by M. Lewis, "A case of transvestism" (his reference of vol. no 64 is, however, given wrong). There are indeed several similarities suggesting how events in Pentheus' family life might have been formative. Like the person analysed in the above case, there is no trace of Echion in Pentheus' life, (a fact which can be contrasted with Dionysos who was in fact carried and 'given birth' by his father). His childhood was spent in a world of women, with Agave, the mother, as a most prominent figure. (Kadmos is a poor substitute of the real father and we actually see how easily and unscrupulously Pentheus can be cruel to his grandfather [250-4, cf. 263-5]. For further discussion of the absence of father within the family see p. 238ff..

25. Winnington-Ingram (1948) p. 175.

26. See p. 65.

27. See p. 8-9.

28. The definition of reality is adopted from the one provided by Bert States - quoted by Zeitlin (1980) p. 70 - in *Irony and Drama : A Poetics.* Ithaca, N.Y. and London 1971. p. 130 : "The dramatist accomplishes <to retain the drama's powers of fascination> by becoming in turn more particular, more inward, more 'free', more indifferent to moral questions, more paradoxical ..., by offering as much sensation as the traffic will bear, until he is finally performing with only a side glance at nature itself, reality observed being mainly the already formulated realities of the tradition to which he belongs. Fidelity to experience, moral qualm, truth - these are indeed perpetuated, but *in terms of the medium* ."

29. At p. 239-40.

30. On the other hand, while Herakles' behaviour during his madness attack determines his role as a madman, the singularity of the instance is representative of the fact that, as with his mythical identity, madness is but one aspect of his nature.

Notes to Chapter 5, p. 131-52 :

1. See Dion and Dion p. 273.

2. See Brehm p. 233, and Peele's excellent article "Fools for Love" in which the main differences between social psychological and clinical perspectives on love are discussed. The article mainly deals with the high degree of addiction potential (modern) love notions entail.

3. Averill J. R., "The social construction of emotion : With special reference to love.", in *The Social Construction of the Person* . Ed. K. J. Gergen & K. E. Davis. New York Springer-Verlag, 1985. p. 88.

4. See, however, Mellen S.L.W., *The Evolution of Love* : "In Egypt of the New Kingdom, starting before 1500 BC, there were Songs of Love expressing with freshness and grace the ardors, joys, and sorrows of young lovers; in China in the Early Chou Dynasty, starting before 1000 BC, there were love poems and love songs of great sensitivity and delicacy; and the much more abundant literatures of Greece and Rome include many chronicles of love, from the legendary devotion of Penelope to the passion of Dido and Aeneas." San Francisco 1981. p. 137.

5. Orlinsky p. 210.

6. See Dion and Dion p. 267.

7. In *Americans and Chinese : Passage to difference.* Honolulu, Univ. Press Of Hawaii, 1981. (3rd Ed.).

8. Goldwin Chu, "The changing concept of self in contemporary China", in *Culture and Self : Asian and Western Perspectives.* Ed. A. J. Marsella, G. DeVos, & F.L.K. Hsu. London, England. Tavistock 1985. p. 258.

9. Overwhelming evidence for this can be found in Walcot (1987) and Rudd. There is also historical evidence about persons 'in love', the most prominent amongst them being perhaps Perikles. Plutarch [*Per.* 24] informs us of his romantic relationship with an hetaira, Aspasia. This was, nevertheless, highly unconventional;

Perikles is attacked in several of Kratinos' comedies on this ground, and the relationship is presented in the worst possible colours [*Nemesis, Dionysalexandros, Cheirones*, cf. Aristoph. *Ach* 526-34].

10. Dover (1973) p. 147-8.

11. See the discussion at p. 24-6.

12. This attitude is reflected in medical and biological theories; see, for instance, King. It is prominent in Jason's words [*Med*. 573-5], but for a slightly different interpretation of Hippolytos' misogynistic statements [617ff.] see p. 210-11.

13. Stesichoros' damning statement of both Helen and her sister [fr. 223] is another illustration of this misogyny. In fact, he might have been responsible for the representation of Klytemnestra in subsequent literature as the sole agent responsible for the death of Agamemnon. Legend has it that he was blinded for his treatment of Helen in one of his poems. This was seen as the reason he produced the "Palinode", (from which Euripides' treatment of the story may have been inspired), according to which it was not Helen, but a phantom that followed Alexander to Troy.

14. For discussions of the fear of eros with special regard to its reflection in attitudes to women see Zeitlin (1978) and Halperin, Winkler and Zeitlin ed. (1990). Also Padel and Pomeroy.

15. That Athenian society treated women with discrimination from the moment of their birth is well known. A male child would be educated even if the parents were poor, but a female one would receive no education even if born to a wealthy family. She would be kept secluded in the women's quarters, till the age of marriage (normal average from the twelfth to the sixteenth year of age). Exit from the house would be exceptionally permitted on rare and specific occasions, (i.e. a religious ceremony), and even then they would have to be escorted. See Dover (1973) especially p. 145 (as repr. 1984), citing Lysias iii 6/Xen. *Oik*. 7. 5/Isaeus iii 14/Aristoph. *Birds* 130-2, *Ekkl.* 818-22,*Wasps* 788-90/Men. fr. 592 and Eur. fr. 521 as evidence.

16. Marriage was entirely regulated by men. The girl had absolutely no say in her future husband. Her obligation was to keep her honour and virtue, and she had to possess the necessary qualities for running a house. More importantly, she had to present her husband with a dowry. Even if not obligatory by law, the dowry was so

by custom, (the Athenian state had to provide dowries for daughters of men who died serving it). Lack of it could be used to imply that a marriage was not legal. Athenian law also prescribed that anyone presenting a barbarian girl as his daughter for marriage to an Athenian citizen should lose all his political rights and have his property confiscated.

17. Note, however, the implications of *Lysistrate*, especially 161ff.., discussed at p. 150.

18. See Longinos' comments [x.1ff.] on Sappho's fragment 31.

19. This might seem even more plausible if what has been said at p. 63-5 regarding Sophokles' portrayal of madness as nosos were true.

20. Again, the problems mentioned in Chapter 1 note 33 do not allow an irrevocable decision on which of the two tragedians first introduced the idea.

21. See p. 203-4 where Phaidra's assumption of responsibility is discussed further.

22. This ignorance would be, following Gorgias, ignorance of the soul (ψυχῆς), that is, of her emotional needs. Phaidra's own conclusion is that it is not through ignorance of what is good and bad that people fail to pursue the right course [377ff.]. Indeed, this other factor that influences them [cf. 382f.] could well be emotional need. Phaidra does not refer to it precisely because of her ignorance of it.

23. This is also obvious in the far more prominent portrayals of love between brothers and sisters. The strength of their feelings in tragedy, as well as the passionate way they are expressed strongly resemble those of romantic love [cf. *Antigone, Orestes,* the two *Elektra* plays]. See Walcot (1987) p. 32ff.. For a further discussion of the relationship between Orestes and his sister see p. 242ff..

24. For example : *Il.* xxiii 84, xviii 22ff., 316ff., xix 209-14, and Max. Tyr. xviii 8.

25. Cf. Aischines i 142.

26. As Dover comments (1978) p. 11 : "Comedy ... translates both heterosexual and homosexual relations into the most explicit physiological terms, with little regard for their 'romantic' aspects".

27. For example, the description of erotic response in *Phaidros* [251A-C], as shuddering, sweating, fever, pain and joy together, religious awe, has major characteristics of what is for us today romantic love.

28. See p. 131-2 on the modern notion of romantic love.

29. Present in other Greek intellectuals too; Sokrates in Xen. *Mem*. i 4 12/Antisthenes, in Xen. *Symp*. 4 38/cf. Diogenes' notorious habit, noted by Plut. 1044B.

30. Something similar to Platos' idealisation of ἔρως is in process in the modern romanticising of erotic love. The relationship between men and women that we today call "romantic" is undisputedly founded upon feelings which are not entirely distinct from the sexual emotions. Any claim to the opposite would indeed be misguided, if not hypocritical. Romantic love is essentially a physical/sexual attraction, but it tends to be idealised and is often named with the paradoxical expression "love at first sight". In general, ἔρως in Greek from as early on as Homer, generally denotes strong, mainly sexual desire. In this respect it is synonymous with words like πόθος or ἵμερος. The lyric poets' use of the word centres mostly around this meaning, and it is essentially what has been termed here at the beginning "passionate love".

31. Moralia ix. The quote is from Rudd p. 154, who goes on to strike a parallel with his comment : "(No doubt they were supposed to close their eyes and think of Hellas.)"

32. Dover (1978) p. 90.

33. Lefkowitz (1981) p. 41-7.

34. Dover (1978) p. 155.

35. Beach & Tesser p. 332.

36. Lee p. 38-67. He concludes his article with : "So many students of love conclude that one kind of love is superior to all others. . . . - the kind of love the researcher likes best is the only 'true' love.
In many forms of human activity, we seek, develop, and celebrate the richest possible variety of kinds. In art, films, ideas, fashions, books, and flowers, who would accept any researcher's notion that there was only one true kind? How ironic, that in the glorious activity of loving, so many still refuse to celebrate the wondrous human capacity for variety."

37. See p. 133.

38. As in note 36.

39. See also p. 227ff..

Notes to Chapter 6, p. 153-71 :

1. See, for example :
Snell (1961) p. 83ff., who thinks that Alkestis is acting purely out of virtue, for Admetos does not deserve to be regarded as a real husband; Rosenmeyer p. 224-9, who thinks that Alkestis' attitude is harsh and vindictive; or Beye, who approves of neither Alkestis nor Admetos.

2. Willamowitz, as quoted by Dale p. xxiv and xvii.

3. See p. 131ff..

4. In Wilson (ed.) p. 100.

5. See, for example, Smith (1960) p. 133.

6. Dale (1954) p. xxvi.

7. See Evadne's words in *Suppl.* 1059-63.

8. Notice the difference of this view with that of Lefkowitz discussed at p. 149-50.

9. See Burnett (1965) p. 243 and 251-2.

10. Ἑστία and λέχος are the two centres of a woman's life and accordingly the importance of her family in her marriage is evident in Alkestis' prayer to Ἑστία 162ff..

11. See, for example, the language of the duet in *Helen,* and its freedom of expression.

12. Lee (1988) p. 52. Burnett (1971) writes p. 35 : "Alcestis' farewells are made to her marriage bed, the symbol of temporal union; her recommendations for the future are made to the goddess of the eternal foyer, from whose altar nothing can be taken away. Nothing that she does has any reference to romantic love, *for this concept is unknown to her.* She is ruled by philia (279), the feeling proper among friends and members of the same family." (italics mine).

13. We are not here dealing with the question whether this was socially right or wrong; what is important is that it was the case.

14. See p. 27-8.

15. Compare this with Alkestis' 287. She seems to have been aware all along of what Admetos is just discovering.

16. Dyson (1988) p. 20.

17. For comparison with similar extravagance or irrational emotionality see the discussion of Evadne's sacrifice p. 151-2, which again is indicative of nothing but sincere dedication and despair. It is worth noting, however, that the roles are somehow reversed as

Admetos in his emotionality shows a rather "effeminate" behaviour, while Alkestis' composure is more "manly". Note also that her κλέος is almost exclusively a man's prerogative.

18. Any form of violation of the ancient law of hospitality was considered ἀσέβεια.

19. Smith (1960) sees the end as a disguised act of betrayal. p. 142ff..

20. Buxton p. 25-27.

21. See Burnett (1965), who sees Pheres' portrayal as that of a hypocrite. p. 248.

22. Rosenmeyer p. 240.

23. Rosenmeyer p. 240.

24. For Diotima ἔρως as real love is identified with ἀρετή.

25. The same theme is present in *Medea*, where she confronts Jason on just such an issue : what constitutes real happiness.

26. Dale p. xviii.

27. See Buxton p. 28, who also points out that the term "pro-satyric" is useful in as much as it denotes the audience's expectation.

28. Dale p. xxf.

29. Dale p. xxi.

30. Such conventionalised commonplaces are scattered all over tragedy; for example, *Med.* 1090ff. (see, however the discussion at p. 225ff.), *Hipp.* 258ff..

31. See p. 127.

32. For *Alkestis* as a two-actor play see Dale p. xixff. and on 1146.

33. See p. 103-4.

34. This actually supports the argument that Euripides is aiming to portray the inexpressibility of emotions.

35. As we shall see in other instances (e.g. Medea, Phaidra), it is remarkable how often in Euripides the two are not just at variance but actually contradictory.

36. In fact there is a line in the play that seems suggestive in determining its nature. At 381 Alkestis says to Admetos : χρόνος μαλάξει σ'· The idea that "time heals" is extraordinary, indeed unique, in the context of tragedy. Combined with the questioned fatality and finality of death, it seems to postulate for its audience a frame of mind completely different from the one required in tragedy.

Notes to Chapter 7, p. 172-197 :

1. 908/911-3 : Note how Jason credits Medea with sincerity and praises (αἰνῶ) her as σώφρων when she presents him with the obedient behaviour expected from a woman.

2. There is one instance of eros at 1080, meaning simply desire, need. Despite the attractiveness of Bradley's interpretation of the play, he still seems to me to misinterpret eros in seeing it as the "life-renewing eros which he fights to control in the presence of the veiled woman." p. 125. See Dale ad loc.

3. ' 'Ανδρεία, manliness or courage, was a cardinal virtue for the Greeks. Medea's language towards Jason is strongly abusive, while Jason will use abusive terms only at the end of the play.

4. The verb here, found - from among the three tragedians - only in Euripides, has a strong erotic context. See Pucci p.193, n. 23.
Nevertheless, it is also indicative of Medea's portrayal in heroic terms (see below, note 25). See p. 63 and Chapter 1 note 27 for similarity of vocabulary with *Aias* .

5. The word is used with the same meaning in *Hipp.* 644, and *Ion* 545. See also its occurence in *Andromache* 938.

6. In the same way that Helen, in her apology to Menelaos [*Tr.* 914ff.] blames Kypris for her irrational and irresponsible passion for Paris. See especially 946-50, but also Hekabe's response to this at 987-90. See also discussion at p. 25.

7. Cf. 187f. For a discussion of lion imagery see : Wolff (1979), from where comparisons can be drawn here of Medea as : _ A hero : In *Iliad* the imagery is used at heroes' ἀριστεῖα: They are portrayed as driven, relentless, and courageous - to the point of self-destruction. [*Il.* xii.46, xvi. 753; cf. xii. 305f., xx. 172f.].
_ Protector of her household and an avenging figure [*Od.* xxii. 402ff., xxiii. 48; cf. *Il.* xvii. 541f.].
_ A monster, beyond the pale of humanity [*Od.* ix. 292f.].

8. See p. 11.

9. See Pucci p. 63ff., whose analysis of Medea as manipulative and exploitative has heavily influenced my discussion here.

10. Medea may be already determined on the eventual plan of revenge, in which case her careful concealment of

the murder of the children renders her exposition intentionally incomplete.

11. See Schadewaldt p. 189.

12. Euripidean tragedy is full of references to this reality, whether directly [*Andr.* 675, 940/*I.T.* 219/*Suppl.* 790-2/*Herakl.* 579f., 592f./Kreusa's situation in Ion etc.], or with misogynistic or ironical statements [*Med.* Jason's 569-75, also the chorus' 1290-2 and Medeas' 384f., 407f., 889-90, 945/*Hipp.* 617ff.].

13. There is a reference to this in *Alkestis,* where ὀθνεῖος and θυραῖος are used by Admetos for Alkestis. See Reckford's discussion (1968) p. 354.

14. Knox (1977) p. 283 (as repr. 1983).

15. The episode with Aigeus is also often regarded as divine guidance, its function being to form Medea's plan of revenge as childless old age for Jason [cf. 714f. καὐτός ὄλβιος θάνοις.]. Aigeus is unhappy and feels threatened because he cannot have children; Medea says to Jason [1396] : οὔπω θρηνεῖς· μένε καὶ γῆρας.

16. Cf. Herodotos vi. 86γ2

17. For example, Helen in *Troiades,* the messenger in *I.T.*. See also the discussion at p. 25.

18. As Knox points out (1977) p. 278ff. (as repr. 1983), Medea is "in sharp contrast with the Sophoklean hero" (see below, note 25), ". . . quite sure, from start to finish, that the gods are on her side." Rather than abandoned by them, she feels she is "their instrument and associate".

19. I am inclined to read 967f. as having a double meaning.

. . . · τῶν δ' ἐμῶν παίδων φυγὰς
ψυχῆς ἄν ἀλλαξαίμεθ', οὐ χρυσοῦ μόνον.

Whether Medea uses the word φυγὰς to mean the sentence of their banishment, or with the possible meaning of escape/rescue, condensely what she means is that she would exchange her very soul to ensure what is best for her children. So, what sounds probable only as a figure of speech, Medea will literally do, as she will need to transform the very essence of her self as a woman and mother in order to achieve what she regards as best for the children.

20. It is interesting in this light to note how the language and manner of her farewell to the children is similar to that used at separation scenes with children who are either dead or are soon to die. For further discussion of this see p. 220ff..

21. Closest comparisons can be drawn with Artemis' cruel heartlessnes in *Hippolytos* (note the similarities in language), and Dionysos' in *Bacchai*, and Apollo's arbitrariness in *Orestes*.

22. There are many other striking verbal correspondences. For example, 1253 and 1329 with 97; 113 and 1346 with 114.

23. That Medea is perhaps Euripides most actively aware heroine becomes more evident in comparisons with other heroines. His women portraits present numerable analogies worth noting with the type created in *Medea*. What gives us a different woman each time is the way the characteristics are presented. A good concentrated illustration of this is in *Andromache*, where :

(a) Andromache is the opposite of Medea in passivity [cf. 4, 213ff.]. Her conformity with established social demands, and the male mentality in proclaiming women's inferiority, is a contrast to Medea, who rejects male standards and claims equality in moral judgement.

(b) Hermione, who regards sexual matters and a woman's passion as a matter of foremost importance to all women [241], shares Medea's attitude, and is, in fact in the same position with her : she is the lawful, displaced, and revengeful wife. The important difference is that, unlike Medea, she is as much of a slave to men as Andromache is. Note especially 943-53, where nothing but male mentality and beliefs are reflected; cf. 926-56 : There is nothing Hermione can do by herself to help herself; she is totally dependent on males. She blames other women, claims she has been ill advised, while Medea remains totally uninfluenced.

(c) Again Hermione is the opposite of Medea in terms of age, nationality, family situation, and social position. In this respect Medea is represented by Andromache, who is accused of barbarity [170ff., 243], as she is by Jason [536-8, 1339f.], and for both women their λέχος is not reputable, being βάρβαρον [*Med.* 591], or δοῦλον [*Andr.* 30].

See also Medea's comparison with Phaidra, p. 205, 214-5, 218-9.

24. See Jason's comment, that no Greek woman would ever have done this [1339f.], which follows paradoxically the chorus' just given example of Ino [1282-9]. Euripides once more seems to play with ambivalence. In fact, Medea seems to originally not have been foreign. "Her

conversion into a barbarian was almost certainly an invention of tragedy, probably of Eur. himself." For discussion of the relevance of Medea's foreigness to her being "a paradigmatic transgressive woman" see Hall p. 35 and notes 108-110.

25. For a discussion of Medea's portrayal along the lines of a (Sophoklean) hero see Knox (1977) p. 274-8 (as repr. 1983).

26. Medea's emphatic femininity is an element very much present in the play. Unlike the Aischylean Klytemnestra, with her manly nature, or the Sophoklean Antigone, Medea retains her feminine nature. The understanding and sympathy she achieves in her speech to the women prove this. Also Medea uses deceit and poison - typically female skills. Nevertheless, she is served by her sophia [285, 677, 741] and therefore she is far more resourceful and eventually successful than any other woman in tragedy.

Notes to Chapter 8, p. 198-219 :

1. Phaidra's description here is based on the tradition, especially strong in the lyric poets, of presenting eros as an invasion, and the individual as victim to his arrows. See p. 139-41.

2. The popular belief of madness as possession by a god, which will be repeated by the Nurse at 236-8. Hekate is specifically mentioned in the Hippokratic treatise intended to refute such beliefs [*Sacr. Dis.* 1]. The choice of Korybantes, rather than Bacchants or mainads may be indicative here of what will soon become evident, that we are not dealing with madness. Phaidra's condition is throughout, in contrast with Herakles' or Orestes' not described in Bacchic terms.

3. More about this link between pain and madness in women's nature and motherhood at p. 225ff..

4. Unlike what we see in Herakles' [*Her.* 1089ff.], and Agave's [*Ba.* 1264ff.] recovery scenes.

5. For indeed, as Barrett suggests (ad loc.), the Nurse's lines [233-5] show that it is most likely Phaidra had been acting out her delirious wishes with gestures.

6. Note also παρακόπτει. Cf. *Ba.* 33 : παράκοποι φρενῶν.

7. For example, in the discussion at p. 25 and Chapter 7 notes 6 and 17.

8. See the introductory paragraphs of this chapter.

9. Hekabe ironically points out this same thing to Helen in *Troiades* [976ff.].

10. Knox (1952) regards Phaidra's ἐμάνην as nothing more than a reference to the madness of passion. p. 314 (as repr. 1983).

11. See Barrett's discussion at 241.

12. Which is something Orestes never does.

13. As seen, for example, in *Alkestis* . See p. 158-9.

14. 504-6 do not seem to me to mean that Phaidra is, or has been, contemplating this. At 506, τοῦθ' ὅ φεύγω, may indeed mean her passion or the dishonour of it, but not giving in to it. See her preceding speech [391ff.], where it is made clear that what she is fighting is her eros; the emotion, the desire which she finds disgraceful and impossible to live with in itself.
In the first *Hippolytos,* Phaidra approached Hippolytos herself and this provoked a strong reaction in its audience. It could be plausibly suggested, therefore, that in this second version of the myth, Euripides, wishing to explore the social reality that the actual relationship between the first play and its spectators highlighted, chose to present an altogether different portrait of Phaidra. This is supported by her anxious concerns about the way the society will judge her, in view of its conventions, for her passion per se.

15. Note the vocabulary used to describe this : she keeps her δέμας ἁγνόν from Δάματρος ἀκτάς [138].

16. This becomes more obvious by the fact that when she talks of her own accord her speech will reveal judgements and decisions [337-87, 388-404], not personal feelings. Being an internaliser she speaks in impersonal terms. Her physical response is large and frequent as we have seen, but her overt reaction (emotional expression) is very little.

17. Her portrayal here resembles that of Medea's un-responsiveness [*Hipp.* 290, 304f./*Med.* 27-9, 176f.]. See p. 179-80.

18. See also Pentheus' attitude [*Ba.* 343f.], p. 110 and Chapter 4 note 6.

19. Highly defensive individuals are reported as experiencing love less frequently, and are more cynical in their attitudes toward love than less defensive persons. To protect their vulnerable self-images, because of threat of self-revelation, they respond less positively to another individual who engages in intimate (self-)disclosure as well as to those of the opposite sex. Evidence in Dion and Dion p. 267-70.

20. See, for example, for Phaidra 273, 297, 394, also 498-506, and Hippolytos' passionate outburst 601ff.. Note especially 603, 604, in contrast with his return to reason at 660, and the silence he keeps about Phaidra's secret to the end. Knox (1952) sees a pattern through the play, of silence representing judgement and speech passion. p. 313ff. (as repr. 1983).

21. They did meet in Euripides' first *Hippolytos,* as well as in Seneca's *Phaedra* .

22. Even the sight of Phaidra dead provokes in him only a cold, amazed : μεγίστου θαύματος τόδ' ἄξιον· [906], for he cannot make the obvious connections.

23. Conacher p. 31ff..

24. Aristotle *Rhet.* II xii, quoted in Chapter 4 note 4.

25. His disgust and contempt [614, 653] do not share Pentheus' curious fascination.

26. His bastard descent is hinted elsewhere [307-10, 962f.], and at the end of the play we are again reminded of it [1455].

27. As has already been seen, Orestes and Phaidra present indeed many close parallels. Some more parallels between the plays are : The suggestion of heredity stressed in *Orestes,* is hinted powerfully by Phaidra herself [337-41]. The Nurse and Elektra are portrayed in a parallel manner in the way they influence Phaidra and Orestes - through their strong personalities, deep affection and close bond. It is also interesting, in the light of similarities, to draw comparisons with Phaidra as a character who is of a more mature age. She seems at the beginning unable to find a way of combining reason with emotion. She starts off with using extreme reason and disregarding her emotions. Then she reaches the other extreme and lets her emotions get full control over her, abandoning any reasoning. In the end, however, she is capable of realising where her attitude is leading, and manages to assert her freedom as an individual, even if it is with her last, fatal act. She reaches her decision with a fine balancing of reason and emotion, and this is

perhaps why her act becomes understandable and acceptable to her audience.

28. Repeatedly stated at 138-40, 322, 401f., 599f., 723.

29. It is interesting to note here that Phaidra dies through her own choice and decision. In the earlier version of *Hippolytos,* her death is the sole unqualified (i.e. not honourable) alternative, forced on her after her disgraceful acts.

30. See Phaidra's interesting statement that her χεῖρες μὲν ἁγναί, φρὴν δ' ἔχει μίασμά τι. [317]; compare with *Orestes* 1603-6, where Orestes, whose χεῖρας as well as his φρένας have a μίασμα, resorts once more to his favourite method of projection.

31. See p. 121.

32. Evidence in Fish p. 64ff..

33. Both are women talking to women about women's problems and conditions.

34. Phaidra's honesty of beliefs is evident in her emotional attitude towards them, expressed in strong terms. The contradiction between the passages of her emotional activity and her more composed speech does not reveal a hypocritical attitude, but, rather, the terrible conflict in herself between desire and duty (about which she **feels** strongly) that constitutes her dilemma. Otherwise, where does her suffering lie? For a contrasting opinion see Fitzgerald p. 20-44.

35. Let us not forget that Phaidra is a married woman. What are, or have been, her feelings towards her husband? There are two inferences that could be made here. Either what Phaidra feels for Theseus was never thought of by her as love, or the difference in what she experiences now indicates to her that she is unfamiliar with what these feelings are.

36. For lyric examples see p. 139-41.

37. One argument against this could perhaps be that motherly love is by nature stronger. Neither this, however, nor the importance Phaidra lays on her honour, which she will not disgrace for Hippolytos' sake, had any influence on Helen, for example, when she deserted her children and ignored her honour to follow Paris. Moreover, Phaidra is considerate of her husband, whom she does not wish to harm, while on the other hand she will not hesitate to harm Hippolytos.

38. See p. 25 and 137ff..

39. Ibykos 287, see p. 140-1.

Notes to Chapter 9, p. 220-55 :

1. This motif, constantly repeated in separation scenes, of γηροβοσκία is discussed further at p. 226.

2. In *Suppliants* [1114ff.] too, where despite the collective mourning the lament's vocabulary and emotional activity is in no way different from other separation scenes [cf. 1134-8, 1160, 1163f.], the children are no longer alive to respond to the mothers' emotions. Paradoxically, however, their irrevocable absence enhances the emotionality, as the mothers take their leave from children that can utter no words of consolation, and can show no last loving feelings.

3. The same disillusionment at the destroyed relationship with a god is shown by Agave in *Bacchai* [1368-87]. Both her words [cf. Κιθαιρὼν μιαρὸς 1384], as well as the actions (getting rid of the dionysiac paraphernalia) that most likely accompany them, reveal her bitterness at the betrayed promises of the god to his mainads.

4. That γηροβοσκία is a cultural pattern surviving in modern Greece largely because of its social importance is attested by the fact that, γηροκομῶ still being the verb describing the looking after of one's old parents, γηροκομεῖον is the word used for what is an "old people's home" in this country. Unsurprisingly, the existence of such "homes" is a rather recent phenomenon, still much dreaded and resented by the majority of people.

5. Something similar happens in *Ion*. Kreousa's violation - physical as well as emotional - is, like Medea's, to both apects of her womanhood and is enhanced by the identity of the violator.

6. See p. 196-7.

7. Loraux p. 44.

8. See Loraux p. 52ff., where she also discusses the example of Io in *Prometheus Bound* .

9. ὠδίνες : cf. *I. A.* 1234f./*Ph.* 30; ὠδίς for the child: cf. *Ion* 45/*I. T.* 1102/*Ph.* 355.

10. Note that in the Hippokratic treatise *On the Diseases of Young Maidens* symptoms of madness are seen as resulting from childnessness.

11. See p. 178-80.

12. See p. 173ff..

13. Knox (1952) p. 325f. (as repr. 1983).

14. I am inclined, however, to disagree with Knox (1952) that "Even in his mourning for Phaedra he is conscious of his public stature (817), ...". p. 326 (as repr. 1983). The interpretation depends on whether at 817 we read ὦ τάλας instead of ὦ πόλις. I follow Diggle's text, and agree with Barrett, who opts for τάλας. Theseus' role as ruler is deliberately suppressed while he expresses his feelings towards his wife, so as to enhance the violent strength of his grief. See Barrett at 817f. and 817-51.

15. See also Luschnig's comments on the Theseus - Hippolytos relationship p. 95ff..

16. See Fitzgerald p. 33ff.

17. Hippolytos himself does not at any point express resentment towards his father regarding his illegitimacy. For discussion of the effects of illegitimacy on his behaviour see p. 210-11.

18. In *Ion* too there is a reflection in Xouthos' words [578-80] of Jason's materialistic attitude.

19. Nevertheless, in both instances we have the depiction of the past relationship as loving and close in contrast to the evidence of the agon.

20. See Herakles' recovery scene p. 69-70.

21. Note : παιδὶ σῷ, [1071], τοῦ φιλτάτου σοι παιδὸς [1112], ὦ τέκνον, [1113], παιδός [1123], ὦ παῖ [1133], ὦ . . . πάτερ [1136], οὐμὸς ἶνις τάλας [1182], ἐμὸς ἐμὸς ὅδε γόνος ὁ πολύπονος [1192], ὦ τέκνον [1204], ἰὼ παῖ [1210], τέκνον [1213].

22. See p. 87.

23. Iphis' experience at losing both his children is painful enough to provoke second thoughts as to whether there is any purpose in having children in the first place [1087-93]. As he talks about the loneliness and worthlessness of the life that awaits him in an empty house, with no purpose in life and, more importantly, no consolation, he provides a rare example of a father making a statement that we have seen belonging to motherhood.

24. Similar affectionate behaviour from old people is present in *Andromache* between Peleus and Andromache, a portrayal that contrasts with Menelaos' relationship with Hermione. Also in *Bacchai*, between Kadmos and Agave [1329ff.], where Agave's ambiguous emotions towards her father while she is mad [1202-58] again suggest a different attitude on behalf of the father when

he was younger. Note, however, that all instances are between father and daughter.

25. And, of course, that between Hekabe and Kassandra. Nevertheless, that scene in itself is exceptional.

26. More simply and more generally speaking, there seems to be a tendency towards portrayal of the less specific mother - child relationship.

27. Gould (1987) p. 37.

28. Simon p. 114.

29. See p. 107-8.

30. Sale (1972) p. 74.

31. See p. 108, 109.

32. Zeitlin (1980) p. 66

33. Mitscherlich A., *Society Without the Father*, New York, 1970. Italics are used for quotes from Mitscherlich, p.14, 285, 53, 82, 186, 49, 300-1.

34. For further discussions of the ("model") relationship between younger and old generations in *Orestes* see Falkner (1983) and Fuqua (1978). For comparison with *Philoktetes* see Fuqua (1976).

35. Zeitlin (1980) p. 63ff..

36. Greek mourning ritual has always involved much tearing and scratching of body and face, beating of breast, pulling and cutting of hair. As is the case in the tragedies, this was essentially a practice restricted to women. See Alexiou, especially p. 22.

37. See p. 91.

38. For more extensive discussion of similarities between Elektra and her mother see Gellie p. 4ff.. At the same time, the daughter is portrayed, in other aspects, as the very opposite of her mother. Klytemnestra hates her husband, while Elektra passionately loves her father; she has stubbornly and proudly remained a virgin, while her mother unashamedly had a lover.

39. It is interesting in this context to remember that the Erinyes represent the mother, and compare this with Agave's "emasculation" of Pentheus.

40. There are strong erotic undertones in the relationship between Elektra and Orestes. See for instance *El.* 1321-33 and *Or.* 1041-55.

41. Menelaos does not prove his claim of family loyalty [482/486], and Helen's original kind attitude is only to be revealed as hypocritical (as, in fact, Elektra suggests [126- 31]), when at the moment of their danger all she will do is seal their property. Helen's and

Menelaos' attitude comes across as naive if not absurd, especially when Helen asks Elektra to take her offerings to Klytemnestra's grave [94ff.], and when Menelaos expects to find Orestes on good terms with his mother [371-3].

42. See Wolff (1968) p. 353 (as repr. 1983).

43. Smith (1979) p. 177ff..

44. Vickers p. 83. See for instance *Hekabe* [1073, 1078f., 1173, 1265] with regard to reduction to a beastlike state, and Medea, who because of her horrific revenge is described as a λέαινα, with a nature more savage τῆς Τυρσηνίδος Σκύλλης [*Med.* 1342f.].

45. Many more examples of metaphors drawn from beasts/ wildness are provided by Boulter p. 104-6. As μητροφόντης Orestes is described by Tyndareos as δράκων, the imagery strongly echoing *Choephoroi*, where the word is used for the murderous couple Klytemnestra and Aigisthos [1047] as well as for the Erinyes [1050]. τὸ θηριῶδες is also used for Orestes' act [479, 524]. See also [678f., 836, 1271f., 1316, 1401, 1459].

46. Zeitlin (1980) p. 67.

47. See p. 39.

48. In the case of *Phil.* 820 the physical reason of his disease is provided for Philoktetes' collapse, the unbearable pain of his soar leg.

49. The weakness and vulnerability of old age seem to be of particular interest to Euripides. See Falkner (1985) who sees this as an indication of Euripides' interest in "yet another constitutent group in society". p. 41.

50. Peleus' verbalised silence is worth noting as it highlights the externalising nature of drama. See discussion on p. 40.

51. The comment of the chorus [545f.] and the fact that he is in need of an attendant [551f.], which are typical characteristics of old age (see Falkner 1985).

52. There are indeed some problems here with the text [see Lesky (1977)], but it seems that in whichever way it might have originally stood, the argument behind Iolaos' collapse would still be valid.

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